1: Longrigg MH1 Iraq MH1

647, 721, 727, 728

[For an account of the British invasion and campaign in Iraq in 1914, the subsequent occupation and the British war-time administration of Iraq in 1917-18, the civil administration by the British from the end of the war in 1918 to 1920, see category 116, pp. 77-121.]

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impassable mountain or swamp. The governing authority was foreign, unloved, and deadly poor. None but a minute fraction of the population was ready to welcome efficient government; the greatest part repudiated it as alien to their ways and interests. The 'Iraqis were and are of independent, individualistic character, unaccustomed to control. Faction in the towns and endless tribal warfare had been the rule for centuries. The deep division between town and tribe was itself a major obstacle to uniform administration; to it was added the gulf between the Sunni and Shi'i communities. Such was the territory which for four centuries the Ottoman Government, acclaimed almost universally by Western opinion as the world's worst, had been trying to administer.

The Government of 1900 of which we speak, and its approach to these problems, differed indeed essentially from that of three generations earlier. In the original form of Ottoman rule, which was pure Oriental despotism, all power was the Sultan's. He stood at the head of an elaborate hierarchy of stratified functionaries, and was represented by governors locally as autocratic as himself. Rule was for his sole benefit and grandeur; no law existed save the Shara', capriciously enforced; no limit or appeal restricted the local powers of Wali or Mutasallim. All posts were for sale, including those of the highest functionaries.

Changes in this régime had been forced upon the Ottoman dynasty early in the nineteenth century by its military defeats, which compelled it to invoke European military teachers. And while successive Sultans were led by this necessity to rebase the conception and machinery of Government with a new body of law and procedure and a new class of officials, other modernizing agencies were at work: those of trade and shipping, educational foundations, travellers, missions, modern communications, and a press. To this impact of the West urgency was imparted by the attitude of Turkey's European creditors and the reaction in Europe to the miseries of the Christian provinces successively detached from the Empire. Under such pressures was evolved the half-modern, pretentious, overburdened, needy Turkish Government of the nineteenth century. For seventy years before 1900 'Iraq had enjoyed the blessings of 'reformed' Government, had seen its Administration modified first on paper and then in fact, with every new meticulous Ordinance in Midhat Pasha's revised wilaya system. With regulations to apply and functions specialized, a numerous and influential class had come into existence, the effendis. Neither landowners nor merchants nor divines, they were of a middle and secular class, complacently urban. 'Iraqi by race except in the highest posts, the effendis formed a great part of the social element receptive of Turkish culture, and acted as the

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main bridge between Turk and Arab. Old-fashioned Muslims or cynical free-thinkers, xenophobe or professedly cosmopolitan, every type was to be found in their ranks. Barely literate, persistent Turkish-speakers, backward but decorous in social habit, uniform in their travesty of European dress, too frequently corrupt and remote from all spirit of public service, they identified the body politic with their own class, contemptuous of tribe and cultivator. Ill-paid and ambitious, they could not prudently rely on merit alone; nepotism was rampant, no intrigue or appeal neglected. The civil service of 'Iraq in 1900 must, by any save contemporary Asiatic standards, rank low; yet it contained, at all levels and all times, not a few honest and high-minded men.

The division of Turkish provincial territory into wilayas, sanjaqs, qadhās, and nahiyas is familiar. The administrative units corresponded generally to no geographical divisions, and were often ill conceived. Changes of status and boundary and the creation of new units were not uncommon. The 'Iraq of 1900 showed, in all, four fewer sanjaqs than there were liwās in 1950, a score fewer qadhās, two score fewer nahiyas. Qadhās were graded as first, second, and third class; they differed no less in size, population, and administrative difficulties. Some were suburban, others wholly tribal, others, such as Razaza or Kuwayt, no more than nominal. Walis and Mutaṣarrifs were appointed by imperial decree, lesser administrative officials locally by the Wali. Frequent repostings and dismissals reflected an uneasy underworld of intrigue and tale-bearing, and were fatal to continuity.

The Wali as the representative of the Sultan dealt with the heads of local communities, foreign consuls, and the greater tribal chiefs. The general and non-departmental administration was in his hands. He directed the municipalities, 'settled' tribal disputes which defied settlement, heard multifarious grievances, and through the Daftardar influenced or controlled the all-important field of land revenue. At every wilaya and subordinate headquarters sat an Administrative Council composed partly of officials, partly of elected members who included Christian and Jewish representatives. The maintenance of law and order depended upon the Gendarmerie—the *Zaptié* familiar to European travellers. This force, organized and commanded on military lines, was administered by the War Office but placed at the disposal of the local Government. Ill-paid and greedy, half-equipped and unkempt and used for every purpose of escort, message-carrying, and even domestic service, the *Zaptié* yet lacked neither loyalty nor hardihood, and did much or most to keep the administration in being.

Over many of the departments operating in his area, the local

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Governor had only a general power of co-ordination and discipline. These departments, directed from Istanbul, included the administration of justice: a field in which Turkish law had by 1900 developed far beyond its Shara' origins. The composite and ill-coded civil Majalla, a mass of *ad hoc* legislation, and a body of French commercial law had been adopted. The resulting codes were not only imperfectly drafted and full of anomalies, but too often quite unsuited to 'Iraqi needs. The Courts which administered them represented a comprehensive and not ill-considered system spoiled by the delays and abuses in its practical working, by its exclusive use of a foreign language, and by the underpaying of the judges. The privileged position of foreigners, protected by their outdated and resented Capitulations, was assured by special arrangements in both civil and criminal matters.

Abundant work for the Courts was provided by the department of Land Registry, or Tapu. It had been inaugurated in 'Iraq by Midhat Pasha as a land-settlement and stabilizing measure; but in unsurveyed agricultural lands, largely in immemorial tribal possession and far from conforming to the official view that 'unalienated State lands' were at Government's free disposal, the Tapu system could do little save create new disputes, bestow rights on parties powerless to exercise them, and destroy the best elements in the shaykh–tribesman relationship. The immense practical difficulties of land settlement in 'Iraq were unrealized, and the whole essential background of cadastral survey and social control was lacking.

In the field of medicine and quarantine the standard of Turkish doctors (rarely Turkish by race) was low, their assistants and inspectors were untrained, their equipment was inadequate. The medical services, accustomed to rely on mission hospitals and dispensaries, were scanty in the towns and non-existent outside. Educational services made a slightly better showing, though standards were everywhere below those of the foreign or foreign-inspired mission schools. Free primary schools, well organized on paper, existed at most towns, and secondary also at the larger. Industrial schools had been founded at Baghdad and Basra, and higher theological learning was available. The military educational system was distinct. The sons of civil notables and high officials went to Istanbul to complete their Turkish education, and a few sons of the greater shaykhs to the Tribal College. The teaching profession was ill reputed and unpopular, its methods primitive.

These do not conclude the list of the 'imperial' departments. The Public Debt administration, handling selected revenues on behalf of the European creditors of the Porte: the local offices of the Régie Co-intéressée who held the monopoly for the manufacture

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647 and sale of tobacco products; the Customs Department; all these likewise were of no direct concern to the Wali. The same applies to the rare public works entrusted to the wilaya engineer, and to the Department of Pious Bequests (Awqaf) The Wali could venture on no official interference in the Oman-Ottoman Administration, none in the favoured Saniya. The last-named had, by 1900, acquired for its master by favourable 'purchase' almost one-third of the cultivable lands of Baghdad wilaya, and very large estates in Basra and Mosul.

701 The VIth Army, whose territorial area was coterminus with 'Iraq, was reckoned as the least excellent of the main Turkish formations. It consisted of two divisions of infantry, a cavalry division, and a formation of artillery. The units of every arm were widely scattered, and constantly changed station according to the needs of the tribal warfare. Transport was hired for the occasion, supply and medical arrangements were primitive, equipment was shabby and deficient. The staffs and organization of the Army were in general those of modern forces; but the troops were misused, discipline was lax, pay irregular. Service with the Army was
702 by conscription, from which non-Muslims and many classes of Muslims were free on payment; tribesmen were wholly exempt. Compulsory service was commonly prolonged beyond the legal three-year period, and this, with the liability to be sent to a grave in the Yaman or Europe, combined to make conscription of all Turkish institutions the most resented. Nevertheless, no Arab province supplied more officers to the Turkish Army, or of higher standard, than did 'Iraq.

706 The Navy at Basra, a puny and decayed service, was commanded by a commodore. Its ostensible duty was that of river police, in which it signally failed. With a shore establishment of some two hundred, its only craft in 1900 were an ancient corvette unable to leave its moorings, the *Kilid al-Bahr*, and a small armed paddle-steamer, the *Alus*.

642 This Turkish Government of 'Iraq, at whose task, evolution, and organization we have now glanced, had irreproachable nominal objectives—order, progress, and public advantage. Its regulations were comprehensive and repeatedly revised: its administrators contained men of education, experience, and knowledge of local conditions. It was, nevertheless, severely criticized by its own servants and not less by outside observers. Excessively centralized, it was bound by a thousand ill-applicable rules which precluded local initiative; it was ill-served, ill-housed, ill-equipped, and incapable of maintaining forces adequate to its clearest needs. It lacked a breed of loyal and vigorous men able to grasp the essentials of ruling a backward tribal territory, and trusted by their superiors.

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openly. A conference was planned for Kuwayt in January 1914, to be attended by representatives of the Sharif of Mecca, ibn Sa'ud, ibn Rashid, Sayid Ṭalib himself, and 'Ujaymi Pasha of the Muntafiq; but Turkish opposition, and the hesitations of these potentates, contrived to prevent the meeting. In March Sayid Ṭalib announced, surprisingly, that his differences with the Government were now composed; he received a high Turkish decoration and a choice of posts as Ambassador, Senator, or Wali.

Nationalist politics were, in the summer of 1914, eclipsed by the excitement of elections to the Turkish Chamber. Elections for the Wilaya General Councils followed. The assembly of these bodies produced little of interest, though open conflict between their ostensible powers and the reality of centralized Turkish control could not be far distant. The telegram of July 1914, announcing the assassination of the Archduke at Sarajevo, reached an 'Iraq whose political problems were all unsolved.

The 'Iraqis prominent in the politics of this period included a number for whom, or for whose families, a distinguished future was reserved. Such were the 'Umari, Jalili, and Khayyaṭ families of Mosul, the Naqibs, Basha'yans, and Mandils of Baṣra, and in Baghdad the Chadirchis (Rif'at Bey and his son Ra'uf), the Suwaydis (Yusif Effendi and three sons), the Kurdish Babans (Isma'il Ḥaqqi Bey and Ḥamdi Bey), the Pachachis, the Daftaris, the Rawis, the Ḥaydaris, the Alusis, the Jamilzada, the Khudhayris, the house of Shawkat Pasha, and a dozen more. The venerable Naqib of Baghdad, 'Abd al-Raḥman al-Gaylani, took no part in politics save for an attitude of conservatism and deep respect for the Caliph; his sons were reputed to be moderate nationalists.

2. ADMINISTRATION: THE LAST PHASE

The last years of the Turkish administration, apart from some well-intentioned striving for improvement after 1909, showed few new elements. It contrasted, indeed, favourably with the struggles, corruptions, and near-anarchy of neighbouring Persia; and it did not lack its European apologists. Mr. Crow, Consul at Baṣra, was heard to call the Turks '. . . genial and agreeable exponents of paternal despotism and *dolce far niente*', and David Fraser in 1908 recorded that 'the Moslem peoples of Asiatic Turkey have no deep-rooted desire for reform . . .: Turkey, from an oriental point of view, has never been a badly governed country.' These were not isolated opinions; many domiciled foreigners were tolerant of the absurd red tape, the easy venality, the delays and impotencies of the effendis.

The level of administration was not greatly heightened by the efforts of the post-revolutionary central Government. A Committee

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

for Administrative Improvement set out in 1910 to overhaul the civil service, dismissed scores of officials, and was soon replaced by another body which reversed most of its decisions. The intrusion of political considerations into officialdom was redoubled after the revolution, and the domination of high officials by this or that faction of the local notables did not grow less. Missions of Inquiry from the capital, appearing in 'Iraq unannounced and with vague unwritten credentials, were unlikely to tackle basic problems. Nevertheless, some constructive steps were taken. The *Polis*—a specialized urban police force distinct from the *Zaptié*—were instituted early in the century. The gendarmerie were strengthened, their organization tightened, their old faults unmended. A school for Mudirs was established in 1912, the C.U.P. spirit being shown in the uniforms and drill parades forced upon these civil officials; the Mudirs would have preferred what they rarely obtained, the regular payment of their salaries. New regulations were issued governing land revenue, though the scandals of auctioned tithes and corrupt assessment continued. The Pious Bequests administration was overhauled. Income tax (Tamattu') was introduced, in a simple form little damaging to the upper classes. An urban property tax made its appearance amid storms of protest. Census procedure was revised to make possible the new military service regulations, which were applicable since 1909 to Christians, Jews, and some of the exempted classes. The headquarters of the Hilla sanjaq was moved to Diwaniya; 'Ana qadhā was transferred from Baghdad wilaya to Dayr al-Zur. The three municipalities of Baghdad city were for a time united. The painful maladministrations of the Customs Department were not improved, though the rates of duty rose, by agreement of the Powers, from 8 to 11 per cent. in 1906, and to 14 in 1914. Courts of Appeal were established at wilaya headquarters, and on the eve of the war a dozen Qadhis selected for dismissal. The Baghdad Law School was founded in 1909. The vast Saniya properties reverted to State ownership on the fall of 'Abd al-Hamid, but their separate and superior administration continued to exist.

The army, as ill-equipped, dispersed, and overworked as ever up to 1909, did not escape the invasion of politics in all ranks after the revolution. The Firman of July 1912, forbidding politics in the Army, had little effect; but the personalities of respected generals contrived to keep a semblance of discipline. The Army's endless tasks of tribal punishment remained far beyond its powers; it could not be active in all the districts all the time. The efforts of Nadhim Pasha and his successors did indeed result in some new barracks, military hospitals, improved transport, smarter uniforms, more modern arms. The Baghdad 'Abakhana (military clothing

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

factory) impressed even foreign critics as well-managed; formal parades and regimental bands improved morale; and Nadhim Pasha's policy of concentrating his forces was retained in some measure by his successors. A state of feud between the Wali and the General was in each wilaya more usual than one of collaboration, and was curable only when the two posts were combined. In army as in civil administration, the fundamental disease was the abiding poverty which, for economy, must needs acquiesce in depleted strengths and reserveless depots, leave pay in arrears, and force the troops often to live on the countryside—or to desert.

The Ḥamidiya regiments, recruited in 'Iraq only in the extreme north, ceased to exist after 1909; but 'frontier companies' designed to give military employment to Kurdish tribesmen of the Shahrizur and Sulaymaniya sanjaqs were formed in 1912 with a more military and less patriarchal complexion. A greater reorganization was that which in 1911, on the advice of von der Goltz Pasha, created the 4th Inspectorate, to cover the whole of 'Iraq and south-western Arabia with two Corps, the 12th and 13th, at Mosul and Baghdad respectively and one, the 14th, in the Yaman. The Reserve system was unchanged until, after a complete breakdown, it was revised, all too late, in 1914. The Navy at Baṣra remained decayed and futile. The gunboat *Zohab*, acquired in 1902, was in 1911 captured by the Italians in the Red Sea. *Kilid al-Bahr* remained afloat. The *Marmaris* arrived at Baṣra in 1908.

Among improvements in communications made during this period the greater use of wheeled traffic, notably on the upper Euphrates routes and those radiating from Baghdad, called for a modest measure of road-making. A Zab bridge was completed, not without grave scandal. The telegraph service was extended to most of the small towns, including those of the Kurdish qadhās. The use of telephones began to be extended in Baghdad to the beginnings of a public service, and in 1914 there was talk of a Baghdad–Baṣra wireless service. The 'Aniza-borne trans-desert postal service, diverted in 1906 from a Damascus to an Aleppo terminal, was twice robbed by Dulaym in 1909 and was suspended in 1912. The Tatar service by Mosul to Istanbul was maintained until the outbreak of war. Offers were twice made of a motor-carried post to Syria: once, optimistically, by Ḥamdi Bey Baban in 1911, and once by a French group in 1914. Adoption of either proposal would have involved major road improvement and called for a standard of mechanical reliability unlikely to be achieved.

Of the succession of well-remembered high Turkish officials of this period, scores of personal anecdotes are still told in 'Iraq today. All suffered from the growing penetration of Turkish administration by party politics after 1908, as they had from

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

capricious rancours and favouritisms before that; all could find in crude xenophobia a popular applauded attitude. None could count on any security of tenure of their post; a term of office of two or three years was exceptional. Flagrant personal dishonesty was rarer among the highest officials than it had been a generation before, but was still familiar enough and viewed with tolerance. The use of generals as civil governors increased after 1908.

Typical of the better high officials were the loyal and just Ṭahir Pasha, Wali of Mosul in 1910: 'Awnullah Bey, Mutaṣarrif of Kirkuk from 1910 to 1913, still quoted as the ideal of virile governors: 'Ali Riḍhā Bey, competent commander and cordial friend of Lorimer, who acted as Wali of Baghdad in 1912: Jalal Pasha graduated from Mutaṣarrif of Karbalā to be Wali of Baṣra, and reappeared, morose and disillusioned, as Wali of Baghdad in 1913. Ḥamdi Pasha, at Baṣra in 1900, was an honest and vigorous admiral. His successor Fakhri Pasha was reputed to sew up his criminals in sacks and consign them to the Shaṭṭ. 'Arif Bey Mardini, at Baṣra in 1909, with his modern home life and English nurse for his children, surprised all by his incorruptibility. Sulayman Naṣif Bey, Wali of Baṣra in 1909, arrived, as did most newcomers, full of schemes of improvement. The rabidly patriotic Jamal Pasha, Wali of Baghdad in 1911–12, left to become Military Governor of Istanbul and later to be notorious in Syria. Ḥazim Bey, in Baghdad in 1907, installed Baghdad's first water-supply system. Jawad Pasha, the last Wali of Baghdad before the war, was remembered as the first to use a motor-car of his own. 'Umar Luṭfi Pasha, assistant Wali under Nadhim Pasha, was known as the worried chairman of a score of committees and inquiries. Such are but a random few of the Pashas[1] of whom some more than average merit or quality is recalled. Good representatives of the older school were Zaki Pasha, G.O.C. and Wali in 1912–13 and, more notably, Muḥammad Fadhil Pasha Daghistani, the Grand Old Man of Turkish 'Iraq, chivalrous and stone-deaf, who acted as Wali in the intervals of commanding the Army, and led a score of expeditions against the recalcitrant. Very different were the aged Faydhi Pasha, Wali and G.O.C. in 1902–4, and famous for his corruption: 'Abd al-Wahhab Pasha the Albanian, Wali of Baghdad in 1905 and the terror of foreigners and their consuls:

[1] The twentieth-century Walis of Baghdad were: Namiq Pasha, 1898–1902: Aḥmad Faydhi Pasha, 1902–4: 'Abd al-Wahhab Pasha, 1904: 'Abd al-Majid Bey, 1905: Ḥazim Bey, 1907: Nadhim Pasha (acting), 1907: Najm al-Din Bey, 1908: Gen. Muḥammad Shawkat Pasha, 1909: Gen. Ḥusayn Nadhim Pasha, 1910–11: Yusif Pasha (acting), 1911: Jamal Pasha, 1911–12: Muḥammad Zaki Pasha, 1912: Gen. Ḥusayn Jalal Bey, 1913: Gen. Javid (Jawad) Pasha, 1914: Dr. Rashid Bey, 1915: Sulayman Nadhif Bey, 1915: and thereafter the G.O.C. 6th Army. Others, notably Muḥammad Fadhil Pasha Daghistani, acted for short periods as Wali.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

with no Constitution; and an intended treaty relationship with Great Britain, but as yet no treaty. These features, however, did not disturb the administration of the country, which in Faysal's first half-year proceeded without interruption. The Naqib and his Council, correctly resigning on the King's accession, were reinstated with changes. The new Cabinet formed on 10 September included Naji al-Suwaydi, a lawyer and patriot of distinguished name and record, as Minister of Justice: a Mosul Christian doctor Ḥanna Khayyaṭ as Minister (later Director-General) of Health: and most of the former Ministers, including Ja'far Pasha in Defence and Sasun Ḥasqayl in Finance. Ḥajj Ramzi, a nonentity who had succeeded Sayid Ṭalib at Interior, retained that office. The Ministers of Justice, Works, and Awqaf were unchanged. The now separate Ministry of Education was entrusted to the learned Shi'i divine Sayid Muḥammad 'Ali al-Shahristani. This Cabinet was unaltered till March 1922. Among the Advisers, Cornwallis was to remain in Interior for the next fourteen years; Bonham-Carter retired in May 1921, replaced for a year by Nigel Davidson also from the Sudan and thereafter by E. M. Drower: Atkinson, leaving for India, was succeeded by his deputy H. H. Wheatley. Lionel Smith became adviser to Education, Colonel P. Joyce—a colleague of the Amir Faysal and of Lawrence in the Arabian campaign—to Defence. Slater and Cooke were unchanged.

The grouping of departments differed widely from that practised under the Secretariats of the Wilson régime (p. 108). The Ministry of Interior covered, besides tribal, 'political', and municipal affairs, the 'Iraq Police, the civil prisons, the Agricultural and Veterinary departments, the Health service (when it ceased to be a Ministry), the Press Bureau and the department of Revenue until its transfer to Finance in October 1921. The Ministry of Finance dealt with its normal revenue, expenditure, accounting, budgeting, currency, and establishment functions, and controlled the Port of Baṣra; that of Communications and Works covered the departments of Irrigation, Public Works, Posts and Telegraphs, Surveys, and the Railways.

The Ministry's task of governing was embarrassed by a financial stringency which was aggravated by the disorders of the last year, by the continuance of post-war economic depression, and by the need to provide funds for the Ministry of Defence and for the Throne itself; nor, with a press and public outcry in Great Britain demanding ruthless economy in 'Iraq—or indeed outright evacuation from it—could funds be expected from that quarter. The new State started without debts, but with such liquid assets only as it could earn. The public services of Health, Education, Works, and the rest were confronted with unavoidable reductions at a

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

loss. In the 'Iraq Government service[1] 'Iraqis of goodwill and sometimes of admirable gifts—not unmixed, inevitably, with others of less ability or less integrity—were found to fill the higher as well as lower positions in provincial and central government. The body of British officials, mainly advisory but in a few cases still executive, included some figures of outstanding merit—and many who offered years, twenty or more, of quiet efficient service to 'Iraq.

A Ministry of Foreign Affairs, its portfolio held always in the early period by the Prime Minister himself, was the creation of Yasin Pasha in 1925. Under the overriding responsibility of Great Britain to the League for the fulfilment of 'Iraqi international obligations, the Ministry could have but limited scope. It was at first represented only in London, and intermittently at Geneva, by Ja'far Pasha al-'Askari. Foreign Consuls, however, began early to be posted to Baghdad, where their presence implied recognition of the 'Iraq State by France, Italy, Norway, Sweden, Germany, and Greece. The 'Iraq Government as such subscribed to various international conventions. Persia, though represented in 'Iraq by a number of Consuls and bound to it by the closest interests, withheld official recognition of the Kingdom, to the damage of both.

Successive Cabinets up to that of Yasin Pasha in 1924 have been elsewhere mentioned. Yasin's was a Ministry of all the talents, and since no alternative programmes backed by parties existed in the 'Iraq politics of the time, it like others must fall or survive by virtue of its own unanimity and the royal approval, or lack of these. Its months of power were marked by preoccupation with the politics of the Mosul Question, and by the frustrations of an empty Treasury. This poverty, the common misfortune of nascent Governments, was accentuated in the 'Iraq of 1925 by depressed trade conditions, the loss of part of the date market, the diminished Persian transit trade, and the bad harvest and low revenue of the year; and the times called insistently for more, not less, expenditure. It was necessary to find funds for an Army now under formation and soon to be called to vital responsibilities: for the acquisition of assets from the British Government, which itself was in no mood for munificent gestures: for the service of the Ottoman Public Debt, of which a substantial fraction devolved upon 'Iraq: and for public services conceived on a scale reputed the minimum tolerable, but still far in advance of financial capacity. The arithmetical impossibilities thus involved led to the advent by invitation in March 1924 of a financial mission from Whitehall, consisting of Commander E. Hilton-Young and R. V. Vernon. The mission studied and reviewed, advocated limited economies, strove to palliate the resented blow of Public Debt obligations, and

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wise and moderate 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Qaṣṣab. By the summer of 646
1926 the routine of parliamentary procedure was established; but it was already clear that the backwardness of the electorate, and the freely used power of the Government to secure the election of deputies of its own choice, could not but preclude any early possibility of genuine democracy.

The Administration, on lines half inherited from the Turks and half established by the British, had well begun. With many shortcomings and omissions it operated already more widely and more effectively than had any Turkish Government, and aimed at a superior standard of service. In Baghdad the departments under each Ministry improved their organization, sifted their staffs, advanced towards complete 'Iraqi control. By 1926 not only were all Ministries in effective 'Iraqi control but most of the larger departments had been handed to 'Iraqi directors, notably those of Health, Education, Agriculture, Posts and Telegraphs, Government Accounts, Police, Prisons, the Census; those of Irrigation, Tapu, Customs, Revenue and State Domains, Veterinary services, Public Works, the Port of Baṣra, and 'Iraq Railways remained for a further period under British executive control. In the provinces, new qadhās and nahiyas were formed or regrouped. The position of the British 'Administrative Inspectorate' was satisfactorily defined by law. A Standing Board selected 'Iraqi officials for higher posts, and the formation of a regulated civil service on modern lines was taken in hand. The Ministry of Finance, where R. V. Vernon assumed the Advisership in 1925 after an interregnum under L. M. Swan, had developed and specialized its organization, reduced its non-'Iraqi staff to a minimum, and founded a Finance Inspectorate. The post of Auditor-General, reporting to the Cabinet direct, was created in 1924 and held by J. Parlby, who had worked in 'Iraqi finances since 1917. The Advisership of Communications and Works was held by Wheatley until the arrival of L. E. Bury in 1925, and again after the latter's departure three years later. In Interior, Cornwallis was assisted by a senior member of his Administrative Inspectorate—Pulley, Wilson, or Edmonds—and by one or more juniors. 645x 631 647

The Courts offered justice and accessibility to an extent far superior to that of alien and corrupt Ottoman tribunals; during these years both civil and criminal courts multiplied at liwā and qadhā headquarters as need declared itself, and the statistics of cases heard showed an increasing recourse to law. Civil jurisdiction lay with the Peace Courts of the Qadhis—who after 1923 included Shi'i Qadhis—and junior judges, the Courts of First Instance at three or four liwā headquarters, and a single Court of Appeal and Cassation, with a British President, at Baghdad. This President 692

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563 668 were postponed at the Mar Sham'un's request. The Northamptonshires returned to Egypt.

In partial compliance with requests in the petition, the 'Iraq Government set up a further land-finding committee. It discovered but little land both cultivable and available, but recommended expenditure on an irrigation scheme to produce more. The Cabinet accepted this report, which was sent to Geneva. The King visited 'Amadiya, talked at length with the Mar Sham'un, and used every means to win his confidence; but the young and intransigent Patriarch would commit himself to nothing in advance of the League's answer, and himself left for Switzerland. He was followed there by a counter-petition of those Assyrians whose original homes had been in Barwari Bala (that is, in present 'Iraq territory), expressing their complete satisfaction with present arrangements.

The final debates of the Permanent Mandates Commission and the League Council on the Assyrian issue, after rehearsing that community's well-known grievances and the desirability (but impossibility) of providing the homogeneous group-settlement which they demanded, could result in no more than hopes for the best. The gap between the full Millet autonomy demanded by the Mar Sham'un, and the favourable minority treatment available at best from the 'Iraq Government, was a wide one. The League Council formally rejected the Millet proposal, 'noted with satisfaction' the impending appointment of a foreign settlement expert, and left the subject with misgivings which were soon to be tragically justified.

5. GOVERNORS AND GOVERNED

642 647 In a community at 'Iraq's current stage of evolution the central Administration was both significant of and powerful in the society of the territory; and great and not unsuccessful efforts were made from 1925 to 1932 by the 'Iraqi and British elements alike to improve it. The reduction of the British part,[1] though accompanied by a variously assessed loss of efficiency and authority, was clearly necessary as part of 'Iraq's planned evolution; and it proceeded so far that the steps taken towards 'Iraqi administrative independence in these years left relatively little for the post-647 mandatory period. By 1932 further departments had been taken over by 'Iraqi directors—those of Revenue and State Domains

[1] The number of Administrative Inspectors fell from 24 in 1923 to 18 in 1925, 14 in 1930, 10 in 1933. The total of British officials of 'gazetted' status in 1920 was 364, in 1923: 181, in 1926: 148, in 1929: 130, in 1931: 118 (38 advisory, 80 executive). For British 'non-gazetted' staff the corresponding numbers were: for 1920: 484; for 1923: 361; for 1926: 52; for 1929: 34; for 1931: 28; for Indian officials, in 1920: 2,035, in 1923: 1,270, in 1926: 250, in 1929: 53, and in 1931: 36.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

(from the present writer), of Income Tax (from Sainsbury), of Public Works (from Clay); these were to be closely followed by that of Irrigation (from Allard) in 1933, of Tapu (from Alderman, who died) in 1934, and of Antiquities in 1934. Progress towards raising the standard for officials, the object of successive boards, commissions, and examinations, was fluctuating; the work of one minister in re-selecting and purifying the personnel was undone by the next, and was rarely free from personal factors. In the task of fixing establishments and regulations, as in all Government activities, the discontinuity of frequently changed Cabinets was an obstacle to progress. Nevertheless, a fair standard was achieved in a body of officials no longer exclusively ex-Turkish veterans, no longer alien, and far superior to anything seen in Ottoman times for honesty, goodwill, and energy. Corruption if not unknown was rarely scandalous and, as never before, sincerely condemned.

The Courts continued, not without an occasional scandal, to earn general respect. The standard of the judiciary was respectable and some 'Iraqi jurists were of high merit. With accessibility, recourse to the Courts grew commoner: 13,000 Peace Court cases were heard in 1919, 63,000 in 1929. Seventy-three advocates were licensed to practise in the former of these years, 165 in the latter.

New administrative units—qadhās and nahiyas—were formed by regrading and subdividing as need occurred; examples were common in Kurdistan, and in the Southern Desert Province formed in 1928 for better frontier control. New groupings among the departments in Baghdad led to changes of ministerial function and nomenclature; but the object of these—the better handling of projects of development—and indeed administrative progress in every field, was for the time partly frustrated by the economic depression of the years 1929 to 1932.

The years of penury and near-crisis preceding the entry of 'Iraq into the League called for wise and firm financial management. The general fall in prices of agricultural products led to a severe drop in land revenue, which the fall in Customs and other receipts aggravated. At the same time essential expenditure did not decrease, and the campaigns in Kurdistan made exceptional demands. The slump and its social effects would have been more severe had 'Iraq been an exporter of manufactured goods; instead, her raw products continued in some demand at lower prices, and it was possible at least to maintain the standards of the public services, and to help distressed pump-cultivators to survive. The State's finances were, under prudent advice, well handled, with careful budgeting, strict accountancy, and measures of economy which demanded some political courage. Vernon left the Adviser-ship to the Ministry in 1928, succeeded for three years by Swan as

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

*645 The failure of Yasin Pasha to impose the peace and security which he had promised was due to causes already analysed, and in some measure to the hasty ineptitude of his Minister of Interior. But, as in 1920, disturbance on the Euphrates and locally and temporarily elsewhere did not greatly affect the rest of the territory. The cities were secure and tranquil, the northern liwās and the whole of Tigris-side untroubled. The period of Yasin Pasha's premiership was indeed by 'Iraqi standards one of firm and reasonable government, and seemed, even in the late summer of 1936, likely to be prolonged. The coming event of violent military intervention cast no shadow before it.

646 [659] The general election ordered in April 1935 produced in August a Chamber swollen from 88 to 108 members: the additional seats arose from increased population-figures revealed by the Census Department, and were useful in placating more shaykhs and partisans. Early sessions of Parliament were disturbed by fierce recriminations between factions for the crime of inciting the tribes —a crime peculiar, in fact, to no single party. The Administration proceeded to a general amnesty of the political offenders of recent months, to a purge of suspect officials, and to the preferment, as the spoils of office, of more reliable personnel.

647 Genuine efforts were made, indeed, to arrest the deterioration of the Administration, though the further reduction of senior British officials may have told in the opposite sense. It cost 'Iraq in 1935 the services of Sir K. Cornwallis, whose work for Fayṣal and for 'Iraq had been outstanding; Edmonds, profoundly versed in 'Iraqi and especially Kurdish affairs, succeeded him. In the same year Prescott, the creator of the 'Iraq Police, resigned from the service and left Cones for a further ten years as Inspector of Constabulary. Sievwright, veteran of the Customs, retired and was succeeded until 1941 by Swan of Finance. Parlby, Auditor-General, returned to India. Hallinan had ceased in 1933 to be Inspector-General of Health Services, and was replaced by an 'Iraqi doctor. The Tapu Department dispensed with British help after the death of Alderman (himself successor of Royds in 1930) in 1934. The same is true of the Department of Agriculture, which Webster left in the same year. B. C. Newland, Director of Surveys, relinquished his post in 1935 to his deputy, A. J. Booth, who still held it sixteen years later. Chadwick left the Veterinary Department in 1934, but was to have a second tenure of the Directorship in 1942 to 1947. The Government Geologist Dr. Macfadyen left 'Iraq in 1937 after two years' service there, and was not immediately replaced. Allard retired in 1934 from Irrigation, in which an 'Iraqi had already succeeded him as Director-General; a British Chief Engineer and British regional staff still served there, and the

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

same was true of Public Works and of Posts and Telegraphs. Tainsh after fifteen years as Director left the Railways, handing over to Ward who combined the post for three years with the Port Directorate. Wheatley left the Adviserships to Communications and Works early in 1937.

The relation of Yasin Pasha to the British Embassy, where Sir Archibald Clark Kerr had succeeded Humphrys in March 1935, were close and cordial. The Census Department was strengthened, that of Publicity represented a development of the old Press Bureau. The Courts, with their complement of British judges under the Agreement of 1930, were well maintained. The general desire for a more comprehensive educational system could be met only in part. Primary and secondary schools showed a limited development, with increased use of borrowed Egyptian teachers, and the beginning of book publication by the Ministry. Technical education, studied by visiting foreign experts, advanced little. The university project stood still. The Higher Teachers' Training College was reopened in 1935. A Directorate of Female Education was formed in 1934, but abolished next year. A Rural Teachers' College—a recommendation of the Monroe Report—was established in 1934 at Shatra on the Gharraf, and later moved to Rustumiya outside Baghdad. An Elementary Teachers' College for Women was opened at Diwaniya in 1934, but did not survive. The College of Pharmacy was founded in 1936. The schools of the minority communities and of the missions, Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish, flourished. The proposal for a public school on the British pattern was not yet realized, and a British adviser to the Minister of Education ceased to be employed. German teaching increased. School books in use became increasingly nationalist and xenophobe in tone. Military instruction was first given in the schools in 1935, and grew thereafter to be a popular feature of school life, with a developed Youth Movement in uniform.

Ancient sites of 'Iraq continued each winter to attract foreign archaeological missions. Valuable excavations were carried out by the representatives of university, museum, or other learned bodies, American, German, British, French, and Italian, from 1933 to 1939 at sites in northern 'Iraq—Gawra, Nineveh, Saydawa, and Khorsabad: in the Baghdad area, at Khafaja on the Diyalā, and at Seleucia: and in the centre and south at the Sumerian cities of Warqa and Larsa. A setback to this activity was caused, indeed, by the intervention in 1933 of the Shi'i Minister of Education, who produced a draft Antiquities Law calculated by its one-sided severities to discourage all future excavation; but under the Hashimi Ministry an improved draft was accepted, and work could proceed in reasonable conditions.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

of further contributions to them. The Assyrians still in 'Iraq, to whom conscription was now applied without disturbance, were established in villages neither overcrowded nor unprosperous, and were reluctant to move. The 'Iraq Government officially assured the League that their status as 'Iraqi citizens was secure; but the return to 'Iraq of the Mar Sham'un, who had taken British nationality and now lived in Cyprus, could not be considered.

The forward movement of foreign trade and prosperity which had marked the period 1935–7 was notably checked in 1938. Produce prices fell, Government's capital-works allotments were overspent, and the later days of the Madfa'i Ministry were financially unhappy. Nevertheless, a monopoly for (packed) date exports was awarded by the Baṣra Date Board to a British firm, Messrs. Andrew Weir, and arrangements for the tobacco monopoly approached finality. The Agricultural and Industrial Bank was prolific of projects, a Cement Company invited funds from the public, and Government remained ambitious to erect its own oil refinery. A concession for the oil of Baṣra wilaya—more strictly, of all 'Iraq territory south of the two existing oil-concession areas—was granted in 1938 to the Basra Petroleum Company, an *ad hoc* creation of the I.P.C. group, upon terms similar to those governing the B.O.D. concession of 1932. The Banco di Roma opened a branch in Baghdad early in 1938. A British adviser was recruited for the Ministry of Communications and Works, G. N. Loggin, of the Egyptian service, in succession to Wheatley who had retired—a serious loss—in 1937, and an expert with long Egyptian experience, J. D. Atkinson, was secured in 1939 for Irrigation, where he remained for seven years. Ward, remaining as Port Director till his death in 1942, gave up the Directorship of Railways early in 1939; he was succeeded for a year and for six months respectively by Loggin and by C. F. Nicoll, after which the post was held, for nine years from 1941, by H. C. Smith. E. G. Hogg retired from the Financial Adviserships in 1939, leaving the post vacant for two years thereafter.

In the field of foreign relations, agreements were concluded, on bedouin rights and on commerce respectively, with Sa'udi Arabia and with Egypt. Turkey was blamed for its pressure to obtain Alexandretta and its sanjaq, which were held to be Arab. Major demonstrations in Baghdad, to be repeated in 1939, condemned the French for the shortcomings of their policy in Syria. A commercial treaty was signed with the United States, though American Zionist sympathies were not unsuspected. The Vatican appointed another Apostolic Delegate to Mosul, this time a Dutchman. Diplomatic relations were opened with Belgium and Hungary. The King of Italy was recognized as Emperor of Ethiopia, and

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

Haydar, the Finance Minister, and indicated an anticipated expenditure of £11 million in four years. For the moment, great loss was incurred by the disastrous fire which raged on and after 27 August in the Suq al-'Aṭṭariya of Baghdad and was extinguished only after great efforts. The Jews, as usual, were blamed. Slack demand and low prices in the date trade in 1938 and 1939 strained to excess the organization and harmony of the Date Board (p. 262) and led to its replacement, under a new law, by a Date Association in 1939. This was endowed with larger funds and powers, and a field of action covering all southern 'Iraq and all branches of growing and marketing. H. I. Lloyd, a veteran of the 'Iraq service as administrator and judge, became Director-General. An early act of the Association was to grant to Messrs. Andrew Weir a five-year monopoly for handling the purchase and export of packed dates.

The outbreak of War in September 1939 led in Baghdad inevitably to a period of financial and commercial panic, with suspension of credit, a run on the banks, buying and hoarding of food and stocks, and an abrupt rise in prices. But confidence was quickly restored and, though some dislocation of communications and shortage of shipping were felt, economic conditions returned almost to normal. In spite of the State of Emergency declared and the issue of a 'Decree for the organization of 'Iraq's economic resources' with nominal Government control of exports and imports, and the establishment of a Central Supply Board, interference in normal trading was in effect slight. There was no black-out, no air-raid precautions, and little sign of war restrictions save press and postal censorship. The date export was well organized under the new monopoly, and the British Government placed a large order for 'Iraqi barley, which was profitably fulfilled.

The Prime Minister announced on 4 September that 'Iraq would fully honour the terms of the British alliance, and thereunder would furnish all 'facilities and assistance' as provided in the Treaty. Of 'Iraq Army mobilization there was no question. Diplomatic relations with Germany were broken off, Germans interned and their property sequestrated, while their interests were entrusted to the Afghan Legation. Dr. Grobba left the country, and his propaganda organization was temporarily merged in that which had its centre at Teheran. Telegrams were exchanged between the Regent and King George VI, and every assurance given to the British Ambassador of 'Iraq's goodwill and acceptance of its obligations. Nuri Pasha's conceptions went, indeed, further than this; he envisaged a modification of the Sa'dabad Pact such as to lead to joint military and political action by its signatories, whom Egypt might join; but of such projects nothing was in fact realized.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

722 was exempted from licensing and price-fixing. During 1945 all
434 controls were discontinued as far as sterling-area commerce was concerned, and traders with one accord sought supplies from every quarter; but freedom of traffic was still hampered by shipping shortages, currency restrictions, and world-wide dearth of goods.
457 The country's requirements in 'hard' currencies, chiefly dollars, were met by an arrangement with Great Britain in March 1945, whereby sums up to the equivalent of $14 million could be converted from 'Iraq's accumulated sterling balances, an arrangement which was to be annually re-negotiated. The restricted convertibility of 'Iraq's own dinars into dollars remained incomprehensible to the public, as to publics everywhere.

722 In the task of economic control, which fell ultimately to the lot
647 of local officials, helped, it might be, by the municipality or Chamber of Commerce, more than moderate results could not be expected from improvised systems based on no adequate statistics or machinery, and applied by unspecialized and impecunious officials to a puzzled and resentful public. The higher economic control of the territory, under a law repeatedly revised and productive of innumerable regulations, was placed originally in the hands of a Central Supply Committee, later in those of a smaller ministerial body, the High Supply Committee, which long survived the war. Many problems called for resolution at Cabinet level, where they multiplied disagreement between ministers. Departments of Transport, Imports and Local Resources, founded early in the war and served by British as well as 'Iraqi officials—Lloyd, Grice, le Blanc—were grouped early in 1944 under the Ministry of Supply established for the purpose; its first Adviser, Colonel P. Bayliss, after a few months of dynamic and impatient activity, retired through disagreement with his colleagues. An Anglo-American-'Iraqi Co-ordinating Committee lasted for a few months from midsummer 1944. Outside the territory, but concerned with its output and controlling foreign supplies to it, was the Middle East Supply Centre in Cairo, of which a conference attended by 'Iraqi delegates was held in Cairo in April 1944; and 'Iraq had in 1943 been toured, under M.E.S.C. auspices, by a Scientific Advisory Mission which produced the valuable reports of Dr. B. A. Keen and Dr. E. B. Worthington. The Centre performed important services in conditions where benevolent inter-territory control was indispensable; it was, nevertheless, commonly blamed in 'Iraq for its meagre allocation of supplies, and its abolition late in 1945 was unregretted by 'Iraqis to whom their own country's needs were paramount, those of the Allies and of the War remote and meaningless. It was succeeded until 1947 by a Supply Mission which kept control of a few scarce items of supply.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

Had it been possible for broader views on practical economic internationalism to prevail in 'Iraq and its neighbours, valuable lessons could perhaps have been drawn from the operations of M.E.S.C.

The shortage of goods, the high price of local produce, and the abundant military expenditure could not be without effect on living standards. Until the middle of 1941 the country's economy was almost normal; prices rose little and currency in circulation had scarcely increased. But thereafter conditions quickly deteriorated. A poor harvest, the decrease in imports, and military expenditure produced conditions of menacing inflation. Government had no better solution than half-hearted and unenforced regulations to deal with the problems of procurement, control, and distribution, which in a few weeks became urgent. The cost of living rose in 1942 to a level of three or even four times that of 1939. The volume of currency in circulation rose threefold, then sixfold, while bank deposits increased correspondingly. Government, happy to receive the greatly increased revenues which rescued it from the alarming penury of mid-1941, was unwilling to adopt strong measures to drain off purchasing power by higher taxation, or by loan issues (until 1945), or by the sale of State lands save on a trifling scale: was unwilling, indeed, to adopt the firm but unpopular measures for which the situation called. Some sales of gold and of diamonds made available by the British Government could do little to correct the position. A slight improvement, thanks to an abundant harvest and lower export-prices, was achieved in 1943 and prevented a further rise of living costs, already six times those of 1939. But the armistice found conditions in the territory scarcely less inflationary, and the tone of its society scarcely healthier.

Government finance in war-time pursued an abnormal course. The three years 1941–3, in spite of high costs, showed useful surpluses; foreign debts could be paid, war-time allowances were made to officials, and development plans were viewed hopefully. But the two following years gave a less happy result; Government revenues did not keep pace with expenditure, the social services and the Police were allowed to expand, and officials multiplied. Normal expenditure, ID 8 million in 1939, reached ID 15 million in 1943 and ID 21 million in 1945. This last year found 'Iraq approaching a financial position less sound than it appeared. The separate finances of the Railways and the Port of Baṣra were highly prosperous throughout the war.

'Iraq's first internal loan, issued early in 1945, was in two parts. The first was a loan of ID 1 million bearing 2 per cent. interest for twenty years, and 2 per cent. in lottery prizes; the second was of

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

the Prime Minister and the Regent both visited London during the year. The objectives of all politicians (save only the vehement minority who would break every form of British connexion) were the removal of all limitation to their independence and free choice, the end of all treatment of the country as a junior partner, and the abolition of provisions which, offensively to their *amour propre*, left Habbaniya and Shu'ayba as British cantonments in the heart of 'Iraq. The early negotiations with the British Ambassador appeared to run smoothly, and the Ministry could hope that early 1948 would see a happy solution. Newspaper attacks on Great Britain, unhelpful in these circumstances, were as ever the commonplace of every journalist, and were suspended only in part and temporarily in the summer of 1947, when a party of 'Iraqi editors visited London.

In the two years following the armistice most of the remaining British officials of the Administration—a tiny remnant of the body so active and so hopeful in 1919–20—left 'Iraq. Edmonds had retired in 1945, succeeded in Interior by A. H. Ditchburn. In 1946 Drower of Justice, Sinderson of the Medical Services, Atkinson of Irrigation, Caparn of Communications and Works, H. I. Lloyd of the Date Board, and Grice of Interior were among the losses sustained by the Government. They were followed next year by Swan of Finance, Seton Lloyd of Antiquities, and Chadwick of the Veterinary Department.

It was regrettable that Ṣalih Jabr's best-meaning of Governments was compelled, like its predecessors, to take steps against press and party agitation which passed all reasonable limits. Its Palestine policy was more than correct, its moves towards Treaty revision active and popular; but this was not enough. Exclusion from power and sheer hatred of the 'old gang'—and of the British allegedly behind them—still led the parties to frenzies of anti-Government zeal. A newspaper was suppressed in April, and two more in June. Kamil al-Chadirchi and 'Abd al-Fattaḥ Ibrahim were charged with sedition. The premises of the People's Party were seized and 'Aziz Sharif arrested, but released. Trials of Communists detained under the last Sa'idi Ministry, some months ago, led to a score of long sentences of imprisonment and to death sentences[1] on Yusif Salman, Zaki Baṣim, and Naji Shummal for inciting troops and police against the State; these were later commuted to long terms of imprisonment. Baghdad bookshops were raided and the premises of the more extreme parties searched.

[1] The *Daily Worker*'s later (17 February 1949) description of the 'Iraq Government was that of a 'corrupt and murderous puppet of British imperialism'; *L'Humanité* (8 February 1949) attributed 'Iraq's anti-Communist steps to 'the Anglo-American millionaires who are preparing war'.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

assessment and collection of the main customary sources of revenue —Customs and Excise, taxation on natural commodities, the tobacco monopoly, income and property taxes—were continued with the full use of improved records, techniques, and expert advice: it was probable that, even apart from the expected oil revenues, the position of the Treasury need not again cause anxiety. From this should follow the liquidation of Government debts and loans, the better housing and payment of the Administration itself, and the possibility of a gratifying expansion of the social services.

The estimates for 1950–1 allotted, out of a total ordinary expenditure of ID 24 million, 30 per cent. to the Army and R.I.A.F., 16 per cent. to education, 13 to general administration purposes, 11 to the Police, 8 to health services, and 22 in all to other departments and functions. Capital works expenditure in that year was to amount to just under ID 4 million.

Receipts from the territory's greatest single source of wealth, its oil deposits and the industry developing them, had since their first appearance normally been allotted to capital development. This rule, partly broken in lean times, was reinforced by the structure of the Development Board set up in 1950 under a law which called for the diversion to it of all revenues from oil.[1] These receipts, amounting to less than ID 4 million in 1949 and little more than 6 million in 1950, would, it was already clear, be more than doubled, more than quadrupled, in future years (p. 376). The division of the State estimates into an ordinary and a capital-works budget ceased with the establishment of the Development Board.

The Board, disliked by some 'Iraqis as an irremovable Government-within-Government, seemed to others and to most foreign observers to offer hopes of a continuity, efficiency, and freedom from political considerations which had scarcely existed before.[2] It consisted of eight members, the Prime Minister and Minister of Finance of the time, and six non-official salaried members to be named by Royal Irada and to hold office for five years. Three of these were to be expert in Finance, Irrigation, and another (unspecified) field and, in defiance of anti-foreign prejudice, a British Secretary-General and Finance expert, Sir E. Miller, and an American irrigation engineer were recruited. The Board, in which Arshad al-'Umari seemed likely to be the leading figure, was in

[1] This was modified in 1952 by amending legislation which provided for the Board's retention of 70 per cent. of oil revenues and the allotment of 30 per cent. to 'general revenues': an arrangement which wisely permitted the devolution to provincial authorities of many smaller development works and services.

[2] The Board, however, was soon under attack by part of the press, irresponsible and malicious as ever, for having failed in a few weeks to 'raise the standard of life of the masses'.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

652 647 1951 establishing its programme for the ensuing five years and allotting an expenditure of some ID 155 million[1] within that period; but it became apparent soon afterwards that revenues in excess of this would, under revised oil agreements (p. 376) be available. It was at this stage clear to all that the acquisition of this copious revenue, which in the absence of some suicidal folly or grave misfortune would accrue punctually and reliably for many years, must completely transform 'Iraq's economy and rate of evolution. Its history indeed from 1951 onwards should be that of a territory extraordinarily favoured in all that appertains to, or can flow from, the resources at the disposal of its Government. Its curse had for centuries been poverty; thanks to its discovered and exploited oil deposits, it stood now at the threshold of an era of abundant wealth; and this must, besides its blessings, bring accompanying responsibilities, stresses and dangers, both moral and economic.

439 [457] The territory's immediate trade balance, which future opulence would doubtless affect, still showed in 1951 its habitual deficit. This was compensated partly by drawing upon the war-time sterling balances, and partly by invisible items as of old. The country's imports were, as ever, principally those of cotton, woollen, and silk textiles: iron, steel, and machinery: electrical goods: vehicles: tea, coffee, and sugar: chemicals, cement, and timber. Nearly half of these were provided by Great Britain, with India, the United States, and Belgium as other main suppliers and to a lesser extent Italy, Holland, and France; Germany and Japan had disappeared from the list of providers. Exports, which the country's evolution had left little changed over many years, were still those almost exclusively of its agricultural and natural products. Exported barley amounted to a yearly average of some 250,000 tons, wheat was shipped occasionally but irregularly—and not at all between 1940 and 1949; maize, millet, and oil-seeds (cotton, sesame, and linseed) were usually available in small quantities. The co-ordinating authority for all grain exports was the para-statal Grain Board and, working with it, an Agricultural Export and Import Company. Dates, to the important yearly extent of some 250,000 tons, were dispatched to more than forty countries. Cotton had disappeared after 1941, but crept back into the export list in 1947. Other items in the slight volume of exports were animals driven to the Levant countries, wool sent to France and America, and hides and skins, gums and gall-nuts consigned to various countries. Hopes that tobacco might be added to this list depended upon improvement in the structure and products of the local tobacco industry. New

[1] The provision for 1951 was to be (in thousands of dinars) 9,364: of 1952, 20,460: of 1953, 28,390: of 1954, 31,600: of 1955, 32,335: of 1956, 33,225.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

Palestine—was common from 1932 until the mid-war period. It was probable that, with research and the establishment of a responsible authority not hitherto created, present production could be largely increased. Fishery development nad in 1948 found its way into ministerial programmes; a trawler for use in the Shaṭṭ al-'Arab approaches was delivered in 1950, and a fish store was projected by the Agricultural Bank.

The history of 'Iraq's irrigation from 1946 to 1950 is one of rapid approach to, or even the partial realization of, prospects long desired and, through new-found wealth, by 1951 fully practicable. The call for heroic measures was the clearer since the disastrous floods of 1946 and 1948 and the acute grain shortage—in a territory of fabulous potential output!—in the latter year; and in 1946 the resources of the highly competent Irrigation Department were supplemented *ad hoc* by the appointment of a well-staffed Irrigation Commission under F. F. Haigh of the Indian Service of Engineers. Its object was to study and report on river control and irrigation, and to submit a programme. The Commission reported in June 1949.

The task of flood control and storage was to be carried out on the Euphrates by a completed and extended Habbaniya–Abu Dibis project: on the Tigris, by the grandiose Wadi Tharthar project (in two stages), by the 'Gibraltar' dam on the Diyalā at its point of passage through the Jabal Ḥamrin, and by the Dukan dam on the Lesser Zab. These works, all pronounced practicable, would save 'Iraq from floods and would greatly increase its low-season resources. They would be accompanied by the development of irrigation in new areas by canals, headworks, barrages, and feeders on the middle Euphrates, the lesser Zab, the middle Tigris (in the areas commanded by the Ishaqi and Nahrwan canals), on the Diyalā river, and on the Gharraf and lower Tigris. Drainage was to be taken comprehensively in hand in both existing and projected irrigated areas, on lines which experiments made from 1940 to 1946 had shown to be practicable. Hydro-electric power was to be developed at the Samarrā headworks, the Wadi Tharthar outlet channel, and the Gibraltar and Dukan dams. Plans for the reclamation of the southern 'Iraqi swamps, and the re-formation of the lower Tigris, were suggested but not formulated. Of this gigantic programme, expected to cost some ID 90 million, about a quarter of the whole was to be undertaken immediately and finished within ten years: it would include the first part of the extended Habbaniya and of the Wadi Tharthar schemes, the Gibraltar dam, drainage work, and the extension of existing irrigation in the Nahrwan and Gharraf areas and on the Euphrates. A large part of these plans was adopted by the Development

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

648 to join with Pakistan and the Sa'dabad Powers in an Eastern bloc securely Islamic and free from all Western exigencies and 'imperialism'. It could not but seem clear to contemporary observers that 'Iraqi thinking on these matters lacked realism, and that in its bewildered hesitations, its willing involvement of foreign policy with domestic factions, its patent inability to stand alone against the dangers of the time, it was typical of small nations who cried indignantly for a 'complete independence' which, in the modern world, could exist only on most precarious sufferance, unless firmly allied to the defending power of stronger friends.

642 647 In internal administration, whereas the Turkish Government had exercised rarely more than a partial control never at one time operative over the whole country, and the 'Iraq Government in its earlier years could claim a wider but still not truly pervasive authority, in 1950 no surviving enclaves of non-government remained in desert or marsh or mountain. From Mudir to minister, from clerk to Director-General, the administration as an operating and governing machine could by that date face comparison with that of any comparable country, and might be thought superior to those of many longer-established nations. The period from 1930 to 1950 had done less than might have been feared to weaken or corrupt it, and had been survived with a lowering of standards which though considerable was not disastrous. If it had benefited from its three years of British rule and twelve more of discreet tutelage, yet it derived its merits primarily from the qualities of its own personnel: qualities which, common as it was for visitors and many 'Iraqis to deride them, were most appreciated by those who knew them best. The faults endemic in all bureaucracies, the relative newness of the machine, the discontinuity of its guiding Ministries, the paucity of experienced high executives, and occasional moral lapses: all these together failed to outweigh the good intentions, the intelligence and the honesty of the majority of civil servants. And the machine itself, the interrelation and subdivision of its parts, the control of departments and their relation to the district Governors, and of the latter to their Ministries and publics: all these had, after a mere thirty years, reached a state of tolerable efficiency adapted, as the Turkish régime never was, to the conditions of the territory.

642 With 'Iraq's remarkable natural advantages and resources, coming at last within sight of full development: with its benevolent and generally popular monarchy vested in an ancient royal house and its not inadequate governmental machine: and with the efforts of its society to evolve on modern lines by manifold borrowing from Western thought and method as well as technology, there was, indeed, a fair measure of hope for a stable as well as a pros-

2: Dowson G-5 (1929-30) 1932 MH Iraq MH

PART IV.—EXISTING CONDITIONS.

MIRI LAND (STATE DOMAIN)

1–4. General Situation

1. As ordinarily used in el 'Iraq the term miri land, or State Domain, embraces the entire land surface of the country with the exception of land registered as owned in mulk or held on tapu tenure, the extent of which is unknown. Of the compound total some 78,000 square kilometres is estimated to be occupied by scattered cultivation, and about another 15,000 square kilometres to be capable of cultivation (see Plates I and II and Table I). In the former figure are included the previous Ottoman Crown Estates, which comprised some of the most valuable land in the country. These estates were originally managed by a special estate service (El Dairet el Saniya). The administration, by common repute that has survived both in Palestine and el 'Iraq, was good. These estates were subsequently termed mudawara Lands, apparently because they were "turned over" to the civil administration after the Turkish revolution of 1908. They have since lost their separate identity and become merged in the general category of cultivated miri land, although, of course, their previous circumstances may have to be taken into account when considering the position of the present holders of such lands.

It is desirable at the outset to recognise that the huge agglomeration thus grouped under the name miri, or State Domain, reflects no real uniformity in legal status, customary practice, or actual treatment. Thus, while it is accurate and informative to speak of mulk ownership or of tapu tenure, there is no such thing as miri * tenure in law and an unknown variety of things in practice. Miri land simply represents the overwhelming residue of the country not held in mulk or on tapu tenure. It is none the less reasonable and convenient to maintain this elastic, if negative, category at least provisionally. For it accords with accepted tradition and statutory law (*a*) to regard the State as the basic landlord of all land other than mulk (and its derivative true waqf) and (*b*) to recognise that, whatever the rights of holders of miri land may be, they fall short of those of a duly registered mutasarrif of tapu land. But the powers of the State as such a landlord must evidently be exercised with most careful regard to the history of the land and to over-riding considerations of an equitable, economic and administrative nature, if they are to prove admissible in practice.

The general management and control of miri land, legally vested in the State, is nominally entrusted to the State Domains Section (qism el amlak el amiriya) of the Ministry of Finance, until recently the State Domains Department of the late Ministry of Irrigation and Agriculture. Some such central State Domains Office is essential; while the keenness and public spirit that I encountered in this service cannot be too fully recognised. But the Department was quite inadequately staffed and equipped to discharge even the practicable part of its colossal titular duties. Actually in the prevailing absence of intelligible maps and

* Using the term in its customary local, as opposed to its legal, connotation (see II. 1).

2: Dowson G-5 (1929-30) 1932 MH1 Iraq MH1

647 423 records of miri land, such management and control as is possible of these heterogeneous and extensive territories must be carried out primarily in the district by persons in direct touch with the people and the parcels affected. Many questions are no doubt settled by the customary social leaders as elsewhere (e.g. tribal sheikhs) and never reach the administration. Those that do may in some cases be dealt with by one of the few local officers of the State Domains or even by another Department (e.g. on the Yuseffya by the Irrigation). But ordinarily the effective agents of Government in the control of miri lands are the officers of the provincial administration on the spot, who must act for the most part according to their individual judgment or on the instructions of their provincial superiors in each case. This local control is naturally subject to the direction, and occasionally to the intervention, of the State Domains service or the Ministry to which it is responsible. It is also necessarily subject to intervention by the Ministry of the Interior or of any other Ministry, whose public responsibilities may be affected by some action taken. It is further subject to intervention by any Deputy or influential private person who may be concerned or interested.

423 682 In a limited number of cases, disputes affecting the holding of miri land are decided under the Tribal Civil and Criminal Disputes Regulations, because of their reaction on tribal peace and public security. But since such disputes in theory merely concern the domestic management by Government of its own estates, they do not as a rule fall within the jurisdiction of any regular Court of Justice. Reference has already been made to the general failure to introduce the Land Code and more particularly tapu tenure effectively. Consequently by the side of a truncated and semi-atrophied Statute Law there have survived throughout the greater majority of the land, methods of acquiring and holding land which have never been regulated by law at all.

423 427 2. An attempt has already been made to illustrate in broad outline the conditions under which land has been for the most part occupied and cultivated in the rainfall zone. There are commonly two classes of people concerned. Firstly (*a*) the larger man, who may be the local Agha or a small capitalist who has helped to develop the land by providing funds, seed, etc. Secondly (*b*) the actual cultivator who, in the mountainous districts, has tamed the wilderness by building terraces, constructing water channels, clearing the ground, etc., and who, in the plains, has similarly, if less laboriously, reclaimed the land by regular tillage and fallow. It is evident that in actual fact a partnership commonly existed or exists between these two classes.

Now it is generally accepted that the intention of the Ottoman legislator, when promulgating the Land Code, was to establish the actual cultivator on the land; and when that cultivator has remained on the same land and effected improvements of a capital nature by his labour, his claim is clear. But the claim of the larger man instanced, who will almost invariably have co-operated in some indispensable way (e.g. by according protection, providing capital or essential assistance), who has very likely been acknowledged as landlord (mallak) and perhaps regularly received mallakiya, cannot be equitably or advisedly disregarded. Investigation on the spot would be needed to weigh the respective claims in each case; but it can be seen that, broadly speaking, local conditions have often produced an association in the development and cultivation of the land between local overlord and cultivating holder in these regions, in which both have rights that should be recognised in their mutual interest as well as that of the country at large.

423 619 In the Irrigation Zone and throughout the desert borders the Turks found the land for the most part in the hands of tribal confederations.

2: Dowson G-5 (1929-30) 1932 MH Iraq MH

be registered to be valid. Thus the Ottoman legislators intended and provided that all holdings of cultivated land should be recorded in the Land Register. The inability of the Ottoman administration to put the land law into force, has left the greater part of the cultivated land of the country in parcels occupied on loose and irregular tenures unrecognised by the Statute law and unrecorded in the present limited Land Register. Instead of comprising, as intended, a record of all cultivated holdings that Register probably excludes from its purview between three-quarters and four-fifths of the cultivated zones. To permit the Land Registry to perform its intended national function and constitute the general and dependable custodian of land tenure that is needed, not only must its administration and procedure be drastically reformed, but the scope of its operations must be steadily extended until they include at least all privately held land of every recognised category. It should in fact become a General Land Registry (Daftarkhana umumiya el arazi) instead of being, as at present, a Department of tapu and mulk registration only. (Dairet el tapu.)

There are three points to which reform must more particularly be directed before the Land Registry can perform its functions. The Land Register is at present a register of transactions or deeds. Registration of deeds is an unreliable and incomplete method of recording rights to land. It should be converted into registration of title. There are also at present two decisive external obstacles to the construction and maintenance of an effective register of title. The first of these is the absence of a dependable cadastral survey. The existing service recognises this need and carries out scattered property surveys itself to the best of its ability: but this is no substitute for a properly controlled survey conducted by the technically competent Department. The second obstacle is the absence of practical provision to make the extreme multiplication and sub-division of shares upon inheritance of mulk property and tapu holdings economically workable. Such extreme shareholding may possibly still be rare, but it occurs*; and it would be fostered by the introduction of an efficient record until the position became unmanageable.

Since the major defects of the existing Land Registry are due for the most part to circumstances outside of the control of the Department itself, no useful purpose will be served by examining its internal procedure in detail now. Nor does space permit here of any explanation of the necessary conversion of the Register into a Register of Title. When the immediate questions of constructive reform have been decided the requisite modifications in the methods and machinery of record that should supplement them can be considered in detail if desired.

7. Land Survey

7. Reference to Part II will recall to mind the position and prospects of the national land survey, which it will be remembered is of a purely topographical nature. So far as can be foreseen it will take about another ten years to complete and map this survey on a scale of 1:10,000 throughout the cultivated area of the country, if the staff and efficiency of the Survey Department are sufficiently strengthened to enable them to push ahead with their general framework and to make good certain other weaknesses while continuing detail survey on the present lines. It may be hoped that Government will be able to afford the Department the necessary financial and administrative support to enable at least this modest forecast to be fulfilled.

* E.g. see "A Report on el 'Iraq," page 33(b), by Ahmed Fahmi Beg, Director-General of Revenue, Government Press, Baghdad, 1923.

423 This forecast could be halved at relatively slight additional expense
647 if a minor expansion of staff of all grades and of resources could be
185 authorised, if land marks could be regularly safeguarded, and if an uninterrupted programme of work could be maintained. This would make a regular and equitable valuation of the Land for purposes of land revenue practicable within a reasonable period (see vi, 9).

But I see no prospect of any general programme of more detailed or larger scale survey being realisable, nor could it be recommended at present.

423 It has already been stressed that the execution of a methodical and
185 trustworthy land survey of the country is a requisite condition of all effective land reform. It is a requisite condition not only of the establishment of a stable and secure land tenure and of an equitable assessment of land revenue, but also of any efficient system of irrigation and indeed of any reliable and systematic knowledge, development and use of the territorial resources of the country. It was, for example, to provide essential information for the Irrigation Department that the Survey has concentrated on work in the Irrigation Zone hitherto. It is, therefore, imperative that while devoting closer and more considered attention to the needs of land tenure in future, the Survey should call no halt in meeting these other primary needs.

Unquestionably a detailed cadastral survey, which reliably locates the limits of all individual holdings, is required to place land tenure and land revenue on to a thoroughly satisfactory basis. Only on the basis of such a survey can the unqualified stability and security of tenure be attained which is required to stimulate the development and productive capacity of the country fully. But the change from pronounced confusion now characteristic of land tenure to detailed order, is too great to be effected at a single step. The requisite detailed cadastral survey would be a lengthy and onerous undertaking for a much richer, better prepared and better equipped country. It should not be attempted in el 'Iraq at present.

[651] Doubtless in the vicinity of the larger towns and in other places, in which the higher value of land brings in commensurate receipts in higher fees or in increased rentals or other revenues to Government, true large scale cadastral surveys may be justified exceptionally. And the ultimate extension of a proper cadastral survey elsewhere, as development proceeds and land values increase, should always be kept in view.

But the hopes of establishing orderly record, secure tenure, and fair and dependable taxation of land throughout the overwhelming mass of the cultivated territories of the country within the next ten or fifteen years, must be based on a foundation of simpler and less detailed survey. To be precise, the measures of attainable land reform within any period worth envisaging at present should be such as are applicable, and can be maintained, in conjunction with a 1:10,000 topographical survey of the cultivated terrain of broadly the same character and accuracy as is now being produced. The work should be converted into (what has been aptly termed elsewhere) a topo-cadastral survey, without markedly increasing the complexity and closeness of the detail. The parcels or sub-divisions of the land adopted as cadastral units for purposes of survey, record and fiscal assessment, must be of considerable size and bounded (at least ordinarily and preponderantly) by easily recognisable physical features. The placing, and still more the subsequent maintenance and control by Government, of a host of artificial boundary beacons outlining individual holdings must be dismissed as entirely impracticable. It will be as much as the country can do to establish and

might embrace all land cases, whether arising from the settlement or not: but if any considered programme of settlement is undertaken, probably more than one Land Court would be required. 185

4. The conduct of settlement operations in the field will be carried out more rapidly, more economically and more effectively by suitable individual executive officers than by Commissions of any sort or by officers with preponderantly judicial experience and training. Executive officers entrusted with the conduct of settlement operations (henceforward called Settlement Officers) should be very carefully selected for qualities of independence, integrity, judgment and experience of the people and the land, as well as for administrative capacity. And they must be capable of conducting simple cases in a judicial manner and exercising simple judicial powers with competence and dignity. For there are bound to be a number of marginal cases on which a minor dispute arises which requires investigation in a judicial manner, but which can most appropriately and economically be dealt with by the Settlement Officer acting in a judicial capacity on the spot.

The regular reference of such minor disputes to the suggested Land Court (or other competent Court) would make settlement impracticable by imposing innumerable delays on its progress and greatly increasing its cost. Such reference would also greatly augment the volume of formal court work. Nor is any gain in justice or efficiency to be expected thereby. A competent officer on the spot is in a much better position to decide the majority of such disputes equitably than a distant court. He will certainly do so more speedily and economically. The majority of more difficult and more doubtful cases alone should be referred to the regular court designated, whose proceedings will gain in value from being able to devote attention exclusively to them.

It is well known that experienced and capable Iraqi officials are at present far too few for the multifarious needs of the country. This is sufficiently evidenced by the enactment of the recent Discipline Law and the proceedings taken under it. Every first class Iraqi will be needed for some time ahead in the regular grades and for the regular work of Government. Settlement of rights is a temporary need apart from the current administration, and Government could not do better than entrust its conduct to some of the present Administrative Inspectors, who are being released from their current duties. It would be impossible to find anywhere a body of officers better fitted to discharge these onerous and responsible functions. They have served the Government of el 'Iraq devotedly for a number of years. They are familiar with the working of the various public services and have long been accustomed to collaborate with them. They have, for the most part, long since shown their knowledge of, and their interest in, the land problems with which they would be required to deal. They are familiar with the fundamental provisions of the current Ottoman Land Code, with post-war legislation affecting land and with the customary practices of the country. They have already had considerable judicial experience as magistrates. They know the country and the language of the people. They know, and are known by, all leading Iraqis. They understand and sympathise with the difficulties of landholders and cultivators, and they would spare no pains to help them. 647 185

5. It would occupy too much space to outline the procedure of settlement in any detail here. Nor will it serve any useful purpose to do so, until the Government have reached a decision on their general policy. But certain broad features of the work may perhaps be usefully indicated. 185

Each Settlement Officer should be entirely responsible for the conduct of settlement operations within a specified Settlement Area and be given the necessary judicial powers for the purpose, subject to such

should also be decided on grounds of common interest and common sense, not by expositions of the law. 185

The management of the miri, or State Domain, date gardens must be mentioned as it has been the subject of controversy for some time and calls for some consistent policy. But interesting and important intrinsically as the points of principle and practice involved are, space does not allow of their consideration here. In its relation to the major problems of the land tenure of the country as a whole, this is a domestic question for the separate consideration of Government in its capacity as one landholder among many. 423

In the Muntafiq liwa, as we have noted, an authoritative settlement of disputes arising out of important and long-standing claims to hold land in tapu tenure was initiated recently under a special law (see iii, 4). But the work appears to be limited to investigations into claims to this tenure alone and thus to fall considerably short of the general settlement of rights to land that is needed throughout the country. If land is declared free of tapu rights it is, I believe, simply recorded as miri without any settlement of the rights of those in occupation of it. Even a successful settlement of tapu rights alone in this, or in any, area is no doubt a valuable contribution to the general introduction of secure land tenure needed: but when all the cost of carrying out investigation of tapu claims is being incurred in a district so honeycombed with them, it would be a great pity to miss the opportunity to effect a thorough and complete settlement. 423 185

And although it was natural, and very possibly desirable, to entrust this particular piece of settlement originally to a Commission, it is permissible to doubt whether the diversion of three important members of the judiciary and two important members of the administration from their normal duties will continue to be justified by any persistent delicacy or difficulty in the investigation of tapu rights in this particular district. The general widespread need of settlement in all parts of the country is commonly admitted. I have represented earlier that the only hope of satisfying this need within the lifetime of the present generation is to adopt the simplest and cheapest procedure and machinery possible everywhere. No doubt the size and composition of the Muntafiq Commission helped to inspire confidence among the disputants with whom it had to deal, but with all its qualities and advantages a Commission of this nature is bound to be costly and deliberate, and unduly to absorb for the benefit of one locality, public service and public funds which can be ill spared from the much wider general national effort that is needed. At a suitable opportunity (of which the Commission itself would be the appropriate judge) the work which they have initiated might be transferred to an organisation of the simpler character that I have recommended for adoption elsewhere, without breach of continuity, authority or efficiency. 423 185 647

In the remaining liwas of the Irrigation Zone there are several canal areas already mentioned (e.g. the Yuseflya canal area) which were settled by the Irrigation Department, when the canals irrigating them were remodelled or constructed. The work that I saw appeared to have been well done and was certainly well recorded. It should not be allowed to fall into confusion. Owing to various chances I did not succeed in visiting the Latifiya estate, which I very much regret, as the lessons to be derived from its methods and experience in the field of agricultural development should be extremely valuable; but in respect of land tenure it can no doubt be regarded as a specially granted and administered canal area.

The Dulaim reach is ripe for settlement because of much good investigatory work already done and recorded; but largely for this very reason, settlement (except possibly in its lower portion) can, I think, 423 185

2: Dowson G-5 (1929-30) 1932 MHl Iraq MHl

PART VIII.—MEASURES RECOMMENDED. ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANISATION

1–8. Unified Planning and Direction of Reform

1. It will be remembered that among the defects which Government expressly sought to cure was the pursuit of reform by three independent Departments of State without proper co-ordination and on no connected plan. I have ventured earlier to express the view that these Departments were not in a position to adopt a suitable common plan or to pursue it unitedly. But it is also important to realise that their Departmental duties are not properly reconcilable with the conduct of the requisite reforms.

In considering the administrative organisation of reform it is desirable to distinguish clearly between the men, measures and machinery needed: (i) to produce order initially out of the chaos inherited from past centuries, and (ii) to consolidate and perpetuate this order as it is secured. These two processes may be conveniently called the execution, and the conservation, of reform.

The executive programme of reform should co-ordinate in one carefully balanced and united effort:

(i) The study and revision of the land law.

(ii) The completion of the topo-cadastral survey.

(iii) The systematic valuation of the land for revenue purposes.

(iv) The general settlement of rights to land.

The economy, speed and quality of the results will depend upon the efficiency of the combination secured. But although the importance of the initial execution of reform is supreme, and although it will necessarily occupy many years, yet administratively, legally and financially it should be recognised to be a special, terminable, capital effort.

The conservation subsequently of the benefits secured by this initial capital effort would necessitate administratively

(i) The progressive establishment, and maintenance up-to-date thereafter, of a General Land Register or Land Book.

(ii) The corresponding maintenance up-to-date of the complementary topo-cadastral survey.

(iii) The establishment of suitable ancillary land revenue records based on the above.

Throughout this Report I have avoided any detailed discussion of these conservancy measures: because the execution of initial reform is a sufficiently complex matter and is independently justified. And it seems more reasonable to defer consideration of methods of conserving reform, until it has been decided whether such reform will be undertaken. It may, however, be observed that if the requisite reforms are carried out successfully, there should be no intrinsic difficulty about subsequent conservation of the results; although it will demand a thoroughly efficient

185 organisation. Moreover, the current cost of such conservation should be balanced by current fees.

But if it is reasonable and proper to defer consideration of conservancy measures which may or may not be needed, consideration of the administrative organisation best suited to give effect to these measures can also be deferred.

2. If the activities to be co-ordinated in the execution of the initial programme of reform are again referred to, it will be seen how slight is any functional aptitude of any of the three specified Departments to undertake this work, and how strong are the reasons of public policy that should preclude them from participation in its conduct. The necessary study and revision of the land law must in any case be taken up by specially selected individuals. The completion of the land survey is the express business of quite another department. Land valuation could no doubt be undertaken by the Revenue Department and the Survey Departments in co-operation, if this was a solitary measure; but it will be more easily, cheaply and satisfactorily effected as part of the general programme of reform. Moreover, it is really preferable that this valuation should be carried out by an organisation occupying a midway position between the fisc and the taxpayer, and not functionally concerned with raising revenue. Again a general settlement of rights is a process that none of the three departments mentioned are in any way organised or equipped to undertake. Such a settlement will necessitate a special staff and special arrangements in any event; while it is imperative that the judicial character and independence of the proceedings shall be unchallengeable. This dominant consideration should preclude all idea of settlement being conducted by either the State Domains or the Tapu Departments. For the State Domains should be responsible for presenting the State's rights as a landholder throughout the whole course of settlement and will thus occupy a partisan position, although most rightly and properly. And during the course of the work the settlement authorities will be continuously required to scrutinise, interpret and adjudicate on Tapu documents and records. It will be the duty of the officials of the Tapu Department to do their best to expound and explain such material to the settlement officers; but the latter must be open to no charge of departmental bias influencing their decisions.

185 647 But although the Departments of Revenue, of State Domains and of Tapu should be dissociated from any participation in the execution of reform, and although they cannot be justly held responsible for failure to unite to produce and promote a programme of such reform in the past, yet the serious character of the defect in organisation indicated by Government, is only emphasised thereby. It is to the lack of a competent executive authority charged with the unified study and conduct of the necessary reforms, that the persistent failure of successive governments throughout the last decade to proceed from discussion to action must be primarily attributed. For the volume of memoranda and correspondence on the subject from the early days of the administration onwards, shows a constant and clearly understood appreciation of the need to put the systems of land tenure and land revenue on to a healthier basis. In the early days settlement of rights indeed appears to have been actually started in one or more districts. But during the latter half of the period the discussions have been characterised by uncertainty and disagreement as to the methods and means whereby the necessary objectives might be attained.

185 If a single central authority, possessing vigour and initiative, had been responsible to Government for the planning and general direction of the requisite reforms, a mass of sterile interdepartmental discussions

4 AND 5. LAND SURVEY

185 4. The general direction and control of all survey work should be left to the technical head of that service. Any administrative subordination of the Survey Department to the small Central Lands Office would only be an inconvenience to both sides and nothing is to be gained by it, if it is clearly recognised that the Survey Department's primary duty is to co-operate as closely and effectively as possible with the Lands Office in carrying out the Government's general plan of land reform. For purposes of the programme of land survey, that plan must provide for the progressive requirements of concurrent development in other branches of work, notably of irrigation; but no departures from the approved national programme of survey should be permitted without the concurrence of the Central Lands Office, as the plan of general land reform, its cost and its speed, will be dependent upon a steady and punctual performance of that programme.

185 647 The Survey Department is rightly recognised to be a specialist scientific service; and good work has been done in organising and equipping it for its duties. But its importance as an agent of economic progress appears to me to be insufficiently appreciated, while circumstances have interfered with its vigorous use in the steady execution of a national programme of land survey drawn up in consultation with the public services primarily concerned. It also possesses serious weaknesses which must be cured if it is to play its essential part in the well-co-ordinated effort without which the successful development of the country will remain a dream.

The land survey of a large, varied and previously unmapped country, like el 'Iraq, is a formidable scientific operation. It would be wasteful and short-sighted to an extreme degree to grudge the few additional specialist officers and the gradual addition to its accommodation and resources that are needed to enable this indispensable service to carry out its work punctually, reliably and to proper general advantage. A first-class Observer to push on with the primary triangulation is long overdue. Effective measures must be taken to protect survey reference marks. Additional specialist assistance is greatly needed in the Mathematical Office and in the performance of the chain of scientific processes whereby the surveyors' field work is reproduced and published as series of national maps. Map drawing, map reproduction by modern photo-metal processes and map printing, under the difficult climatic conditions existing in Baghdad, call for great skill, knowledge and experience, if they are to be successfully and economically performed. The publication of the Department's maps is very much in arrear, as has been already noted. And yet the value of national expenditure on survey operations is seriously minimised if the work remains locked away in the Department's cupboards in the form of original drawings, instead of being published in printed maps available to all. More systematic provision for the training of Iraqi staff in the technical operations of survey is also very necessary.

And timely consideration should be given to the whole question of the situation of the Survey Department and the arrangements for its present and future accommodation. The present site of the Department is, or is likely to become, valuable; and it is by no means the most suitable for the delicate processes of map reproduction. Again a fireproof map store is badly needed. The original field sheets and records of the Survey (and to a lesser extent its eventually published map series) represent the capitalised value of all the expenditure of past years on this branch of work. The set back to the country if all these records were destroyed as development of all sorts was at length getting well

under way, would take many years and a large expenditure of money to retrieve. And such wholesale destructions of valuable public documents have quite frequently occurred elsewhere. Perhaps an opportunity might be found to transfer the whole Department to less valuable, less busy and less dusty, but more commodious precincts, where its map reproduction offices, its map stores, etc., might be planned for gradual expansion as the Land Survey of the country extends. Scientific organisations, such as this, depending upon the punctual co-operation of numerous specialist branches are wasteful to administer if badly arranged and they are costly to move after they have been long established. A central urban situation is neither necessary nor desirable, for the Headquarter Offices of a national land survey.

185 647

3. Another matter calling for early consideration is the amalgamation of the two existing organisations charged with the conduct of land survey—the Survey Department proper and the Survey branch of the Tapu Department. The Survey Department has had a somewhat chequered career; but two important steps in the direction of constituting it the single unified national service that is required for the economical and effective conduct of land surveys, appear to have been previously taken. In 1922 about half of the survey staff of the Tapu Department were absorbed by the Survey Department proper; while in 1923 the Irrigation Department, which had previously carried out its own surveys, transferred its Survey Division to the Survey Department. The process should now be completed.

When I was in el 'Iraq the comparable field staff of these two existing land survey services were returned to me as follows:

Survey Department	*Tapu Survey Branch*
3 Survey Officers	1 Director (Mudir)
14 Inspectors	4 Inspectors
100 Surveyors	58 Surveyors

I wish to make it clear that the development of its own little Survey Department by the Tapu Department is a matter for commendation: not for reproach. That Department realised acutely the need to define with some approach to accuracy the parcels of land which were purported to be held on tapu tenure. The National Survey were either non-existent or too weak at the time to assist, so that two parallel survey organisations were established.

The arrangement is none the less indefensible and absurd from the national standpoint. If the land surveys carried out by the smaller organisation are necessary in the public interest they should be carried out under the technical direction and control of the competent public service. In the course of this report various weaknesses in the Survey Department proper have been indicated. Of the lesser service it may be briefly said that, in spite of much keenness and appreciation of technical needs it is not, and cannot be, either properly organised and equipped or adequately directed technically to execute land surveys of the quality and permanence which expenditure of public funds should secure. No country, and particularly no country which requires the utmost economy and efficiency of effort to promote its primary development, should attempt to maintain two organisations to carry out the indivisible task of a national land survey. It is otherwise with what may be called engineering surveying or lay-outs for railways, roads, etc. These are sectional operations which can be best performed by the Engineering services concerned; but even these services should, and no

185

186 doubt would, make the fullest use of the National Land Survey and leave all genuine land survey operations to it.

I do not advocate any hasty change. That would probably do more harm than good. But I venture to urge that it should be accepted in principle that this duality must be terminated as rapidly as the mutual convenience of the Survey Department proper and the Tapu Department permit. And among the duties of the proposed Central Lands Office should be the examination at an early date, in consultation with the Tapu Department and the Survey Department, of the comparative public advantages (i) of continuing to carry out the Tapu Department's special programme unabated, or (ii) of employing a portion of the resulting addition to the Survey Department's resources on the greatly needed acceleration of the national programme. I am not questioning the intrinsic value of the former, and so far as it meets specific Land Registry needs which are covered by fees received, it should doubtless be continued; but it may well be that on mature and comprehensive consideration the acceleration of the national programme of survey may justify some sacrifice of the more purely departmental work.

6. Administration of Areas Awaiting Settlement

6. However intensively, and by whatsoever methods, a general settlement of rights to land is conducted, there will for many years be a large balance of unsettled holdings, which balance can only be very gradually redressed. The satisfactory administration of these unsettled holdings pending their turn for settlement, is one of the most serious problems of the transition period; but it is clearly one that will be more manageable and better understood, if homogeneous settled and unsettled areas are maintained so far as possible. Any attempts to effect a general settlement sporadically would not only dissipate energy and resources (as previously pointed out), but also further complicate the administration of unsettled land by causing settled and unsettled holdings to occur increasingly intermixed side by side. It has already been recognised that sporadic settlement of some special holdings will be necessary; but this should not occasion undue difficulty if it is restricted to really necessary cases.

185 647 It is the current mangement of the enormous extent of miri land during the years preceding settlement that is however the main problem. This must in practice be conducted for the most part, as at present, by the local officers of the provincial administration, except in areas under some form of tribal or sectional occupation. Some measure of central supervision and control must be maintained. This can continue to be exercised most suitably by the State Domains Section, which, I believe, is now administered in association with Land Revenue, under the Ministry of Finance. In advance of settlement this association of functions appears to me to be both an economical and a convenient 185 arrangement. If land valuation is undertaken methodically in the manner suggested, there will gradually be formed in advance of settlement a national roll of land revenue payers who will also for the most part be claimants to prescriptive rights to hold and use miri land. So that the connection between the supervision of miri land and of land revenue will throughout the pre-settlement stage be close. After settlement the work of both services should be greatly simplified and new arrangements would probably be required; but these can be more usefully discussed after the measures of executive reform to be undertaken have been decided.

3: Clark S-5 (1950)1951 MH1 Iraq MH1

If developments of this kind proceed it is likely that the agricultural productivity of Iraq will increase considerably. Although most of the profits will find their way into the pockets of a few, more taxable wealth is likely to be produced which could wisely be devoted to the development of educational and other social services. Indeed, if means could be devised of applying income tax to such profits, considerable additional revenues for public services would accrue.

The Dujaila Project of Land Settlement. But perhaps the most hopeful and significant economic and social development which is taking place in Iraq is the Dujaila Project of Land Settlement.

Some years ago, as one of the first attempts at land reform, the Government distributed parcels of land to small, independent farmers. The Government provided the irrigation facilities and, on the land which could consequently be brought under cultivation, allowed families to settle. The scheme was not nearly so successful as it should have been, partly because some of the tenants lacked sufficient farming experience but mainly because it was not accompanied by a scheme for providing agricultural advice. Further, because of the failure to institute adequate drainage arrangements, there is a danger that much of the land in the settlement area will lose its fertility through otherwise avoidable salinity.

In the Dujaila area, in the province of Kut, the Government are now in process of organizing a much more satisfactory and intelligently conceived scheme of land settlement. In 1945 a large tract of hitherto uncultivated land, roughly seventy kilometres long and about half that distance wide, was selected as an area for land settlement. The scheme is being organized by a department known as the Dujaila Directorate to which a reasonable delegation of powers has been given. Its main features may be summarized as follows:

(1) Each settler, who must have had previous agricultural experience in or near the locality, is provided with a holding of about sixty acres. The settler has to sign a well-devised form of contract which binds him for a period of ten years to farm his holding in accordance with advice given by the agriculturalists and horticulturalists attached to the Directorate. At the end of ten years the holding is apparently vested in the holder in a form of limited freehold.

(2) Each settler is eligible to apply for an initial grant not exceeding £100 for the purchase of equipment, assistance towards the building of his house and farm buildings.

(3) Each settler must plant sufficient trees around his holding,

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educational policy in the light of opinions and schemes based on his own inevitably limited educational experience, or by considerations of his own political group or sect, but as a trustee of the educational interest of the whole country.

The Formation of a National Council of Education. It was also suggested by the special committee referred to that a means of assisting successive Ministers to pursue a consistent policy of educational advance would be the creation of a National Council of Education which would be composed of Directors-General of Education, the Deans of Institutions of Higher Education, representatives from other Ministries whose co-operation is essential in educational progress, representatives appointed by Parliament, and other leading personalities in the country. It was suggested that 'the principle function of this National Council of Education should be to ensure that educational policy is well-founded and that there is stability in its application'. In other words, the National Council of Education would be a continuing body pledged to an agreed national policy of educational development from which successive Ministers of Education would find it difficult to depart.

It appears that a properly constituted National Council of Education has never been formed. Some such bodies have been established and abolished from time to time at the discretion of successive Ministers. One reason given for failure to maintain a National Council of Education is that the Minister should justify himself, not to a Committee of 'experts' but to public opinion. Theoretically there is much to be said for such an explanation but, in a country where the bulk of the population have not had educational opportunity and cannot therefore be articulate in public affairs, it is difficult to decide what constitutes a sound public opinion in matters educational.

A new Education Law giving the Ministry of Education the necessary powers and duties to cope with present pressing demands and needs is overdue. Such a law should include categorical provision for the establishment of a well-balanced National Council of Education with a dignified status. It should have definite powers and duties and meet at regular and legally stipulated intervals. The Minister should be required to consult the Council on major changes of policy, and should not make changes without a majority decision by it. The Council should approve all major plans and developments and regulations of the Ministry before they become effective. Most important, the National Council should have the power of initiating discussion and enquiry as it thinks fit, and should not necessarily await the invitation of the Minister before so doing.

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ment or official discrimination, were now forced to pay in full. The political unrest of 1920 was not primarily due to this heavy taxation, as Lord Islington declared in the House of Lords,[1] but the fact remains that the taxation was harassing. The inability of the landlords, dignitaries, and tribes to evade taxation as they had once escaped it influenced them to throw their weight against a regime which was determined to collect what it demanded. Moreover, gratitude for the fact that for the first time in the lives of the tax-payers, tangible and concrete returns for their money were visible, was often lost in the knowledge that they had no voice in the initiation or incidence of taxation or in the choice of the objects of expenditure which, because they were essentially desirable in the eyes of the British administrators, were placed in the budget estimates regardless of whether or not the expenditure had corresponding value in the desires and standards of the tax-payers or whether it was necessary for the peculiar needs of the country.

Notwithstanding early instructions to the contrary, as on March 29th, 1917, the Civil Administration employed comparatively few Arabs in responsible administrative positions. Arabs drawing Rs. 600 or more per month[2] on August 1st, 1920, numbered 20 and formed but 3·74 per cent of the 534 officers in the same category.[3] The remaining 514 officers were British or Indian officials. Nor were the various advisory Councils, of which so much has been made as indicating the participation of responsible Arabs in their own government,[4] of any practical value, having been so organized as to make their effect negligible on the conduct of the Administration except in minor local affairs.

[1] *Parl. Debates*, H. of L., 5th S., Vol. XL (1920), pp. 850-1.

[2] Following the official division as in *Review C. Admin.*, 1914-1920, p. 122.

[3] The Arabs so employed were distributed among the departments as follows: Judicial Department, 10; Divisional Political Staff, 4; Irrigation, 3; T&P0., 2; Waqf, 1. Telegram No. 9804, Civil Commissioner, Baghdad to S/S for India, August 14th, 1920.

[4] *Review Civil Admin., O.T.*, 1914-1918, pp. 24-6. Ibid., 1914-1920, pp. 131-2.

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CIVIL ADMINISTRATION

This situation was due partly to the lack of 'Iraqis who, by training, education and character, could stand comparison with the ability and efficiency of the British and Indian officials, and partly to the view, in accordance with the local official policy that direct British control must be maintained, that 'the interests of the country will be served by having a large proportion of British personnel in all branches of the Administration'[1]. Indeed, it was from Indian rather than Arab sources that both administrative methods and officials were drawn. In 1917, 29 of the 59 officers serving in the Civil Administration of Baghdad Wilayet, came from services in India, either directly or on loan from the military authorities. The proportion, roughly, held good in Basra Wilayet as well.[2] In 1920, although only 79 of the 507 British Officers drawing over Rs. 600 per month were on the active lists of the Indian Government services, a much greater proportion of these as well as of the 515 British Officers drawing less than Rs. 600 had Indian training and experience. No less than 1280 of the Indian and British officials in the latter category came from the Civil Service of India.[3] A total of 2216 Indians was employed, who with the 1022 British officials, composed 50·5 per cent of the total administrative personnel, excluding the railroad staff and the non-administrative ranks of the Police and the Levies.[4] Of the railway personnel, numbering 24,928 of all grades on April 1st, 1920, 80 per cent were Indians, 3 per cent were Europeans and 17 per cent were inhabitants of the country, including Arabs, Kurds, and Jews.[5]

[1] *Admin. Report, Baghdad*, 1917, p. 3. The figures above, together with the Acting Civil Commissioner's persistent refusal to set up an Arab Government in Mōsul, as ordered by H.M. Government, May 9th, 1919, make it difficult to understand his later statement (Wilson, op. cit., p: 313), 'from the outset I did my best to induce H.M. Government to allow me to introduce a very large Arab element into the Civil Administration'.

[2] *Admin. Report, Baghdad*, 1917, p. 2.

[3] Telegram No. 9268, Civil Commissioner, Baghdad to S/S for India, July 31st, 1920.

[4] Table III. Also, Telegram No. 9804, Civil Commissioner, Baghdad to S/S for India, August 14th, 1920.

[5] *Review C. Admin.*, 1914-1920, p. 118.

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175' 727' 647 The Acting Civil Commissioner has disclaimed with perfect sincerity all intention on his part for thus organizing Mesopotamia along Anglo-Indian lines.[1] Nevertheless, the fact remains that whatever his personal intentions may have been, the great

TABLE III

Officers and Personnel
Employed by the Civil Administration, August 1st, 1920.*

		British	*Indian*	*Inhabitants Occupied Territory*
Part I	Officers and Personnel drawing over Rs. 600 per month			
	Central Administration	5	—	—
	Divisional ,,	106	—	4
	Other branches	396	7	16
	Total	507	7	20
Part II	Officers drawing less than Rs. 600 per month			
	Central Administration	55	62	123
	Divisional ,,	28	316	862
	Other branches	432	1,831	2,167
	Total	515	2,209	3,152
	Grand Total	1,022	2,216	3,172

Total non-Arab staff 3,238

Above does not include Railways or non-administrative rank and file of Police and Levies (less than Rs. 600).

* Based on *Review C. Admin.*, 1914-1920, p. 122, and on various monthly *Lists of Officers (Part I and II) Serving Under the Civil Commissioner, M.E.F.*

strides toward creating a bureaucracy, staffed and administered on Indian lines as has been indicated above, took place during his period of office. The early division of the country into political districts as in British India with a British officer at each key position, responsible to the central administration, to which voluminous reports and statistics were dispatched in

[1] Wilson, Sir A. T., op. cit., p. 304.

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accordance with Indian practice for every aspect of life within the division, was extended and the hierarchy of officials increased from 1918 to 1920. The very titles borne in India, Civil Commissioner, Political Officer, Assistant Political Officer, Revenue Officer, Judicial Officer and others were reproduced in the 'Iraq administration.[1]

Whether or not the Acting Civil Commissioner desired to extend the Indian system or not, the shadow of India was over him at all times. Such administrative practices as he had learned by 1914, when at the age of thirty he was inducted into the political service in Mesopotamia, had been learned in India. His early assistants with a few notable exceptions, had been trained in Indian methods and with a tenacity characteristic of Indian Civil Servants, refused to acknowledge that methods applicable to Indians might not be suitable for Arabs. Officers came from other parts of the Empire but the Indian tradition remained.[2]

Much of the Indian influence on the character of the administration in 'Iraq was undoubtedly due to the fact that India had provided both the motive and the personnel for the Expeditionary Force. The original intention of making Mesopotamia a dependency of India had been given up but the rumour persisted and had to be officially denied.[3] The early suggestion that 'Iraq might provide an outlet for India's surplus population[4] had subsided but had not entirely died out even in official circles.[5] The strongest claim, however, which India

[1] Political Officer H. R. P. Dickson had suggested in 1917 that familiar Arab titles be given to the British officers. *Admin. Report, Suq esh-Shuyukh*, 1916-1917, p. 20.

[2] There has been a suggestion of a Civil Service on the lines of the Indian Civil Service, but comprising 'Iraq, the Sudan and the Levant generally Telegram, S/S for India to Political, Baghdad, March 29th, 1917; also Ormsby Gore, W., *J. C. Asian Soc.*, Vol. VII (1920).

[3] Telegram No. 3070, Balfour, Paris, to Political, Baghdad, February 10th, 1919.

[4] *J. C. Asian Soc.*, Vol. IV (1917), p. 87.

[5] The Secretary of State for India, Edwin Montagu, writing in February, 1918, in *My Indian Diary* (1930), p. 250, seems to have had in mind some colonizing scheme for Mesopotamia.

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had been sent to the Euphrates area by the Council to study civil reorganization; to the Muntafiq *Liwā*, until the British troops had been withdrawn; and to the Kurdish districts until their future status had been decided. Sir Percy Cox had already approved of the creation of the Baghdad Municipal Council which, although sanctioned under the previous regime, had been so mistrusted and so hedged with limitations as to be valueless as an instrument of government. The new Council had full executive and financial powers, subject to the general supervision of the *Mutasarrif* of the *Liwā*.

Appointments to administrative offices were vested in the Council of State, subject to the approval of the High Commissioner, by Section XIV of the Instructions.[1] In practice, this arrangement was applied by the Council of State only to those posts for which the Sultan's *firmān* had been required under the Ottoman regime. For other posts, appointments were made on the authority of the Minister concerned. In all cases, however, it was understood that no appointments involving the displacement of British or Indian officials were to be proposed to the Council without previous consultation with the High Commissioner.

The actual transfer of power in the provinces awaited the re-establishment of comparative peace and stability. Not until January 10th, therefore, following the return of Ja'far Pasha and the Commission from the Euphrates area, was the Minister of Interior permitted to put forward his first list of administrative appointments.[2]

The principal criticism of the list came from Shī'a sources. Their original grievances, other than inherent opposition to the British-controlled provisional Government itself, had been

[1] Appendix VI.

[2] Only four major administrative appointments had been made previously by the Council, all in Baghdad and vicinity; Mahmūd Nādim Beg Tabaqjali, *Qaimmāqam* of Mandali, November 19th, 1920; Mumtaz Beg al-Daftari, *Qaimmāqam* of Kādhimain, November 21st, 1920; 'Ahmad Beg, *Qaimmāqam* of Sāmarrā, December 1st, 1920; Rashīd Beg al-Khojah, *Mutasarrif* of Baghdad, December 11th, 1920.

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that no Shī'ī held a portfolio on the Council. Their resentment was not decreased by the fact that of five *Mutasarrifs* and nine *Qaimmāqams* on the list, only one, a *Qaimmāqam*, was of their sect. The High Commissioner, however, realized the difficulty of avoiding Sunnī appointments. Only a few trained and experienced Shī'īs were available as a result both of their habitual boycott of Turkish service and professional schools and of official Turkish discouragement to the entrance of Shī'īs into office and schools. The list with minor alterations was, therefore, approved in late January, 1921. When, however, the predominantly Sunnī Council continued to indicate, by appointing Sunnīs to the almost entirely Shī'a districts along the Euphrates, that it was prepared to do little to conciliate hostile opinion of the sect, the High Commissioner felt obliged to make a firm stand for the appointment of Shī'īs to such places, at least, where members of the sect predominated. After considerable persuasion, also, a place in the Council was found for a Shī'ī, the Ministry of Education being offered to Saiyid Muhammad Mahdī Tobatabai of Karbalā.

The reorganization of the Judicial Department under the new administration entailed comparatively few changes. Sir Edgar Bonham-Carter, who now became Adviser to the Ministry of Justice, had early adopted the policy of making the fullest use of 'Iraqīs as judges and officials, and of making no alterations in the institutions and laws with which the people were familiar, except in cases of clear necessity. The idea itself of an Arab Minister was not new. Sir Edgar had suggested such an appointment in early 1919,[1] but it had been deemed premature.

Reorganization of the Criminal Courts became necessary, however, when the Council of State adopted its scheme of reconstructing provincial administration along the lines of the Turkish system. One of the essential features of that system was the complete separation of the executive from the judicial

[1] Memorandum on Place of the Arab in Administration, February 5th, 1919.

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646 blood from the ranks of those who have absorbed with their education a modicum of civil spirit and a sense of duty to the State, it might yet prove to be the vital political institution of 'Iraq.

Whether these conditions will be attained or whether parliamentary institutions themselves will be retained under the present Government, it is too soon to determine.[1] It is not too much to believe, however, bearing in mind the historical pattern of other dictatorships based on military force, that should the Chamber attempt to take an independent attitude, or should an opposition party arise, the Chamber will have a short life, and that the eventual overthrow of the constitution must follow, together with the loss of such rights and liberties as are now valued by the people of 'Iraq and the destruction of all those conditions essential for the development and maintenance of democracy.

Administrative Services

• 647 A major difficulty which has faced 'Iraq in the development of her administration has been the lack of a regularly organized Civil Service with regulations governing cadres, appointments, promotions and conditions of service.

Attempts to organize cadres for the various branches of administration, made as early as 1923 when a Cadre Commission was appointed[2] and renewed from time to time, as in 1926[3] and 1928,[4] have not been productive of a systematic

[1] Freedom of voting and introduction of new blood marked the elections to the new Chamber which convened on February 27th, 1937. It was apparent, however, even before the secondary elections had been held that the candidates, as in all past elections, had been selected so that there would be little or no opposition in the Chamber.

[2] By a decision of the Council of Ministers, March 5th, 1923: see also *Admin. Report*, 1923-1924, p. 124.

[3] Ibid., 1926, p. 70.

[4] The Cadre Commission was reorganized by the Council, October 6th, 1928. See also ibid., 1928, pp. 66-7.

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organization of the services. The Civil Service Law of 1931,[1] although it attempted to provide detailed regulations for the Civil Service, has not produced adequate and satisfactory results, not even being generally applied before October, 1932. Its comparative lack of success has been due in part to the constant reorganization of departments and in part to the tendency, restrained as far as possible while the British officials were in authority, to provide posts, either by turning out former occupants or by creating new positions, for applicants whose qualifications were too often those of relationship or personal influence rather than those of ability and capacity.

The result has been a general feeling of insecurity among practically all appointed officials, even those who might be expected to occupy permanent posts, a feeling not appreciably altered by the manner in which the State Official Discipline Law of 1929[2] has been applied. The sense of insecurity, accentuated by dismissals on a large order which have frequently followed Ministerial changes or which have been made in the name of economy as in 1931 or in February 1936, when over 300 officials, many of them highly placed, were dismissed[3] has no doubt contributed to the aversion, amounting in individual cases to fear, which most officials have evinced towards the assumption of responsibility and initiative. All executive authority within departments of State tend to be centralized in the offices of the Ministers. This has been due partially to the system of dual control and responsibility between British and 'Iraqī officials and partially to practices inherited from the Ottoman regime. Every official, as a result, has looked to the official above him to assume the initiative and the responsibility for every action which he has performed, fearing to launch any new idea or plan or to risk any departure from routine for fear of censure and dismissal.

[1] *Compilation*, 1931, p. 191: Civil Service Law No. 103 of 1931.
[2] State Officials Discipline Law No. 41 of 1929 in *Compilation*, 1929, p. 24.
[3] *Great Britain and the East*, March 5th, 26th, 1936.

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647 As a result, officials, even those nominally responsible, have tended to become mere head clerks in their own departments, while Ministers have found themselves overburdened with work. The British Advisers, especially before October, 1932, were able to assist in reducing the burden of the Ministers but elsewhere the administration was retarded in pace and was lowered in quality.

[563] Among officials belonging to minority communities, as the Jews and Christians, the lack of security and the desire to avoid responsibility has been doubly apparent as the result of widespread opposition to the employment of any but 'Iraqis professing Islam. This opposition was evinced as early as 1921, when Jews and Christians were included in the outcry against the employment of foreigners. Although members of these communities have been employed especially in posts attached to the Financial and Technical departments and have even occupied Ministerial positions,[1] the tendency seems to have been to retard their advancement, as evinced in June, 1936, when promotions of Jewish employees as made by the Director of the 'Iraq Government Railway were cancelled by order of the Minister,[2] or to eliminate them as far as possible from Government service, a trend which has been more apparent in recent years.

Finance

652 In the development of 'Iraq's financial system from 1925, three major problems presented themselves: the reorganization of the land-revenue system including its purification from abuses and the development of land-settlement, the equalization of the

[1] Sasûn Effendi Haskail, a Jew, and Yûsuf Ghanima, a Christian, served repeatedly as Ministers of Finance.

[2] So vehement was the outcry in the vernacular press over the promotion of the Jewish employees that not only were the promotions cancelled, but disciplinary action had to be taken by the Bureau of Press and Propaganda and an order issued that no promotions should be made without prior sanction of the Minister. See *Great Britain and the East*, July 2nd, 16th, 1936.

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eases are still rampant and infant mortality is distressingly high.

In agriculture the wave of optimism of the early 1920's has ebbed away. The Agricultural School at Rustam has been curtailed in funds, in purpose and in function. Improved machinery and agricultural methods foreshadowed during the British Occupation have not been introduced generally and are still regarded with disfavour in many quarters. Cotton, once believed to be the crop in which 'Iraq would rival the Sudan and India has been rendered unprofitable by boll-weevil, by hot winds, by the reluctance of the *fallahīn* to cultivate a strange crop which does not provide a living for themselves as it grows, and by the drastic fall in world prices. Wheat and barley remain of low quality, the foreign market being practically lost. Improvement in packing and marketing dates, 'Iraq's principal crop, has been apparent but effective co-operation among the growers is still lacking. Cheering features, however, have been the negotiations whereby Japan may take 'Iraqī wool and the signature of an agreement between 'Iraq and Palestine, December 14th, 1936, granting 'Iraq a free zone at Haifa and numerous commercial concessions.[1] The favourable trade balance of £217,000 for 1934-35, recently announced by the Ministry of Finance, is also encouraging.[2]

Large-scale industries are, for the present, practically non-existent although a number of projects, such as cement making, have been under consideration for some time. The Department of Labour Affairs, necessitated by 'Iraq's entrance into the League of Nations has had few important matters to come into its hands, although a law protecting 'Iraqī labour against foreign competition has been recently passed.[3]

These brief summaries of tendencies apparent in the political, economic and social life of 'Iraq seem to indicate, on the basis of absolute standards, the development of 'Iraq along unsatisfactory lines. It is only fair, however, in judging a government

[1] *G.B. and E.*, March 11th, 1937. [2] *Al-'Iraq*, September 7th, 1936.
[3] *G.B. and E.*, December 26th, 1935.

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mals offers a more practical answer to their needs at this time. Experience in Iraq shows that tractor plowing may increase yields by 20 to 50 percent, largely through more effective destruction of weeds and partly also through better preparation of the soil. Much the same effect could, however, be achieved through better animal-drawn plows replacing those which now, for the most part, barely scratch the surface and fail to uproot the weeds. Means for the acquisition of such tools and improved draft animals should be created through the organization of cooperatives and the provision of better credit facilities.

Mechanization will nevertheless play an increasingly important role in the future, especially as labor becomes more scarce and additional land becomes available for cultivation. Mechanization has already facilitated the expansion of cultivation in the dry-farming areas of Mosul and the new pump-irrigated lands in central Iraq. While certain areas in the irrigation zone are undoubtedly overpopulated in relation to land currently available, in other areas, particularly in the rain-fed zone, labor is scarce relative to the supply of land. As development schemes are launched and new land is opened up for settlement, the available manpower on lands already under cultivation may well be reduced. The government will need therefore to take steps to insure that mechanization will keep pace with developing requirements. In the period immediately ahead, however, the government should be mindful of the possibility that mechanization initiated by landowners may result in a substantial reduction of the portion of the crop going to sharecroppers or in the displacement of sharecroppers before alternative means of employment or settlement become available. Through its control over the importation and distribution of machinery and the extension of credit for the purchase of such machinery, the government will have the power to influence the direction of mechanization and thus minimize to some extent possibly adverse social consequences.

At present only a small portion of Iraqi agriculture is mechanized. Combines and tractors in operation are reported to number 320 and 750 respectively, with about half of the number concentrated in the provinces of Mosul and Baghdad. Of these, 75 combines and 81 tractors are owned by the Agricultural Machinery

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Administration, an autonomous agency within the Ministry of Economics. The AMA rents this machinery to farmers and, in addition, is responsible for testing and demonstrating new machinery, licensing of imports and controlling the distribution of the limited supply of spare parts in order to prevent black-marketing.

Some provision for rental of machinery, whether by the government or by private enterprise, will be necessary for some time, partly because it enables farmers to become acquainted with the value of such machinery and partly because many farmers do not have sufficient capital for outright purchase. As long as private enterprise is incapable of providing this service at reasonable rentals or until cooperatives can be established, continuation of the government rental service appears essential. On the whole, therefore, the AMA's three-year program to replace and expand its machinery park and to equip repair shops appears desirable despite the obvious drawbacks of government operation. At present, however, the AMA is operating at a substantial loss. In the calendar year 1951, for instance, its rental income will probably not exceed ID 50,000 compared with estimated operating costs, including depreciation, of about ID 150,000. Since the beginning of 1950, when it started operations as a fiscally autonomous agency, it has had to cover its deficits out of the ID 500,000 capital which the government undertook to provide. While the government should probably defray that part of the AMA's expenditures not directly attributable to the rental operations, the overall deficit should be reduced by gradually increasing rental charges. Rental charges on tractors, in particular, appear unduly low and may be depriving private persons of the incentive to purchase tractors either for their own use or for rental to others.

Since the overhead costs of the AMA's rental operations will probably always remain rather high and its machinery must be transported over considerable distances, it is important that the government encourage as much as possible private purchase and operation of machinery. The extension of credit for this purpose appears essential. At present, however, the Agricultural Bank cannot lend money on farm equipment partly because it is short of funds and partly because such loans would not afford sufficient security in the absence of any legal requirement to register title TO MACHINERY.

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to machinery. In the future cooperative ownership and operation, especially in the new settlement areas, should be encouraged as one of the best means of extending the use of machinery on a practicable and economical basis. The experience of the Dujaila cooperative, which, owing to low overhead and transport costs, rents machinery to its members at rates lower than those of the AMA and yet is apparently able to cover the cost of depreciation, seems promising in this respect.

Lack of repair facilities and spare parts have greatly handicapped mechanization. The government is seeking to overcome this difficulty both by establishing its own repair shops and by requiring importers to provide repair facilities and maintain minimum stocks of spare parts. Such centrally located shops will be available, however, only for major repairs. Since local repair facilities are now almost wholly lacking, steps should also be taken to establish a considerable number of small shops equipped to undertake minor repairs. In addition, courses designed to train drivers in elementary maintenance are urgently needed. The cost of mechanization will remain discouragingly high unless the life of machinery is prolonged by more adequate maintenance and repair.

3. Soil-building and Forage Crops: Fertilizers

The cultivation of soil-building and forage crops is virtually unknown even though the fertility of the soil needs to be replenished and an improvement in feed supply would make the greatest single contribution to an increase in the low productivity of livestock. In the irrigation zone berseem clover, sown in the grain stubble in late summer, would provide a particularly good pasture, soiling and hay crop. In the rain-fed region winter oats and vetch, when cut and cured, would provide a good reserve feed. In the irrigation zone quick-growing crops such as millet could be grown for summer pasture; and more corn, sorghum and legumes such as cowpeas and mungo beans should be cultivated.

Little fertilizer is used and animal manure is generally collected and dried for use as fuel. With the expanding cultivation of crops such as cotton, the use of fertilizer is becoming more urgent. There is need for soil analysis and extensive experimentation to ascertain the fertilizer requirement and the effect of fertilizer on

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and trained medical and veterinary assistants to control disease. In the North, livestock shelters would reduce the high mortality in the winter. In the long run, however, livestock raising is likely to become increasingly the preoccupation of settled farmers, particularly as the area under cultivation is gradually extended and natural pastures correspondingly restricted. Mixed farming, in which livestock raising based on the production of fodder crops would have its appropriate place, would greatly enhance incomes, especially because it would give more year-around employment to farmers who now, with the concentration on winter crop production, are underemployed for the greater part of the year.

5. Research and Education: Incentives

While is it relatively easy to point out what should be done to improve agriculture and livestock, devising the means to accomplish the improvement is incomparably more difficult. The means available to the state for a direct attack on low productivity are necessarily limited. The government can, of course, lay out drainage schemes, make more water available, provide facilities for combatting plant and animal diseases and pests, establish livestock shelters, assist in organizing cooperatives, and furnish more ample credit facilities. However, except perhaps in the new settlement areas, the state cannot prescribe better crop rotation, the use of improved seeds, better methods of cultivation and the like. These depend on private initiative which can at best only be stimulated and encouraged by the government. In some circumstances farmers can be relied upon to seize the initiative, as in the case of cotton where high prices have stimulated a rapid expansion of production. In the main, however, greater productivity depends on the success of efforts to persuade large numbers of landowners and cultivators to change their time-hallowed methods and techniques. For this reason principal reliance will have to be placed on education, supported by practical research and supplemented where feasible by financial incentives provided by the government.

First of all, steps should be initiated immediately to organize an effective extension or advisory service to farmers. At present the Department of Agriculture has less than 25 qualified agriculturists capable of research and educational work, and much of their

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attention is devoted to administrative and regulatory tasks. The relatively small number of agricultural officers in the provinces are engaged primarily in the distribution of seed, in the collection of rather inadequate statistics and in administrative tasks. They lack the time, the transport facilities, and, often, the ability to counsel farmers on methods of improving their output. While shortages of trained personnel will prevent the immediate establishment of a full-time extension service, the Mission recommends the early appointment of a director of extension and education whose first responsibility would be the recruitment and training of personnel for such a service. The need is for people well-grounded in practical, general agriculture rather than specialists. The facilities of the secondary agricultural school and the higher agricultural institute at Abu Ghuraib might well be used to train the required people, provided the quality of the staff is improved and the curriculum revised, especially in the direction of giving more practical training in agriculture. It will be impossible, however, to attract properly qualified people to an extension service unless the status of agricultural officers in the provinces is considerably raised and their conditions of service, particularly housing and pay, are greatly improved.

The effectiveness of such an extension service would be greatly enhanced by the organization of demonstration units on strategically located government and private farms. There, farmers could be brought to see with their own eyes the practical advantages of improved methods of raising livestock, poultry and farm crops. At the same time the extension service might work closely with the public schools in the rural areas and small towns to insure that a knowledge of the rudimentary principles of agriculture is instilled in children at an early age. Rural primary and secondary schools should give agriculture an appropriate place in their curriculum.

An extension service must be backed up by sound, practical research which will develop new crops and more productive varieties, improved livestock breeds, better methods of cultivation, and more effective control of pests and diseases. At present there are few people engaged in full-time research. Government farms are devoted primarily to the commercial production of seed, serving neither as demonstration farms nor as centers for extensive

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tive cooperatives. As already indicated, the producers' cooperative in the Dujaila project is the only promising venture in this field. The organization of cooperatives is at present entrusted to a department in the Ministry of Economics whose entire staff consists of a part-time director, one assistant and one clerk. About forty cooperatives are now registered with the department, but most of these are apparently inoperative and all but one are consumers' cooperatives for which there seems to be less need. The Mission urges that in the future efforts be concentrated on the organization of agricultural cooperatives and that therefore the responsibility for cooperatives be transferred to the Department of Agriculture. Such cooperatives can become an important means of self-help and saving by farmers. Gradually they may become an important vehicle for the extension of credit to small farmers by the Agricultural Bank.

Undoubtedly progress in inculcating farmers with the necessary cooperative spirit and a knowledge of the benefits of cooperation will be slow. Strong guidance and control will need to be provided initially by the government, and the cooperatives will have to be held to strict accountability in the use of their assets. Yet the experience with the Dujaila cooperative and, to some extent, with cooperatives in other Moslem countries, such as Egypt, indicates that beneficial results can be achieved by persistent, well-directed efforts. Cooperatives for the purchase and distribution of seeds, fertilizer and other tools of production and for the joint ownership and operation of machinery should be made an integral part of the new settlement schemes. While primary emphasis should be put on this task, efforts should also be made to organize cooperatives on a small, experimental scale among existing sharecroppers. Such cooperatives, assisted by the Agricultural Bank, might confine themselves initially to relatively modest operations such as the provision of seed and simple tools. Success in this field will depend on the existence of a small cadre of enthusiastic government officials properly trained in the organization and operation of cooperatives. It is therefore suggested that the government take prompt steps to have a number of such officials trained in a country like Cyprus where a well-developed cooperative movement exists.

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Forestry

137 313 In a country where the plains are almost entirely devoid of trees and only the mountain valleys contain a few scattered forests, the importance of forests as a means of controlling erosion and floods and overcoming the acute shortage of timber needs no emphasis. The Mission did not give special attention to this problem because the government has already received an excellent detailed report and recommendations from a British expert. It wishes only ~~to stress~~ that it is important not only to protect and extend the forests in the mountain areas, but also to undertake the planting of trees in the plains to serve as windbreaks and as sources of fuel and building timber. In the Dujaila project an encouraging beginning has been made with the planting of trees along roads and boundaries. In future settlement schemes it might be well to require farmers to plant and maintain small wood lots. To carry out a proper program the Forestry Department, which is now only a division within the Department of Agriculture, should be given an independent status and headed, as at present, by a well-trained foreigner. The training of an adequate number of foresters should also be undertaken.

Establishment of a Ministry of Agriculture

●447 Agriculture, livestock-raising and forestry are of such critical importance to Iraq that they merit a separate ministry in the government. The Mission recommends therefore the establishment of a Ministry of Agriculture and Land Use. Within this Ministry and directly under a permanent secretary, it is suggested that directorates-general be organized for each of the following subjects: agriculture and horticulture; animal husbandry; forestry and soil conservation; land settlement; and research. Special sections for administrative and personnel questions, legal affairs, economic research and statistics, and extension and education might form part of the immediate staff of a permanent secretary. Within the Ministry there should also be grouped the more or less autonomous organizations such as the Tobacco Monopoly, the Grain Board, the Agricultural Machinery Administration, the Date Association and the Chambers of Agriculture. The Mission believes that such a ministry would greatly facilitate more effective direction of the government's efforts to improve agriculture and related pursuits.

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temporary, moderate protection of certain industries, it wishes to emphasize strongly the need for a rapid and progressive reduction in special assistance.

Government Organization for Industry

Government activities relating to industry, except for the Industrial Bank, are now handled by a Department of Industry in the Ministry of Economics. This Department under its present director concentrates primarily on research and laboratory work and is not equipped to analyze and record the commercial and economic operations of industry. The Mission recommends that a Department of Industries be established to maintain adequate statistical records on industrial production, analyze economic problems relating to industry such as marketing, and administer the laws concerning assistance to industry. The research and technical functions now being carried on would then be continued under a separate Department of Industrial Research and Standards.

These two departments should gradually be equipped to give increasing assistance to industry in improving its output and reducing its cost of production. This type of assistance should be stressed more and more in the future as compared to special measures of protection and assistance which tend to shield industry against competition. Much can be done in the long run to assist industry in better controlling the quality of its products, reducing waste through material salvage, analyzing production costs, making market surveys and increasing labor efficiency through improved lighting, noise abatement, in-plant training programs and better work flow.

Labor and Vocational Education

Finally, it should not be overlooked that a contented, well-trained labor force is of the utmost importance to industrial development. An improvement in working conditions and more attention to the welfare of the worker would tend to increase labor productivity. Such an improvement can to a large extent be brought about only through a growing realization among employers that it is to their own interest. The government should, of course, lay down minimum standards in this respect, particularly since the absence of real trade unions precludes workers from achieving

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759 ence has already been made to the importance of special training for medical assistants who will generally be in charge of village dispensaries.

278 Many people will continue to be far removed from hospitals, dispensaries and pharmacies. For these it is important to make available such simple "household remedies" as anti-malarial drugs, aspirin, tincture of iodine, DDT powder and Epsom salts. It is suggested that the government make arrangements to supply through village shops such drugs in suitable packets carrying simple directions for use. The general availability of these remedies at a reasonable price will also help to reduce the large number of visits to dispensaries for comparatively trivial ailments.

Organisation of Public Health Administration

744 649 The measures outlined above require a number of changes in the administration of the public health program. The present organization, which is the responsibility of the Ministry of Social Affairs, does not lend itself to an effective attack on the problem of disease prevention. Like most of the other central administrations, it suffers from excessive centralization. There is too little contact with other ministries whose activities are of importance to public health. The Mission suggests that a public health administrator, together with an epidemiologist and a sanitary expert, be recruited abroad to advise the Minister on the organization and further development of the health services. The epidemiologist would concentrate on the principal endemic diseases and the sanitary expert would advise on measures to improve sanitation and environmental hygiene. While a detailed reorganization should await their advice, it would seem best to group health services according to two main divisions, one concerned with the curative, the other with the preventive services.

In the future the reorganized health services will need to work much more closely with the departments concerned with irrigation and agriculture and, on the problem of health education, with the Ministry of Education. In carrying out a much needed decentralization considerable responsibility must, above all, be placed on the chief medical officer in every province. This officer, who now also carries on a private practice, should be given more adequate pay so

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that he can devote his full time to public health work. It will also be important to provide both the provincial and district medical officers with sufficient transportation to enable them to discharge their duties.

VI. Community Planning and Facilities

In the past, communities have unavoidably grown up rather haphazardly. The older parts of the cities are characterized by great congestion, narrow and winding streets, open drains and generally unsanitary living conditions. Livestock are frequently kept in buildings and backyards of major cities. Overcrowding has been greatly aggravated by the influx of people from the land seeking to escape the hard conditions of life in the rural areas and to find opportunities for employment in the cities. Many of these have simply squatted on vacant lots and on the outskirts of cities; they live in primitive, poorly constructed mud and mat huts under conditions of great squalor and without sanitary facilities. Baghdad has about 60,000 of these so-called *sarifa* dwellers and Basra probably no less than 20,000. In each case most of them have immigrated from the province of Amara where problems of land tenure and the silting and salting of land have made conditions of life unusually difficult. Sewage systems are lacking in all of the cities.

Villages are generally clusters of mud houses where, in many cases, men and livestock are not segregated. They have usually grown up around wells or along streams and irrigation canals under conditions where water pollution becomes inevitable. For the most part, safe water supplies are not available. The current flight from the land cannot be arrested as long as the ordinary village lacks the most elementary facilities of sanitation, medical aid, clean drinking water, and schooling, and generally offers little attraction to the person who wants to improve his lot and enjoy a reasonably comfortable life.

Dwellings of mud and mats are not of themselves undesirable. They have the advantage of cheapness and, when properly constructed, are well adapted to climatic conditions in Iraq. Often,

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362 however, they are poorly built and too small; and they are crowded
342 together on sites and under conditions which breed disease.

Need for Community Planning

321 In recent decades there has been a growing awareness of the need for community planning, better housing and community facilities. With respect to villages, little has as yet been done except for the planned development of the Dujaila project. Here some effort was made to have houses erected according to standard specifications and to depart from the village-type of settlement by requiring that houses be erected in groups of four on the adjoining corners of four land allotments. As an aid to town and city planning there has been created within the Department of Municipalities of the Ministry of Interior a small planning section to provide "technical advice as regards municipal schemes for the organization and planning of cities and towns in accordance with modern principles". The municipalities themselves have been charged with "the division of the town into areas having regard to its development capacity and the specifications of plans to be followed for the improvement of streets, public places and buildings in such areas". The final responsibility for planning has, however, remained unclear. The surveys, plans and partial plans have generally been hastily drawn and with little regard for the actual conditions prevailing in the community. In any event, municipalities have for the most part continued to develop without reference to any plans. In many towns new streets have been arbitrarily cut through residential and commercial districts with little concern for real needs or for the people affected. The various ministries concerned with the erection of schools, hospitals, public buildings and bridges generally locate their projects without reference to an overall plan and without consultation with each other.

361 There is today a real need for integrated community planning.
647 The Mission believes that it would be desirable to work towards the establishment of a genuine Community Planning Office in the Ministry of Interior. Such an office should ultimately be staffed with an adequate number of experts versed in architecture, engineering and other aspects of town planning. The first step might be to strengthen the existing planning section in the Department of

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Municipalities by appointing a capable, experienced town planner as director and giving him authority to build up a trained staff gradually. It could serve both the Development Board and local authorities in coordinating development projects on the community level and in ascertaining whether the projects for schools, hospitals, and similar facilities in any given community are properly related to the needs and facilties of neighboring communities.

Housing Developments

Public and quasi-public housing has received increased attention in recent years. The Ministry of Social Affairs, which is authorized to construct houses for workers, has built 204 units and has 185 units under construction. The low rentals on completed units constitute a definite subsidy to the occupants. The city of Basra is now building 750 low-cost houses in accordance with a plan that unfortunately was hastily and inexpertly prepared. Probably the best municipal housing project is near the old city of Bedra in Kut province where a new town site is being developed. The Railway Administration has provided housing for more than 2,400 of its employees, and the Port of Basra is also building accommodations, primarily for its junior officials.

Laws which require the construction of houses by industrial firms and large landowners have remained unenforced. Industrial housing is still little developed. The outstanding project of this kind is at Kirkuk where the Iraq Petroleum Company has been building a large housing development, consisting of 1,028 units, for its skilled artisans and officials. The cost of this project is such, however, that it is unlikely to be widely copied.

Most of the public and quasi-public housing is open to criticism on several counts. Use of poor materials, improper spacing and orientation, poor planning and site engineering have characterized some of these projects. The few public housing projects undertaken have been launched without adequate attention to the problem of how much rent the potential occupants could pay.

Establishment of a Housing Authority

In the light of these considerations, the Mission suggests that the responsibility for planning and supervising housing be entrusted ultimately to a Housing Authority located in the Ministry of Social

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362 647 Affairs and staffed by men trained in house design, architecture, site and sanitary engineering, public health, housing and land economics, and project management. Initially a nucleus for such an Authority might be created by strengthening the existing housing section of the Department of Labor. At present the section is staffed only by one part-time architect with one part-time assistant, a superintendent, and a few clerks and accountants. The Authority should be provided with a Housing Fund to which the Development Board would allocate money set aside for housing and into which the proceeds of rentals would be paid. Maintenance and repairs could thus be financed without constant resort to the Treasury.

[816] The Authority should be complemented by the establishment of an Applied Building Research Station attached to the proposed Department of Industrial Research and Standards in the Ministry of Economics. Such a station would conduct research designed to develop improved methods and techniques for low-cost housing. In particular, it would experiment with the most economical and effective combination of locally available materials and try them in actual housing units. It would test, for example, such possibilities as the utilization of date-palm fronds for the manufacture of pressed boards, of rice husk and asphalt mixed and pressed into blocks or bricks for interior partitions, and of reed mats and bitumen to form waterproof sheets for roofing materials.

362 How much public housing should be undertaken is difficult to determine in the absence of sample surveys to ascertain the needs of different parts of the population, particularly in the light of what they can afford to pay for housing. Housing will, of course, automatically improve as the productivity and the incomes of the people rise, but this does not mean that some portion of the revenue from increased production of oil should not be used to provide housing for those in urgent need. Pending a more thorough study, an amount of about ID 400,000 annually might be taken as a provisional target for expenditures. Presumably public housing should cater primarily to the needs of low-paid employees and industrial workers. While a large public housing program is not a matter of high priority at present, it is vitally important that adequate accom-

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to be about two and a half times the combined outlays (ID 37,200,000) of the government, the railways and the Port of Basra in 1950-51. Moreover, actual development expenditures, which require proportionately far more technical and administrative organization and preparation than ordinary outlays, will need to rise to a rate about 10 times the total public capital expenditures (ID 5,200,000) in 1950-51. 654x

Such a rate of expenditure will be achieved only with great effort and by careful planning. It will necessitate substantial improvement in the efficiency of public administration so that the government will be capable of coordinated planning and execution of the program. It will be necessary to take full advantage of technical assistance available abroad and to enlist experienced foreign firms for the purpose of planning and designing as well as executing major works.

Improvement in Public Administration

Improvement in public administration is of key importance. The multiplicity of projects in the development program will require an enormous amount of detailed administrative and technical preparation, all of which must be properly coordinated. As indicated by the nature of the Mission's recommendations, the work involved will fall on many ministries and departments and not simply on the Development Board. Moreover, in order to avoid overburdening the Development Board, the latter should be in the position to decentralize as far as possible the detailed planning and execution, reserving to itself principally the task of overall planning and coordination. Decentralization would also contribute to morale by giving the entire government service a sense of participation in constructive endeavor which now appears to be lacking. 654x 647

Public administration in Iraq, as in many other underdeveloped countries, requires improvement in many respects. Excessive centralization causes ministers and high officials to be overburdened with detail to the neglect of policy formulation and planning. Inadequate use is made of such talent and knowledge as is available elsewhere in the government, including the local administrations. Coordination of related activities is frequently lacking, so that, for instance, there is no cooperation in the planning and operation of

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654* 647 irrigation works among agricultural officials in the Ministry of Economics, the Irrigation Department of the Ministry of Public Works and health officials in the Ministry of Social Affairs. The efficiency of civil servants seems to have declined since before the war. Certainly the increase in the number of government employees (excluding police) from about 11,000 before the war to almost 20,000 in 1950 has been considerably out of proportion to the expansion in the government's functions. Many government offices appear to be overstaffed, while others cannot obtain extra personnel for essential increases in services. Officials are frequently shifted from one position to another without regard for their qualifications and experience. Often government officials both in the provinces and in the capital do not enjoy sufficient continuity in office to enable them to become really useful. Promotion appears to be based almost entirely on seniority and other considerations rather than on merit. The morale among government servants is generally low.

647 465 The two most important factors contributing to inefficiency and morale are probably the low level of government salaries and the lack of any sense of real participation in constructive work. Since before the war salaries and allowances have risen only 20 percent for high government officials and 160 percent for the lowest paid officials, while the official cost-of-living index has increased by about 400 percent. To some extent, however, there has been an increase in salaries through shifts to higher grades, so that, judging from comparative total disbursements of salaries and allowances, it may be concluded that average salaries have risen by about 130 percent since before the war.[7] Nevertheless, salaries, particularly of officials in the higher classes of the civil service, are very [461] inadequate. The probity of officials is thus put to a severe test and to the extent that some successfully utilize their positions as opportunities for personal gain, the morale of others suffers. Moreover, many civil servants are compelled to supplement their salaries by engaging in business or accepting other employment with resulting neglect of their official duties.

654* 647 The lack of a real sense of participation in constructive tasks is conspicuous in the civil service. The Mission found a wide-

[7] Total disbursements of ID 14,700,000 on salaries and allowances in 1949-50 compared with a sum of about ID 3,500,000 before the war.

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spread feeling that nothing was being accomplished. Although the establishment of the Development Board and the large prospective increase in oil revenues appears to put Iraq on the threshold of an era of potentially great progress, the Mission discovered very little awareness of these developments among officials both at the center and in the provinces. Where this awareness existed, it was often accompanied by an inclination to disparage the results likely to be achieved. Thus it appears that the government has largely neglected the opportunity to acquaint its officials with its program for the future and to enlist their enthusiastic cooperation in lifting Iraq to a higher plane of economic development.

In order to remedy some of these shortcomings, the Mission urges that a small commission, consisting of high Iraqi officials assisted by two foreign experts in public administration and personnel, be appointed to make a complete survey of the system of public administration and recommend improvements therein. This commission should inquire into the training, classification and promotion of government officials and the appropriate staffing of government departments. It should devise a new and adequate pay scale which should take into account inequities in the existing salary structure and provide relatively higher pay and improved amenities for officials working in the provinces. It should examine also the measures which might be taken to improve the coordination of government activities and to bring about a gradual decentralization of administrative functions.

Pending the commission's study and recommendations, the government might take certain interim steps to improve its operations. One of these might be the appointment of a permanent Secretary in each ministry who would be responsible for the coordinated administration of the ministry. He would relieve the Minister of as much detail as possible and would brief the Minister on major policy questions requiring his decision. The other might be an interim, perhaps initially modest, general increase in the salaries or allowances of government officials. It might be desirable to cover at least part of the cost of the interim and final increase in salaries out of additional taxes, but some resort to the funds at the disposal of the Development Board may not be inappropriate in view of the importance of more efficient public administration to development.

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Finally, the Development Board should, as far as possible, enlist the aid and cooperation of other government ministries and agencies and of the provincial and municipal administrations in the task of planning and carrying out a development program. It should actively encourage them to submit suggestions and plans for development, integrate these plans with each other and the Board's own, and, to the maximum extent feasible, allocate money and responsibility for the execution of these plans and projects to other agencies. The establishment of a Community Planning Office and a Housing Authority, as proposed earlier by the Mission, would be in line with this suggestion.

In the last analysis the Development Board would, of course, retain the final responsibility for formulating the overall program, for coordinating those projects such as irrigation which concern many government departments, and for allocating the funds necessary to finance the various parts of the program. In order to enable the Board to carry out this overall coordinating and planning function, it is essential that all major development projects be brought within its purview, even though its financial assistance may not in all instances be necessary. At present, projects for a government petroleum refinery, a government textile mill and a new grain silo are all being kept outside of the Board's jurisdiction. The formulation of an integrated program with a well-conceived system of priorities is difficult as long as this remains the practice. In addition, coordination would be facilitated if the Board, of which only the Prime Minister and Minister of Finance are ex officio members, were to give the Ministers of Economics, Agriculture (a new Ministry proposed by the Mission), Public Works and Social Affairs facilities for attending Board sessions whenever matters of interest to them are being discussed. The possibility of making the Governor of the National Bank also an ex officio member of the Board might be considered.

Technical Assistance

A substantial increase in the technical staff available to the government will also be of critical importance to the success of the development program. No project should be approved under the program until evidence is submitted that it is technically sound in

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however, had to be kept small. In the field of industry the government sought to stimulate private enterprise by according special tax benefits and protection and by establishing the Industrial Bank.

The Development Board

With the prospect of a rapid rise in oil production and therefore in government oil revenues, the promise of a much wider field of activity developed. Accordingly a law was enacted in 1950 establishing a Development Board and assigning to it all the oil revenues as well as the proceeds of any loans contracted by it or by the government on its behalf. The Board consists of two ex officio members—the Prime Minister, who functions as its president, and the Minister of Finance—and six executive members appointed for five years. The Board was directed to draw up a general program for the development of Iraq and, upon its approval by Parliament, to proceed with the detailed plans and specifications of the projects included in the program and with their execution in accordance with an approved order of priorities. Each year any revisions in the program, an annual budget and an annual report are to be presented to the Parliament. The Board is also to consider and coordinate development schemes which may originate in the various ministries of the government.

The establishment of this Board is evidence of the government's determination to see the extraordinary oil revenues used for developing the country's resources and raising the standard of living and to insure some continuity in development which frequent changes in governments have made virtually impossible in the past.

The Board was constituted and began operations toward the end of 1950. The British and American governments each nominated one of the executive members in accordance with a request by Iraq. In the spring of 1951 the Board submitted its preliminary over-all program involving a total outlay of ID 65,674,000 over a five-year period beginning with the fiscal year 1951-52. About ID 29,401,000 of the Board's projected revenues, consisting of the income from oil anticipated at that time and nearly all of the proceeds of the $12.8 million loan obtained from the International Bank for the Wadi Tharthar flood control project, were reserved

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for subsequent programming. Expenditures for the five-year period were allocated by broad fields as follows (in dinars):[5]

Water storage and irrigation schemes	30,044,000
Roads	15,826,000
Buildings, including hospitals and schools	12,618,000
Miscellaneous projects	6,216,000
Administrative expenditures	970,000
Unprogrammed reserve	29,401,000

Because of the brief time devoted to its preparation, this program will necessarily undergo modification as more detailed study is given to requirements and the cost of individual projects and as some of the over-all allocations are programmed in detail.

The magnitude of this projected outlay is in startling contrast to the financial stringency which has characterized public expenditures in the past. The government has had great difficulty in making both ends meet. Severe economy has been the rule. Development outlays were pared; government salaries were not increased despite the increasing cost of living; and local administration was starved of funds.

Government Budgets

The trend of government finances is indicated in Table 16.

It will be noted that, despite economies and tax increases, the government's total budget showed substantial deficit in 1948-49 and 1949-50, primarily because of the bad harvests in 1947 and 1948 and the effects of the war with Israel. Of the government's principal autonomous enterprises, the railways also ran considerable deficits on capital account which were defrayed only by using reserve funds, by borrowing ID 1,000,000 from the government and contracting a loan of ID 3,000,000 through the Export Credits Guaranty Department of the British Government. The Iraqi government borrowed at home to meet its own needs, its domestic debt rising from ID 4,500,000 on March 31, 1948, to ID 10,800,000 on March 31, 1951. Borrowing had to be limited, however, because the market for government securities was virtually restricted to the banking system. As of March 31, 1951, the National Bank and the commercial banks held ID 9,200,000 of the domestic debt.

[5] For a more detailed breakdown, see Table V in Appendix.

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TABLE IV

Expenditures Projected by the Development Board

(in millions of dinars)

	1951-52	1952-53	1953-54	1954-55	1955-56	Total
Irrigation projects:						
Wadi Tharthar	1.3	3.6	3.1	1.5	0.2	9.6
Habbaniya	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.7	—	2.1
Diyala Reservoir	0.2	0.7	1.1	2.2	1.9	6.1
Dokan Reservoir	0.2	0.7	1.0	1.8	2.0	5.7
General drainage	0.3	0.3	0.5	0.5	0.5	2.0
Other irrigation projects:						
New projects	0.4	0.9	1.2	0.9	0.9	4.2
Completion of projects begun previously	0.3	—	—	—	—	0.3
Total	3.0	6.6	7.4	7.5	5.5	30.0
Roads and bridges:						
Main roads across Iraq from south to north (Basra - Baghdad, Kirkuk, etc.)	0.8	1.3	1.5	1.5	1.5	6.6
Other roads	1.3	2.1	2.1	2.0	1.9	9.4
Total	2.1	3.4	3.6	3.5	3.5	15.9
Buildings:						
Hospitals	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.9	3.8
Schools	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.9	3.8
Other buildings	1.0	0.9	1.1	1.1	1.1	5.0
Total	2.4	2.3	2.5	2.7	2.9	12.6
Other projects:						
Small settlement projects	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	1.2
Artesian wells and water for drinking purposes	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	1.2
Special projects in northern Iraq	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	1.3
Reforestation and filling of swamps and marshes	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.5
Telegraphs & telephones	0.5	—	—	—	—	0.5
Other projects	0.2	0.1	0.1	—	—	0.4
Expropriations	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	—	1.1
Total	1.7	1.2	1.2	1.1	0.9	6.2
Administrative expenses	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	1.0
Grand Total	9.4	13.7	14.8	15.0	12.8	65.7

Note: Totals do not necessarily add up because of rounding.

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ments in the best use of water mentioned earlier and could assist in disseminating the findings. They would be an important means of developing the concept of common responsibility for the efficient operation and upkeep of irrigation systems and might ultimately serve also to disseminate information on agriculture.

The legal situation with respect to water rights and the construction, maintenance and operation of irrigation and flood-control works is defined by Articles 1234 to 1238 of the Mejelle, or Ottoman Civil Code, and Law No. 23 of 1923 and its successive amendments. Repeated changes in this legislation have made it difficult to determine the validity of certain provisions. It would be desirable to codify and clarify the legislation and, in the course of such a review, to eliminate some of its defects. It would be advisable, for instance, to ensure a right of passage for canals across the property of third parties with compensation fixed by the Irrigation Department in accordance with defined criteria. At present such a right of passage is recognized but with the proviso that the interested party must buy or lease the necessary land, which, in practice, may lead to extortionate terms. There is also a need for a review of old water rights. While presumably such rights cannot be abolished, the right to use water might well be brought into closer accord with the amount of land to be irrigated.

The law makes the Directorate General for Irrigation in the Ministry of Communications and Public Works responsible for the construction, operation and maintenance of the irrigation and flood-control schemes. In 1949 the irrigation services had a staff of 1,330 persons, classified approximately as follows:

Engineers	26
Assistant engineers	20
Overseers	94
Office personnel	250
Bund personnel	820
Specialists	120

On the whole, there is an insufficient number of competent, experienced engineers; and pay scales are inadequate to retain able men in a service which often entails considerable hardship. The staff in the provinces is generally not large enough to cope with technical problems along with the many administrative questions

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centering particularly about the distribution of water. Young engineers are often sent as beginners to outlying posts where they work without adequate technical supervision. The service has lacked an experienced Chief Engineer who could, through frequent visits in the field, provide advice and guidance and support the staff with the weight of his authority. The Mission understands that such a Chief Engineer has now been appointed. It would be desirable to provide him with several experienced assistants specialized in drainage and irrigation questions.

In the past the planning of new works has been characterized by two defects: inadequate coordination with other government departments, particularly those dealing with agriculture and health, and failure to make full use of the knowledge and experience of the divisional irrigation engineers.

Although irrigation obviously serves agriculture, the Department of Agriculture in the Ministry of Economics has been virtually ignored in the planning of new irrigation schemes. The same has been true of the health service which is vitally interested in the layout of irrigation projects in connection with its fight against malaria and bilharzia. In its capacity as an over-all planning and coordinating agency the Development Board will be able to insist that all interested government departments be consulted in the planning of projects. A committee consisting of representatives of the Irrigation, Agriculture and Health Departments might be established to pass on irrigation and drainage projects and advise on their priority.

This committee might be complemented by a technical committee which would direct the experiments to ascertain the optimum use of water, to which reference has already been made, and perhaps to study other technical operating problems.

In the future planning of irrigation works it would be desirable to make greater use of the divisional irrigation engineers in the provinces. These officials have often acquired an experience and knowledge of local conditions which could greatly aid realistic planning.

The cost of new flood-control and irrigation works will in the future be defrayed out of the budget of the Development Board.

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The cost of operation, however, will have to be met out of the ordinary budget. In the past the ordinary budget of the Irrigation Department has been wholly inadequate to insure efficient operation and maintenance of the existing irrigation systems. In the last ten years an average of only ID 270,000 has been spent annually under the ordinary budget.[7] Expenses for operation and maintenance should actually be about 150 fils per gross mashara under flow irrigation. With a gross area of approximately 6,800,000 masharas under flow irrigation, the appropriate total would therefore be about ID 1,000,000 per year, inclusive of the salaries of the requisite personnel. The Mission therefore suggests that the budget of the Irrigation Department be progressively increased to reach that sum within the next five years, with the additional cost to be borne by the Development Board.

V. Costs of the Program

The Mission estimates that the total cost of the over-all program it has recommended would amount over the next five years (1952-53 to 1956-57) to about ID 55,000,000. Of this ID 27,600,000 would be for water reservoirs, ID 7,000,000 for drainage, ID 2,000,000 for improved maintenance and the balance for new irrigation works. A more detailed breakdown is given in Table V of the appendix. These estimates are exclusive of the provision made in the first year's budget of the Development Board. They are based upon cost estimates made in Iraq by the Haigh Commission and others, but make allowances of 10 to 20 percent for intervening price increases. A further rise in prices in the future would, of course, raise the aggregate cost.

[7] See Table IV in the appendix.

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APPENDIX

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TABLE I

AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY ADMINISTRATION BUDGET FOR 1950
(actual results)

REVENUE		EXPENDITURES	
Rentals of machinery	ID 40,262	Salaries	ID 11,073
Sale of agricultural machinery and tools	7,267	Cost-of-living allowances	4,844
Sale of spare parts	317	Transport	117
Fines	195	Transfer	7
Repairs of agricultural machinery	106	Furniture	1,317
Transport charges	584	Printing & stationery	290
Interest on deposits	2,376	Postal, telegraph and telephone charges	276
Sundry	138	Rent	1,330
		Water and light	1,664
		Machines, cars & fuel	40,981
		Buildings	30,284
		Bonuses	399
		Temporary officials and employees	20,679
		Sundry	4,557
Total	ID 51,245	Total	ID 117,818

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TABLE II

Agricultural Machinery Administration Budget for 1951
(estimates)

I. Ordinary or Operating Budget

Revenue		Expenditures	
Rentals	ID 50,000	Operation of garages and repair shops	38,726
		Agricultural machinery operation	48,708
		General administration	25,884
		Total cash expenditures	113,318
		Depreciation allowance	37,145
		Total expenditures	ID 150,463

II. Capital Budget

Revenue		Expenditures	
Sale of machinery, tools, etc.	ID 20,000	Purchase of agricultural machinery	54,000
		Purchase of trucks, jeeps and tractors	21,500
		Imports of spare parts for sale	25,000
		Diwaniya shop	3,000
		Requisites for completion of shops	7,500
		Sundry capital expenditures	1,000
		Total	ID 112,000

III. Total Budget

Total cash revenue	ID 70,000	Total cash expenditures	ID 225,318
		Total expenditures	262,463
Total cash deficit	ID 155,318		
Total deficit	192,463		

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463 874 in economics and finance capable of acting as company secretaries or as economic and financial experts in business or government. Greater emphasis should be placed on practical training; the teaching staff should be strengthened; and more attention should be paid to banking and accounting, particularly cost accounting. Advisory committees consisting of representatives of leading banks and business houses should be appointed to both the College and the secondary school to review the curriculum. They could assist in arranging for part-time apprenticeship training and would provide a means for checking how well graduates of these institutions measure up to the requirements of business.

Effective Government Organisation for Industry

● 647 654 Government activities relating to industry, except for the Industrial Bank, are now handled by a Department of Industry in the Ministry of Economics. This Department under its present director concentrates primarily on research and laboratory work and is not equipped to analyze and record the commercial and economic operations of industry. As industry expands both types of activity will become increasingly important. The Mission therefore recommends a realignment of the present organization to provide for two separate departments within the Ministry, a Department of Industrial Research and Standards and a Department of Industries. Research and technical functions now being carried on would be continued under the Department of Industrial Research and Standards. Its facilities need, however, to be expanded to meet industry's growing requirements for laboratory testing and quality control.

The newly organized Department of Industries would carry on economic research and analysis. Among its functions would be the maintenance of adequate statistical records of industrial production, the analysis of economic problems relating to industry such as marketing, and the administration of the laws providing special protection to industry.

Both departments should gradually be equipped to give increasing assistance to industry in improving its output and reducing its cost of production. This type of assistance should be stressed more and more in the future, as compared to special mea-

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sures of production and assistance which tend to shield industry against competition. There is much to be done to help industry to achieve better control of the quality of its products, in reducing waste through material salvage, in analyzing production costs, in making market surveys and in raising labor efficiency through improved lighting, noise abatement, in-plant training programs and better work flow.

IV. Other Suggestions for the Improvement of Industry

Possibilities for Economies in the Use of Capital

Whenever the capital cost of a plant is an important determinant of production costs, it becomes essential to utilize the plant to the fullest extent. This may be accomplished, for example, by increasing the number of shifts, by extending the work week and by stepping up machines to their maximum economic speed. Completely integrated plants seldom if ever offer the opportunity for this type of operation, because certain machines are never called upon for continuous use. This is, of course, very noticeable where the plant does all its own maintenance work, even to all of its foundry items. The solution is obviously one of resorting to contracting or sub-contracting with concerns specializing in particular operations. For example, a single finishing and dyeing concern might advantageously serve two or more textile mills, where the capacity of these mills is insufficient to load separate finishing departments to their economic limit.

In Iraq there is a tendency in industry to generate its own power rather than to purchase it. This leads to the installation of expensive facilities which are utilized only part of the day. While industry is operating, many municipal power plants stand virtually idle because they serve primarily lighting needs and their peak load accordingly comes at night. In some cases, where large quantities of process steam are needed, industrial enterprises may be justified in generating their own power, but for the most part, the purchase of power is preferable. Unfortunately, power rates, except in Basra and Baghdad, are so high that the purchase of

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V. Roads

Organization

Iraq's road system is controlled and maintained by the Public Works Department under the Minister of Communications and Public Works. It is headed by the Director General of Public Works and under his direction five divisional engineers assure the maintenance and works service in divisions centered in Baghdad (four provinces), Hilla (three provinces), Basra (three provinces), Kirkuk (two provinces) and Mosul (two provinces). A sixth divisional engineer is in charge of central operations in the capital. District engineers, usually stationed at the provincial capitals, are in charge of day-to-day maintenance. Planning is carried out at the headquarters of the Director General. There is a lack of technical staff to carry out surveys in the field. Except for this fact, the organization is efficient and effective. It may have to be expanded as the road construction program progresses. Provincial governments and municipalities control secondary and urban roads and streets.

At present the road system controlled and maintained by the Public Works Department consists of approximately

2,500 kilometers metalled and surfaced,
500 kilometers metalled only,
5,000 kilometers earth roads.

Many of the metalled roads were built in the two war periods, and most of them are concentrated in the immediate vicinity of the capital, between Baghdad and the East and North, and in the North. All the roads in the southern plains are earth roads, and their maintenance and use suffers from the effects of rains on the salt-impregnated soil. Roads within municipal boundaries are generally in a very poor state of repair, not excluding the streets in the capital. Roads in the Basra Port area are controlled and maintained by the Port Directorate and are in good repair.

Maintenance was, until a few years ago, extremely poor, but today every effort is being made, and with conspicuous success, at least to prevent further deterioration. Maintenance costs are allocated on the Ministry's budget and calculated at ID 40 per

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Future Developments

It must be expected that Iraqi Airways will continue to operate at a loss for some years to come. This should be accepted because the air services serve a real traffic need and there are reasonable prospects of reducing and perhaps ultimately eliminating operating deficits. The Airways Accounts are separate from the Railway Accounts and the steps recommended in the Palmer Report for complete separation of the finances of the Railways and the Airways should be adopted. There is no reason why the Railways should be expected to defray the deficits of the Airways.

There appears to be room for expansion of services in the area where Europe, Asia and Africa meet; and the government should encourage Iraqi Airways to play an increasingly important part in air traffic in this area. Internal demands appear to be negligible at present but may be expected to develop in conjunction with extended international services. These services appear to present an opportunity for far-reaching economies through closer cooperation between Middle Eastern airlines in their services, their administration and agencies outside the home countries.

VIII. Post, Telegraph, Telephone, Radio Communications

Organisation

Responsibility for communications is concentrated in the Directorate General of Postal, Telegraph and Telephone Services in the Ministry of Communications and Public Works. Iraq is a full member of the International Postal Union and the communications services of the country, including their tariffs, comply with the standards of the Union.

The number of post, telepragh and telephone offices has developed as follows:

Type of office	1940	1951
24 hrs. service	14	46
16 hrs. service	12	37
12 hrs. service	18	4
7 hrs. service	42	54
Local and rural agencies	155	171

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It is expected that once this work is completed, the personnel problem will ease somewhat.

The development program of the service provides for a survey and mapping to a scale of 1:20,000 at an estimated cost of ID 200,000. For the appropriate housing of the service, a new building with 10,000 square meters of floor space is now under construction and is expected to be completed in January or February 1952. This will facilitate administration of the service which is now scattered in three widely separated buildings. The new building will also house the up-to-date printing plant ordered in Great Britain. Funds for building and plant have already been sanctioned. Air surveys now in progress should be continued at an annual cost of approximately ID 40,000.

XI. General Observations

Teamwork

Not only the development of the transport services but also the general development program, with all its implications of temporary and seasonal demands for transport of construction materials and imports of machinery and plant, will materially affect the tasks before the transport managements. The teamwork in the existing transport departments is exemplary. It is therefore emphatically urged that no change be made in the present organizations and their leading personnel until after the main development programs are completed.

Intermediary Staff

In all the transport services there is a great dearth of intermediary staff—foremen, inspectors, surveyors, supervisors, and the like—for whom practical training in workshops and on construction sites is far more important than school or college education. In all transport development projects, special courses should be provided to train adaptable Iraqi apprentices under skilled teachers in shops, factories and on tracks and roads in the country.

These observations apply to all forms of transport, port, railways, roads, airways and communications. Unless continuity is maintained with a gradual, cautious transfer of responsibility from foreign to Iraqi personnel, efficiency will be seriously jeopardized.

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V. Organization of Health Services

744 647 It is most important that a properly organized program should be established to carry out the suggested medical services and preventive health measures.

The existing organization for the health services is highly centralized—first within the Ministry of Social Affairs in Baghdad, then in the hands of the Chief Medical Officers of each province. The whole system appears to be too rigid throughout, without sufficient delegation of responsibility and without enough consultation among departments of the Ministry or with those of other Ministries. Certain medical problems (e.g. health in irrigation schemes, nutrition, etc.) concern other ministries or departments (irrigation, agriculture, education, etc.). To be really effective, boards or committees should include representatives of all groups concerned.

There is no general board of public health but there are various committees with different functions. The Director General of Health is responsible for the licensing of private practitioners and pharmacists, and he has a committee to assist him. But it is the Minister who sets up a committee to consider disciplinary Cases brought against practitioners or pharmacists by the Director General of Health. There is also a committee consisting of three Directors General and two other members nominated by the Minister who act in an advisory capacity to the Minister. It would be reasonable to expect the Directors General to be given wide powers without need for frequent reference to the Minister.

744 647 732 747 The health services have been repeatedly reorganized. The latest reorganization still does not appear to have defined very clearly the principal lines of responsibility. The Director General of Health is to be largely responsible for the curative services; a Director General of Health Affairs, for the public health services of Baghdad, Basra, Mosul, and Kirkuk, for the mobile dispensaries and for health projects in cities, villages, and the countryside; and a Director General of Social Services, for the supervision of the administration of the institutions for the disabled and the blind, supervision of reformatories and health conditions in prisons and

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for the promotion of 'social centers'. It is understood he will also "take an interest" in the numerous voluntary societies that undertake work of a social and medical nature.

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While this organization does not seem satisfactory, no alternative can be suggested at the moment without further study. The Mission would recommend that a foreign public health administrator be appointed to advise the Minister of Social Affairs on the organization and further development of the health services. His appointment, incidentally, would enable the Professor of Preventive Medicine in the Royal Faculty of Medicine, who is at present also acting as adviser to the Ministry of Social Affairs, to devote his full time to teaching and research.

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The public health administrator should have had wide experience in the Middle East or in a tropical or sub-tropical country. He should have a good knowledge of the English language. To assist him he will require the services on temporary appointment of a foreign epidemiologist and a public health or sanitary engineer. The epidemiologist would undertake a study of the most prevalent diseases and recommend the best methods of attacking them. The public health engineer should have had considerable experience, preferably in a state medical service in a tropical or sub-tropical country, and be able to speak English. He would advise on measures to be taken to improve sanitation and environmental hygiene throughout Iraq and assist, if necessary, in teaching at the Royal Faculty of Medicine.

The public health administrator would require sufficient and suitable transport for himself and his staff; he would also need adequate office accommodation and office staff for himself and his own expert staff (epidemiologist and public health engineer). He should have at all times direct access to the Minister of Social Affairs.

As a result of the studies made by this team of advisers, it may be possible to give the organization of the health services a clearer focus. In any such scheme the preventive aspects of public health will need to be featured much more prominently. Although the borderline between curative and prophylactic measures may not always be clear, it may prove feasible to have one division responsible for all the services primarily curative

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744 447 and another division responsible for those characterized as principally preventive.

Meanwhile one important improvement could be effected by delegating more responsibility to the chief medical officer in each province and enabling him to devote his entire time to his public duties. The chief medical officer is responsible for all medical work, both preventive and curative, within the boundaries of the province. As such, his main duties should be to inspect the health institutions, to appraise the state of public health and to guide, advise and encourage his subordinate staff. To carry out this task effectively he needs to devote his full time to the job and should be free to travel freely about the province. At present, however, the chief medical officer usually has a private practice on the side. Without means of transportation at his disposal and, in fact, unable to travel without express permission from the Director General, he seldom leaves his headquarters. It is strongly recommended that these officers be paid salaries commensurate with their responsibilities and the importance of their post. Further, they should be provided with suitable transport and be required to submit a monthly report on the inspection work undertaken throughout the province. When necessary, a director (or medical superintendent) should be appointed to the hospital of the chief town of the province to free the chief medical officer for general inspection of all medical facilities under his direction. Similarly, doctors in charge of districts or *qadhas* should be provided with suitable transport to enable them to visit the dispensaries in their area. In certain districts they should also be provided with suitable housing.

It should be remembered, however, that without qualified personnel no reorganization, no matter how effective on paper, will succeed. In the health service, as in many other branches of the administration, conditions of employment must be considerably improved, particularly outside of Baghdad. Unless adequate salaries and accommodations are provided for the health services staff, doctors and trained personnel will continue to prefer private practice and specialized work in Baghdad and other cities.

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V. Administration

It is an obvious truism that no educational policy or program can be implemented with any chance of success unless there is reasonable stability in the administration and approved schemes are carried on without being affected by ministerial changes and the varying fortunes of party politics. Such, however, has not been the case in the country during the last few decades. There have been quick changes not only of government but also, and in consequence, in the higher administrative personnel of the Ministry of Education. It has been calculated, for instance, that during the 18 years between 1927 and 1945, there were 14 different Directors General of Education, although the post is supposed to be permanent and the person in charge is expected to work as the head of the administration. The Departmental Committee which formulated the Ten Year Plan has itself rightly and courageously drawn attention to this distressing situation; its report points out that frequent changes of Ministers has led to instability in personnel and programs and that officials at the Ministry have often been too weak to defend programs and policies before successive Ministers who wished to make changes before they had been long enough in office to study the needs of the situation carefully. The Mission believes, therefore, that the government should take immediate steps to insure that there is reasonable stability of administration in the Ministry so that, once basic educational policies and programs are approved, they are not subject to change without mature consideration. In order to secure this objective, the following measures relating to the operation of the Ministry of Education are put forward:

1. A statutory Board or Council of Education, consisting of appropriate officials and nonofficials conversant with different types of educational problems, should be established to assist the Ministry of Education in the formulation of educational policies and programs and to guard against the possibility of hasty and ill-considered changes or the abandonment of approved programs. If the Board is created by statute, its constitution and personnel will not be easily upset as an incident of changes in the Ministry.

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2. There should be a permanent secretary in continuous charge of the Ministry and reporting directly to the Minister. He ought to be a qualified and experienced educator who would serve as a connecting link between successive Ministers and thus help to assure reasonable continuity of policy. The government might consider whether to merge the existing position of Director General of Education with that of permanent secretary or to have two separate positions. In any event, the present arrangement, under which separate and independent Directors General of primary, secondary and higher education work directly under the Minister, is administratively and educationally unsound and makes integration and coordination of educational effort extremely difficult.

3. An effort should be made to build up within the Ministry a body of competent educators, possessing vision and enthusiasm as well as experience, and enjoying reasonable security of tenure, who would specialize in different aspects of education. They should be able to speak with authority and confidence in their respective fields and guide and advise teachers in all types of schools. If they are to do so, it is essential that they be relieved of much of the petty administrative detail which at present hinders them from devoting themselves to larger issues. This would involve a certain amount of delegation of power to local educational officers, which would need to be carefully worked out but which is sound in principle.

4. It is certainly desirable to associate local administration and influential local persons with the working out of the program that the Mission has recommended. Such association will go a long way to stimulate public interest and cooperation in education. The Mission is, however, of the opinion that, at this stage, this assistance should be enlisted chiefly in an advisory capacity and that the over-all direction and supervision of the new and far-reaching educational reforms and measures should remain in the hands of the Ministry for the present. The Mission strongly questions the wisdom of the steps recently taken to entrust the provincial councils with the responsibility for primary education. Experience in other countries has shown that a sudden devolution of authority to local administration may lead to serious complications and difficulties and endanger the success of the entire program. This should not be taken to imply that many of the functions and powers which are at present exercised by the officials at the center need not be delegated, say, to the

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Directors of Education. It is meant rather as a warning against transferring the supervision and control and the general responsibility for compulsory or adult education to local bodies or officials who have had little or no experience in dealing with such problems.

The people in each locality should unquestionably be given a sense of participation in the educational effort. The Mission has already stressed the importance of enlisting local support for the introduction of compulsory primary education and the inauguration of adult education. Local participation can take the form of voluntary self-help through the provision of free midday meals, books and stationery, or shoes and clothing to needy children, improvements in school equipment and school gardens and the like. Local self-help in constructing or adding to school buildings should also be encouraged.

VI. Conclusion

The Mission has considered already the financial implications of the educational program and has expressed the view that it is within the resources of the state—actual and potential—to undertake the suggested program of educational expansion and reconstruction. It trusts that the government will definitely adopt the view that increased expenditure on education is a long-range productive investment likely to give the country a generous return in the form of a more prosperous, cooperative, socially conscious and enlightened population. This return is no less real, though less tangible, than those that may be expected from investments in industry or even agriculture. Thus it requires courage and vision to make a large investment in education, for the purpose not only of multiplying schools, but also of raising the quality of education they provide.

The Mission's approach in the educational field is founded on the conviction that education is one of the most important means of raising production levels and living standards and thereby assuring the economic health of the country. It is for this reason that the Mission has given it a high priority in its recommended projects for development. If national development is to be balanced and har-

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ANNEX H

COMMUNITY PLANNING AND COMMUNITY FACILITIES

I. Introduction

In its main report the Mission has expressed in general terms its view that more attention needs to be given to the problems of community planning and housing. Well-planned communities and a well-housed population are clearly desirable social assets; but it may not be so generally realized that they are also economic assets. The extra cost of good design and careful planning is small compared with the waste that ensues if they are ignored. In purely financial terms it is costly to maintain, and far more costly to improve, a city which has extensive slums and congested streets and whose growth does not follow lines that permit the provision of efficient public services.

The Mission has advocated the strengthening and improvement of the Planning Office of the Directorate General of Municipalities in the Ministry of Interior to take care of community planning, both rural and urban, and of the Housing Section attached to the Department of Labor in the Ministry of Social Affairs to take care of housing in all its phases. It believes that these related agencies should ultimately be developed into a genuine Community Planning Office and a central Housing Authority with separate and well-defined functions and with the power necessary to discharge those functions effectively and adequately. As a technical supplement to the Housing Authority, the Mission has recommended the establishment of an Applied Building Research Station which would conduct research on improved methods of construction and on the new use of available building material and, as such, would most suitably be attached to the proposed Department of Research and Standards in the Ministry of Economics. The broad functions of these offices have been described in the main report.

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447 361 In this Annex it is intended to describe more fully their functions and the principles which should guide them and to illustrate this description by reference to particular conditions in Iraq. It may, however, be well to note at the outset that the men [424] needed to discharge the functions of these offices adequately will have to be trained, as there are very few now in Iraq who have even part-time training in community planning and housing. The sooner a start is made, the quicker the offices can be built up. Promising men, who have had some experience, could be sent abroad for further training and experience. In Iraq, courses on the subjects might be introduced into the engineering and architecture curricula for those who intend to pursue a career in either of the two new government offices. Initially, it might be necessary to employ an experienced foreign technician to give these courses and to act in an advisory capacity to the government.

000 ***The Functions of Community Planning and Housing***

Community planning is the process of effecting the orderly layout of a community and the continuous improvement of that community for the physical, economic and social welfare of its residents. It involves the task of thinking ahead so that proposals may be appropriate, timely, and based on factual analysis in the light of the objective sought. In an industrial community, for example, it would mean, after a survey of conditions, preparing a plan which would allocate various sections of the land to the category of use, industrial, business, residential, recreational, and so forth, for which they are best suited, considering the needs and existing facilities of the community. At all times, consideration has to be given to the future growth of the community, both in relation to the existing development and to the bigger metropolitan area or region of which it is a part.

Housing is not as broad a field as community planning, but the two are closely related, especially as housing affects the standards and development of residential areas. Housing has for its goal the most effective utilization of available resources for sheltering for the people and providing for them, or helping them to provide for themselves, the facilities and services for pleasant living. This involves the analysis of the composition and characteristics of the population, the determination of their ability to pay for hous-

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with little regard for the consequences; the remnants of buildings which have been sliced through at odd angles can still be seen.

By law, the Ministry of Interior, through its Directorate General of Municipalities, is already responsible for the planning of municipalities. The Directorate General of Municipalities in turn has under it the Technical Section for Planning and Organization (or Planning Office) which has among its duties the submission of "technical advice as regards municipal schemes for the organization and planning of cities and towns in accordance with modern principles" and the carrying out of "any of the said schemes which are required to be performed . . .".[8] This office with a staff of 17 does topographic surveys of towns and prepares development plans from such surveys. It also plans for and supervises construction of some municipal structures, including housing, and attends to legal matters concerning land sub-division and assessment.

Also by law, the Ministry of Interior has jurisdiction over the administration of municipalities. Law No. 84 of 1931, as amended, provides that municipalities should attend to "the division of the town into areas having regard to its development capacity and the specification of plans to be followed for the improvement of streets, public places, and buildings in such areas." This particular duty concerning planning is assigned to the Office of the Municipal Engineer.

Although both the Planning Office and the Office of the Municipal Engineer are under the Ministry of Interior, the two entities involved with planning are quite distinct from each other. Duplication of work and conflict in jurisdiction both occur. Municipalities prepare their own plans and then forward them to the Ministry of Interior but apparently they do so only for information, and not for approval. Some plans are merely sketches. Others have been made without surveys. Where surveys have been undertaken, they are mainly topographic surveys showing the existing layout of streets and buildings, and not the diagnostic surveys required by scientific planning. In several cases plans have been altered without submission to the Ministry. Some streets which

[8] Regulation of the Ministry of Interior, No. 39 of 1947.

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361 have been newly constructed do not appear at all on the records
● 647 of the Planning Office. The Mission, in fact, found that many major details of developments such as civic centers, markets and the like, either were not shown in the plans or were contrary to the plans as prepared and filed. There were also instances where planned projects under construction were suddenly changed or stopped by a new mayor on his assuming office.

Cooperation of the central government with the local authorities has also been noticeably lacking. The Ministry of Education, without consultation with local officials, prepares school plans, showing not only the details of structures but also their location and distribution. Likewise, the Ministry of Social Affairs, without reference to local administration, prepares plans for hospitals, clinics, social centers, and housing schemes which form definite parts of the community. And, in similar fashion, the Ministry of Communications and Public Works prepares many plans for public works such as bridges, national highways and streets, and government structures designating details not only of construction but also of alignment, orientation and location. All these specialized planning activities are carried on with little or no coordination with the Planning Office in the Ministry of Interior. Even in Baghdad, where better cooperation between the municipality and the various government departments might be expected, a large school building was recently completed, abutting on a busy major thoroughfare, the proximity of which was dangerous for school children. The location was approved despite objections by the Planning Office.

Financial Difficulties

361 Financial difficulties have contributed to the failure of the
631 municipalities to plan more effectively. A large part of their
[651] revenues, which are in any case small, is derived from a share in the petrol and property taxes, the proceeds of which are handed over to the central government and, in theory at least, reallotted to the provincial and municipal governments. In years of financial stringency, however, the government has withheld a large part of these taxes for itself.

For capital funds, the municipalities have to rely on occasional loans—or, in rare cases, grants—from the central govern-

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361 185 these residential structures, there were a number of community facilities: a dispensary staffed by the Ministry of Social Affairs; a primary school building for 200 students and a secondary school building for an initial enrollment of 30 students constructed by the Ministry of Education; and a clubhouse which had been paid for by the people themselves. The municipality intended to erect a market and to install an electric generator. Residences for the *Qaimmaqam* (the administrator of the *qadha*) and the physician were also scheduled to be constructed.

Plans for the development of the new site for Bedrah were prepared by the Planning Office and followed by the local officials in the construction of the project. Work has been proceeding for several years and has been financed largely out of past savings. The whole project has, in fact, been carefully thought out and planned ahead. The initiative was due largely to the *Mutasarrif* of Kut and the success of the project to his close personal relation with the Planning Office.

361 447 This example is, unfortunately, an isolated one. In fact, the present status of the Technical Section for Planning and Organization in the Ministry of Interior does not permit comprehensive planning. It has neither the authority nor the staff to guide the planning of public works or buildings that are currently the concern of other ministries. The need for coordinated planning undoubtedly exists, but the function can only be discharged adequately if the Authority is given sufficient staff, trained not only in architecture and civil engineering, but in all the economic and sociological aspects of town planning.

General plans for the development of each municipality could then be based on facts and drawn up with a schedule of priorities, and future work should only be sanctioned if it is in conformity with these plans. Such plans should be practical and preferably designed so that they could be carried out in stages and changed and improved as conditions may demand. The new Community Planning Office should be made clearly responsible for approval of these plans or any changes in them. As a safeguard, funds for municipal development should be disbursed only for purposes which are in accordance with approved plans. This will require amendment of the present Roads and Buildings Regulations, which

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

are at present an amalgam of a building code and zoning regulations. These two distinct parts need to be separated and each properly administered.

While the Community Planning Office will have to take the lead in organizing the program, it is essential that it should not attempt to do all the detailed work itself. Although, in some cases, technically good plans may be prepared in this way, the result will be neither popular nor lasting and the planning authority may become a bottleneck. On the other hand, if plans are prepared independently by local authorities or by other government departments, the results will probably be uncorrelated and, therefore, unsatisfactory. The most desirable kind of planning is likely to be achieved by a combination of the two. Although plans should be initiated and later executed by the agencies immediately concerned, the central planning body should guide and coordinate them throughout the various stages. In the larger cities it could probably confine its activity to stimulating interest in the benefits of planning, advising on the preparation of plans and reviewing them at intervals in the course of preparation. In the smaller municipalities, it may have to do more of the actual work, but it should certainly endeavor to enlist as much local advice and cooperation as possible. As was noted earlier, imposition from above is undesirable.

Once plans have been drawn up, the financing of development should be placed on a more satisfactory footing. The principal source of funds for capital expenditure should be the Development Board. Whether they are in the form of loans or grants, they should be committed (although not actually credited) sufficiently far ahead for the municipalities to arrange a schedule of work with some degree of confidence. Loans should be made for a longer period and on less burdensome terms, especially as regards amortization. A careful study of a municipality's finances should be made to assess its probable ability to repay.

Slum Clearance

One of the major problems confronting the municipal authorities is the eradication of the worst slum areas of the cities. In Baghdad and Basra, this is a formidable undertaking, since the influx of people from Amara has been very large. Estimates vary

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

IV. Housing

Although the resettlement of slum dwellers and the improvement of living conditions in the villages constitute by far the largest housing needs of the country, the provision of adequate housing on reasonable terms to workers on a somewhat higher income level is also important. Efforts in this direction have been started by the central and municipal governments, by the two quasi-public transport organizations and by the Iraq Petroleum Company. Private entrepreneurs have found it profitable to concentrate largely on construction for the well-to-do. Some of the projects have good features, particularly that carried out by the IPC. Generally, however, defects are such that there is clearly much that a Housing Authority could accomplish.

The Need for a Housing Authority

The need for a Housing Authority is twofold. First, it is required to take the initiative in providing suitable housing for the lowest economic strata of the population, such as the Baghdad sarifa dwellers. This is a special kind of problem, which cannot be expected to be undertaken by other agencies. Secondly, it is required as a general, policy-making, coordinating and advisory agency. In this there is no suggestion that it should try to undertake housing for the whole country. On the contrary, initiative from municipalities, quasi-government agencies and private concerns should be welcomed. The function of the Authority should be to give technical, legal and financial assistance where it is required; to prescribe certain minimum standards; and to act on its own initiative only in cases where there seems to be both an urgent need and no alternative.

It will be necessary for the Authority to initiate a systematic survey in order to assemble all the necessary data for the formulation of a national housing program. Census data will be helpful, but probably additional assistance will be required from the statistics department of the Ministry of Economics in devising sampling techniques in order to determine the requirements. These would be especially useful in resettlement projects for sarifa dwellers.

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

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Due to the nature and magnitude of the work involved, the Housing Authority should be firmly established in the Ministry of Social Affairs and provided with powers commensurate with its responsibilities so that it may perform its functions effectively. It should ultimately have a staff composed of technical men trained in housing design, architecture, site and sanitary engineering, law and project management. As in the Community Planning Office, they should also have some knowledge of the sociological and economic aspects.

On the financial side, the Housing Authority should be provided with a Housing Fund to which the Development Board would allocate money set aside for housing and into which the proceeds of rentals would be paid so that maintenance and repairs could be financed without constant resort to the Treasury. Pending a housing survey the amounts set aside for housing in the five-year program of the Development Board, namely ID 300,000 annually, might be increased to ID 400,000 as a provisional target for housing expenditures.

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On the technical side, the Housing Authority should be complemented by the establishment of an Applied Building Research Station attached to the proposed Department of Research and Standards in the Ministry of Economics. Such a station should test, develop and demonstrate improved methods and techniques for low-cost housing; collect and disseminate technical housing and building information; experiment with and develop new uses of local building materials, construction methods and house designs; and carry on other useful research in the housing field. The Station should be staffed as far as possible with local technicians, but for the first year or so one or two building research experts from abroad should be engaged to start and run the Station and train the local technicians in order to enable them to operate the Station themselves after a time. A new building should be constructed for the Station and equipped with the basic instruments and machines necessary for starting tests and experiments. It will clearly be necessary for the Authority to work closely with the Station and to insure that the broad outlines of its work conform with the need of the country.

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

Labor and Materials

The Housing Authority could also take the lead in improving the quality of labor and materials in order to bring the costs of building down. In this task, it should cooperate with the Ministry of Education in reorganizing training methods. It could also advise the Industrial Bank on desirable types of specifications of building materials and should estimate probable requirements so that the Bank could initiate investment to this end in partnership with private enterprise.

The materials produced locally for housing construction are on the whole inferior and expensive. For example, a casual inspection of house construction in the cities will reveal that unevenly burnt bricks with cracks and chipped-off edges and corners have been and are being used. To remedy the shortage of good building materials, foreign goods have been imported at high cost. In the case of the IPC housing project, it was estimated that the cost of imported steel window and door sashes alone amounted to as much as 20 percent of the cost of the structures.

The inferiority of building materials is matched by the poor quality of building labor, which again adds to the cost of construction. There is urgent need for good carpenters, masons, plumbers, electricians and painters. Unfortunately, attempts to improve skills through vocational schools have not been altogether successful. The schools lack competent instructors, a number of those teaching in Baghdad, for example, being illiterate. Workshop accommodations are restricted and the equipment is out-of-date or in bad condition. These deficiencies might be overcome by importing instructors from neighboring countries, by obtaining new equipment and by running evening classes until more laboratory space is available. This is not, however, the full answer. Graduates from vocational schools tend to prefer desk jobs to field work. It would be preferable to concentrate more on training schemes on the job under good supervision.

Government Housing

The Ministry of Social Affairs is empowered by Law No. 38 of 1941 and Law No. 22 of 1945 to "construct dwellings for

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
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Iraq each capable of manufacturing 10,000 tons of sugar per annum from sugar beet to be grown locally, a bitumen plant, and a small steel plant. In addition the Government is investigating the recommendation of the International Bank mission[1] for the erection of a chemical plant at Kirkuk to produce ammonium sulphate fertilizer, cement, sulphur, and carbon black. The mission has also recommended plants for manufacturing bone-meal fertilizer, date-packing crates and motor-car tyres, and for batching concrete, converting steel scrap into building components, and possibly for remelting glass.

Labour

Conditions of work and employment are regulated by a Labour Law (1936–46), which so far relates only to 'workmen' (a term requiring more precise definition) in industrial undertakings. It is in process of revision and extension. Its application is supervised by the Department of Labour and Social Security, which maintains a small corps of inspectors. This department, advised by foreign experts, proposes to experiment with employment exchanges, is starting to compile labour statistics, is undertaking a programme of housing for labour, and is examining plans of social security, for which the existing Labour Law already contains some provision in the form of indemnities on discharge, paid sick and confinement leave, and compensation for injuries. Safety and sanitary working conditions are covered generally by the Labour Law and made obligatory in greater detail by a Workshops and Factories Regulation (1937). In January 1953 it was stated that new provisions, for eventual inclusion in the new Labour Law, had been drafted for establishing wage boards, regulating disputes, and determining the rights, obligations, and administration of trade unions, which are not clearly defined in the existing Labour Law. The latter grants industrial workers the right to establish associations to safeguard their special interests, strengthen the spirit of co-operation, effect educational, cultural, hygienic, social, and moral improvements, and develop Iraqi industry. A few trade unions exist; their membership is small and activity slight. Others have been suspended for subversive activity. The movement is still rudimentary.

Communications

Railways.[2] The railways constructed by the British forces during the Mesopotamian Campaign eventually formed the

[1] See above, p. 275.
[2] This section is based on the *Directory of Railway Officials and Year Book*, 1952–3.

25: Warriner S-5 (no date) 1948 M1 Middle East
Iraq MH1

423 Government the right to settle title to land. From 1933 to 1943 5,330,000 hectares of land were settled covering the whole of the agricultural area, in the following categories:

	Hectares	Acres
Leasehold (*Miri Sirf*)	3,000,000	7,413,270
Freehold (*Lazma*)	1,200,000	2,965,308
Freehold (*Tapu*)	900,000	2,223,981
Endowed (*Mulk Waqf*) ..	250,000	617,772
TOTAL	5,350,000	13,220,331

The freehold title, described as *lazma*, was a new legal category, supposedly suitable for tribal conditions. It grants freehold ownership, that is, *tapu* title, to the occupier after ten years' cultivation as a leaseholder, and its special feature is that land so granted cannot be sold outside the tribe. The object of introducing this new type of tenure was to maintain tribal solidarity, but it has not in fact had this effect, and has been mainly used by the pump owners to secure ownership against the customary rights of the tribesmen.

423 Nor have Dowson's recommendations as to the creation of a Central Lands Office been carried out. The Survey and Land
647 Settlement Departments are under two separate ministries, Communications and Justice respectively. The Survey Department complains that it has not enough surveyors for its work, and that owing to lack of co-ordination its surveyors are taken off for land settlement work and cannot therefore carry on their regular work of survey. Land registry is undertaken by two departments, the old Turkish Tapu Department which is reported to issue title deeds on the basis of the titles settled, and a newly created office for registration of changes in tenure after settlement; this is an unnecessary duplication of function. Thus there is not any central department charged with the direction of policy, and this defect has had bad practical results.

423 The real problem of settlement has been the decision as to who should be regarded as the real owners of the land, the sheikhs, the sirkals, or the cultivators. The general objective was to settle the land on the basis of the existing rights. If, that is to say, the sheikh has a claim of one-fifth of the produce from each of a hundred cultivators, he should receive a holding of land equivalent to one-fifth of the total land and each cultivator

29:Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 MI Middle East
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511 of the people are even more primitive than their ancestors of several thousand years ago. They live on the ground in mud huts, in the shadows of the stone ruin of their ancestors' homes. They draw water by hand from wells from which water was once pulled by giant water wheels; they irrigate their tiny garden patches with hand scoops where once large canals watered thousands of acres.

871 212 Despite the progress in education, less than half the children are in school, and only half of those fortunate ones finish the primary grades. In the country as a whole, 80 per cent of the males and 95 per cent of the females are still illiterate.

These people now hope for a new life, a place in the sun again.

DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS

651 382 The internationally-owned oil companies operating in Iraq recently have increased oil output materially and expect by 1955 to be producing at a rate five times above the 1951 level. Half of the profits before taxes will accrue to the Iraq Government, and should amount to about $600 million during the next five years.

● 647 654 These revenues will be assigned to the Central Development Board, an autonomous agency established to insure greater continuity in the planning and implementation of development programs. An American, Wesley Nelson, formerly Assistant Commissioner of the Bureau of Reclamation in the United States Department of Interior, is a member of the board by invitation of the Iraq Government.

FINANCING

652 654 The Board is following rather closely a development program recommended by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development after its special mission made a detailed study of the Iraq economy at the request of the government. The cost of the suggested five-year program, beginning with fiscal 1952-53, is estimated at approximately $471.8 million to be apportioned as follows:

Project	*In Millions of Dollars*
Flood control, irrigation, and drainage	154.5
Industry	103.6
Transport and communications	86.8
Community Facilities	65.0
Agriculture and Forestry	21.0
Education	17.1
Public Health	14.0
Development Board administration, studies, etc.	4.2
Miscellaneous expenditures	5.6
	471.8

To carry out the program the Development Board would have to spend $42 million in 1952-53 and successively larger sums each year, up to a total of $140 million in 1956-57.[33]

[33] *Economic Development of Iraq*, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1952, p. 63.

44:Matthews and Akrawi S, G-3 (1945-1946)1949 Ml Middle East
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Chapter 8

ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM

THE PUBLIC-SCHOOL system is an integral part of the government in Iraq, being under the control of the Ministry of Education. It attempts to reach all levels from kindergarten through institutions of higher learning, embracing specialized instruction as well as general culture Like other departments of the Iraqi government, the administration of the public-school system is highly centralized, and the Ministry of Education not only issues regulations, instructions, and orders, but also is responsible for the appointment, promotion, and dismissal of teachers, the founding, financial support, and closing of public schools, the determination of curriculums and textbooks, the training of teachers, and the formulation and grading of public examinations. This intensive government control to a large extent determines the policies, curriculums, and methods of private and foreign schools. The regulations of the Ministry of Education went through repeated revisions in the period from 1933 to 1945.[1]

The Ministry of Education

The Minister of Education, a Cabinet member, is the supreme head of the Ministry. He is responsible for its administration and for the satisfactory performance of various duties by all of its officials. All orders, decisions, and instructions are issued in his name and executed under his supervision and control. All new appointments, promotions, and dismissals require his approval, as does the expenditure of sums exceeding 37.5 dinars (about $150). Under the Minister are the Director General of Antiquities, the Director General of Education, the deans of the Law College and of the Higher Teachers College, the Technical Adviser, and the chief of the Private Bureau. (See Chart III.) The latter is a comparatively minor

[1] Another revision took place in the summer of 1946, nine months after the American Council Commission left Iraq.

44:Matthews and Akrawi S, G-3 (1945-1946)1949 MI Middle East
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official who acts as secretary to the Minister. The Director General of Antiquities has charge of all the museums and the archeological activities conducted by his department and also supervises the work of foreign archeological expeditions and the preservation of monuments and remains of historical value. Although an agency for informal education, the Antiquities Department is not an integral part of the educational system.

In the days of the mandate a British adviser was attached to the Ministry of Education, but the office was abolished after 1930, prior to the termination of the mandate. It was re-established in 1943. The function of the adviser was to render an opinion on questions referred to him by the Minister and to make recommendations for the improvement of the work of the Ministry. The post of adviser was abolished in 1946.

The deans of the Law College and of the Higher Teachers College are directly responsible to the Minister for the proper functioning of their respective institutions. Both colleges are run under the supervision of their own faculty councils, whose decisions are subject to the approval of the Minister. They develop their own curriculums and conduct their own examinations. The faculty council of the Law College recommends candidates for its teaching posts, but in the Higher Teachers College this function is performed by the dean.

The Minister serves also as president of the Advisory Council on Education, a body created by the regulations of 1943 and consisting of the Minister, the Director General of Education, the Technical Adviser, the Director General of Antiquities, the deans of the Law College and of the Higher Teachers College, and four permanent members appointed—one each—by the Ministers of Finance, Communications and Works, Social Affairs, and Economics. All these persons meeting together elect four private citizens known for their experience and interest in education to supplement their number. The council meets at least twice a year, in October and April, and makes recommendations to the Minister of Education.

The Director General of Education

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The Director General of Education is the real administrative head of the public-school system. He is expected to be a man of experience in educational administration and in matters of teaching in the schools. He is responsible to the Minister for the proper operation and inspection of all the schools in order to insure that all Iraqi youth shall receive the right moral, intellectual, and physical education regardless of their race, lan-

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

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

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

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guage, or any other difference. Actually, the Director General of Education is the key man of the Ministry. It is he who implements the policies initiated by the Minister or by himself or laid down in various councils and committees. As the Minister is the political head of the Ministry and usually changes with the changes in the administration, it devolves upon the Director General to provide the administrative and professional direction of the system as well as the continuity of policies desirable in any educational system. He is the equivalent of a permanent under secretary and is supposed to be professionally well trained. In practice, however, the Directors General have changed frequently, fourteen having held office between 1927 and 1945, with an average tenure of 15.5 months.

The Director General is aided by one assistant and by directors for each of the six fields of educational activity: primary education, secondary education, teacher training and educational missions abroad, vocational education, educational research and statistics, and private- and foreign-school education. The post of Director of Education for Women, established in 1934, was abolished the following year. The post of Director of Rural Education was twice instituted and abolished—in a country having 75 percent of its population rural. The Directorates of Teacher Training and of Private- and Foreign-School Education are recent innovations, originating in 1945.

Within the office of the Director General there are also ten sections which are shown in Chart III. Their titles are self-explanatory, but four require special comment.

The Publication and Translation Section has charge of the publication of all texts for public primary and secondary schools and of various other publications issued by the central office of the Ministry. At one time the publication of approved textbooks for public schools was left to the authors, who usually agreed with the Ministry about the sale price of the books. In 1935, however, the Ministry, in an attempt to produce textbooks more economically and adequately, inaugurated the policy of buying the authors' rights and publishing the books at its own expense. Although the policy has not been consistently followed, an appreciable number of approved texts are now published by the Ministry.

The Examinations Section has charge of all public examinations conducted at the end of the sixth grade of the primary school and the third and fifth years of the secondary school. Each year the section establishes committees for setting the questions and other committees for grading the papers. It keeps complete records of the results of the examinations.

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871 The Educational Missions Section has charge of the affairs of students
647 selected for study abroad at government expense and keeps records of all students who study abroad at their own expense.

744 The Medicine and Hygiene Section safeguards the health of the school children. It inspects school buildings, conducts regular health examinations of pupils, treats those who suffer from diseases, trains teachers in first aid and simple treatments, propagates health information, and supplies schools with drugs and first-aid materials. In addition, it gives physical examinations at government expense to all teachers and officials entering the service of the Ministry of Education and all students entering the various schools and colleges. This section has set itself the task of fighting the three endemic diseases—trachoma, malaria, and bilharziasis—prevalent among school children. In 1943–44, 67,415 pupils out of the total public-school registration of 104,359 were examined; and of those examined, 16,599 were found to have trachoma, while 3,253 suffered other eye diseases; 5,864 had malaria, and 1,299 had bilharziasis. Treatment of those afflicted with bilharziasis resulted in steady improvement. The fight against trachoma has proceeded systematically, and the percentage of school children suffering from it is being reduced. Much effort has been expended on the campaign against malaria in all the provinces. The Medicine and Hygiene Section began very humbly in 1931 with the appointment of one doctor. By 1942–43 it had twenty-one doctors, two dentists, ten women nurses for the provinces, and more than seventy other health workers. In 1943–44 it maintained twenty-nine clinics throughout the country, and more recently a special hospital for students was established in Baghdad. Treatment at the clinics and at the hospital is free.

Provincial Directors of Education

871 There is a provincial director of education for each of the fourteen
635 provinces of Iraq. He is responsible to the Director General for the proper functioning of all schools and educational institutions in his province with the exception of teacher-training colleges, some of the vocational and special schools, and higher institutions; these exceptions are the direct concern of the central office of the Ministry. It is the function of the provincial director to make sure that teaching in the schools within his jurisdiction is in accordance with accepted syllabuses, to supervise the behavior of teachers and education officers in his province, and to carry out instructions of the Director General. The regulations of 1945 provide for provincial advisory education councils under the chairmanship of the governor and with the director of education as secretary. These councils

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were to act in an advisory capacity, reviewing the educational situation in the province and making proposals for the improvement and extension of education.

However, a new Provincial Administration Law, passed by Parliament in 1945, effective early in 1946, provides for a general provincial council in each province to meet yearly in the month of March. The councils are empowered to levy local taxes to support various local services, such as the opening of technical classes and schools, the teaching about industries that will fit the local needs, the establishment of agricultural schools, and the founding, administration, and supervision, according to the provisions of the Public Education Law, of primary schools and of schools for workers and illiterates. It is not yet clear what the relation will be between the provincial educational councils, provided for by the regulations of the Ministry of Education, and the general provincial councils provided for in the new Provincial Administration Law.

The Inspectorate

Side by side with the administrative service is the inspectoral service headed by a chief inspector responsible to the Director General. Inspectors are of three kinds: specialized inspectors, provincial inspectors, and women inspectors. Those in the first category are specialists in subject-matter fields who visit classes and teachers in their own fields in intermediate and secondary schools, teacher-training colleges, and special schools on the secondary-school level. They report on the performance of individual teachers, as well as on the general situation with regard to textbooks, library books, equipment, and laboratories. There is also a specialized administrative inspector who inspects the general administration of the school systems of the provinces.

Provincial inspectors make their headquarters in the education offices of the provinces and visit primary and secondary schools, but not technical schools or teachers colleges. In the secondary schools these inspectors have to ask the help of specialized inspectors in matters concerning the various subject-matter fields. Provincial inspectors are under the jurisdiction of the chief inspector and are independent of the provincial director of education. Women inspectors visit and report on girls schools, under the direction of a first woman inspector.

Inspectors' reports are sent to the chief inspector with copies to the provincial directors of education, and the substance of the reports is sent to the individuals about whom the reports are made. The chief inspector presents semiannual reports to the Director General of Education, de-

44:Matthews and Akrawi S, G-3 (1945-1946)1949 MI Middle East
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scribing the condition of the schools, and he makes an annual report to the Minister. It is his duty to insure the proper inspection of schools, the dissemination of information about improved methods of teaching together with the giving of demonstration lessons before teachers, the inspection of extraclass and out-of-school activities, the behavior of both teachers and pupils, and the condition of school buildings, equipment, and furnishings.

Councils and committees

In addition to the previously mentioned Advisory Council on Education, the provincial educational councils and the general provincial councils, there are various other councils and committees which carry on some of the most important work of the Ministry.

Foremost among these is the Permanent Education Council with its two committees, the Central Education Committee and the Committee on the Equivalence of Diplomas and Degrees. The Permanent Council, a kind of executive board for the Ministry, is composed of the Director General of Education as chairman, the Director of Antiquities, the deans of the Law College and the Higher Teachers College, and the chief inspector. The Technical Adviser may be invited to meetings, but has no vote. The council meets at least once a month at the request of the Minister to deal with the general policies and trends of education, curriculums, budget, educational missions, laws and regulations, and employment of foreign teachers, and acts upon decisions made by committees.

The Central Education Committee is composed of the Director General as chairman, the assistants to the Director General and the six directors of the various types of education. Its principal function is to do the groundwork for the Permanent Education Council as regards curriculums and educational missions; in addition, it sanctions the purchase of books for the public libraries. The Committee on the Equivalence of Diplomas and Degrees decides on the value of degrees and diplomas received abroad.

Another important body is the Council of the Provincial Educational Directors, which meets annually in the summer. It consists of the provincial directors, the higher officials of the Ministry of Education, the dean of the Higher Teachers College, and the principals of the primary-, elementary-, and rural-teachers colleges. Its chief function is to study the progress of education in the provinces and correlate the work of the central office with that of the regional offices. At its meetings the annual budget is apportioned among the provinces, new graduates of the teachers colleges are assigned to the several provinces, transfers of teachers from one province

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tributed into small plots for purpose of development shall be entrusted with the distribution of water within the project's areas (Article 11, para. 3) and water distribution shall be confined to the lands of the project (Article 11, para. 1).

1) The Use of Water for Irrigation Purposes

Notification No. 226 of the Minister of Communications and Works dated 9 June 1927, issued under the Irrigation Law of 1923, declares all rivers (anbar) and waterways (majari) in Iraq to be "Irrigation Works." This term covers irrigation and flood protection works as well as areas, occupied by or required for the construction or maintenance of such works. The right of undertaking irrigation works on privately owned lands is granted (Art. 3) to the Government, provided the land so required for the works is expropriated according to Law, once the proposed works have been declared to be of public utility. A private owner wishing to carry out works on or through another person's property shall obtain a certificate from the Executive Irrigation Engineer, stating the necessity of such works together with their extent and probable effect on neighboring lands. The applicant remains responsible for the acquisition, lease or arrangement with the interposed owners (Art. 4).

Requests from particulars for constructing any irrigation works are submitted to the mutassarrif of the Liwa concerned. If such requests are not rejected for administrative reasons, they are transmitted to the Executive Irrigation Engineer who may reject them on technical ground or otherwise issue the necessary permit on Irrigation Form No. 44, embodying instructions constituting the specifications of the work for which approval has been granted. The Law does not confer "water rights," but when a permit is issued and implies use of water, it is henceforth recognized that the land to be brought under cultivation shall enjoy the use of water under conditions similar to others within the same district.

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All irrigation works of public importance shall be constructed, repaired and maintained by and remain under the control and supervision of the Irrigation Department, even when such works have been declared to have ceased to be of public importance (Art. 6). The Executive Irrigation Engineer may require the person responsible with the maintenance of watercourses (channels not maintained by the Government, Art. 2, para. 4),

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to carry out the necessary repair work and in the event of failure, the said Engineer may execute such work at the expense of the defaulter. If damage has been caused to structures and the offender is not found then the owners of the lands depending on the watercourse shall be held jointly responsible (Article 7). A "Notice of Repair or Removal" on Irrigation Form No. 45, is used for the repair, removal or reconstruction of works as defined under Articles 4, 7, and 11 of the Law. 312 647 654

The Irrigation Engineers shall determine the dimensions of canals and watercourses, the lands and areas which may be irrigated from such canals and watercourses (Article 5). The distribution of water is carried out by the Irrigation Department up to a point below the heads of the watercourses (Article 8). Interference with another person's water supply, or the opening of any outlet which has been closed by competent authority or the taking of water from a source other than that prescribed by the Executive Irrigation Engineer, are not permitted (Article 10).

Article 9 prescribes that the Executive Irrigation Engineer shall have the power to stop the water supply to any watercourse in the following cases:

a) for the purpose of executing irrigation works;

b) whenever the watercourse is not maintained in such repair as to prevent the wasteful escape of water;

c) to supply water in rotation;

d) whenever wastage or misuse of water takes place;

e) whenever notices issued or demands made have not been complied with regarding (i) maintenance and repair of works (Article 7); (ii) supply of able-bodied persons for undertaking either work or repairs to works for preventing loss of life or serious damage to property and land (Article 13) or repairs and maintenance of irrigation works (Article 14). This notice shall be called "Notice of Stoppage of Water."

Article 11 states that no person shall construct any building, canal or watercourse, erect any pump, water lift or water wheel, plant any crops within the boundaries of any irrigation area without the written approval of the Executive Engineer, who

312 may order the offender to remove the unauthorized structure within 15 days of the date of notice served on Irrigation Form No. 45. Should he fail to comply with the instructions contained in the Notice, the work of removal may then be carried out by the Executive Engineer and cost recovered from the offender.

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If the water supplied is used in an unauthorized manner or causes damage to the lands, and if the persons responsible cannot be discovered, the person or persons on whose land such water flowed shall be held responsible. Such person shall be liable to a fine not exceeding 20 rupees per kashara 1/ of inundated land.

2) Requisition of Labour

Article 13 provides for the recruiting at rates of pay to be fixed by the Executive Engineer in consultation with the Mutassarrif, of able-bodied persons whenever workers for the immediate execution of emergency or repair works for preventing loss of life or serious damage to land and property cannot be obtained in the ordinary manner. For the purpose of the repair and maintenance of irrigation works, the person who will benefit from their being in good condition and will lose if otherwise, may be called on to furnish the necessary labor (Article 14).

The Executive Engineer may call on the mutassarrif or qaimaqam (sub-prefect or sub-governor) to raise the necessary labor contingent. To this end, the mutassarrifs shall furnish the Director of Irrigation with two statements every year, before the tenth of August: the first statement (Irrigation Form No. 47) shall show the total number of able-bodied men of laboring class residing in the Liwa, for purpose of Article 13. The second statement (Irrigation Forms 48 and 48A) shall show the total labor residing in the Liwa available for work under Article 14, during three different periods, i.e.: September to December - January to April - May to August. The requisition of labor, urgent (Art. 13) or otherwise (Art. 14) is made on Irrigation Forms 49 and 50 respectively.

Any person who refuses or neglects to supply labor as provided for in the two above-mentioned articles of the Law, shall upon conviction be liable to a fine not exceeding Rs. 500 or to

1/ 20 rupees = ID. 1/500 = $6.00; kashara = 1/4 hectares = 0.618 acres

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portant of these, prior to the International Bank Mission, was perhaps the Haigh Irrigation Commission, which worked from 1946 to 1949 and recommended a £100 million development plan which would have increased the irrigated area from 8 to 17 million acres.[22] Yet in 1949 the United Nations Survey Mission reported that the financial resources available to the Iraq Government, not only from oil royalties but also from the accumulated wartime sterling surplus, had been largely diverted to financing consumption imports and the operating expenses of the State.[23]

In this statement the Mission touched on the basic problem of the area, even of those sections which have available financial resources for development projects. The realization of the importance of investment in development projects which will bear returns in the future necessitates self-denial of immediate consumption goods. Such long-range visualization, especially when resources for gratification of immediate needs are readily available, is, however, a quality with which neither the masses nor many of the political leaders are endowed. It is perhaps in the lack of this quality that the explanation for the failure of all the numerous development plans of the Middle Eastern oil producing countries may be found. The ability to curtail current spending for the sake of investments which will increase not merely the individual's returns but the wealth-producing potential of the nation as a whole would be a *sine qua non* for any growing and even highly developed economy, and certainly for underdeveloped areas. But the temptation to utilize the "external" income—from oil—for current needs which could never before be afforded, for alleviating the tax burden, for improving political standing with the electorate, proved too strong, and sooner or later all succumbed.

The Development Board

To return to Iraq. In May 1950 the Government promulgated a law (1950 No. 23) creating a Development Board to which was to be assigned the revenue derived from the oil com-

[22] U. N., *Review 1949-50*, 29; "The Economic Development of Iraq," *The Times Review of Industry*, Sept., 1953, 93.
[23] United Nations, *Final Report of the Survey Mission*, I, 36.

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panies; in 1952 the law was amended assigning only seventy per cent of the revenue to the Board. The Board with the Premier as chairman, the Minister of Finance as member *ex officio*, and six non-political full time executive members, was charged with preparing an overall development plan and given the authority to execute major capital development projects. On October 10 of that year Iraq officially requested the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development to send a survey mission to review the economic potentialities of the country and make recommendations for a development program.[24] The Mission arrived in Iraq on February 25, 1951 and a year later, on February 11, 1952, the report was submitted to Premier Nuri es Said. It proposed a development plan for the years 1952-1956 involving a total expenditure of some $470,000,000, to be derived from the oil revenue for the same period. Basing itself on the Mission's report, the Development Board worked out the following five-year plan:

Table V. *Iraq Development Board Program*

Projects	*Cost* (in I.D.)
Irrigation schemes	53,400,000
Roads	26,700,000
Other communications	4,100,000
Buildings, including hospitals and schools	18,000,000
Public utilities	4,100,000
Agriculture	7,500,000
Industry (including erection of a chemical factory)	31,000,000
Miscellaneous	10,600,000
Total	155,400,000[25]

As far as the financing was concerned, the Development Board had no difficulty. As mentioned in the previous chapter, oil production in 1952 and 1953 ran ahead of schedule, and the Board's share of revenue in those two years alone was about ID30,000,000.

[24] International Bank, *Iraq Mission Report*, ix. The terms of reference agreed to were: "The Mission will be expected to undertake a general review of Iraq's economic potentialities and to submit recommendations designed to assist the Government of Iraq to formulate a long-term program for the further development of the country's productive resources." *Ibid.*

[25] This differs in some respects from the recommendations of the Survey Mission both in total expenditure as well as in the allotments for the various items. See International Bank, *Iraq Mission Report*, 73.

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The general progress of the Development Board under the existing conditions was tolerably satisfactory, but the long-range objectives and the conditions necessary for their realization were not appreciated either by the people or by the politicians. In 1953 the Development Board Law was amended and a new Ministry of Development was created. Though the Development Board was retained, the execution of the development plan was placed under both the Board and the Ministry. The Minister of Development became an additional *ex officio* member of the Board, responsible to Parliament for the conduct of his Ministry and of the Board. The original intent of the law to remove the Board from the vagaries of political change was thus negated. Moreover, because of the general educational and technological level of the population, the Development Board found itself in the unusual, if not unique, position of not being able to spend the constantly increasing revenue.[26] The Board consequently resorted to lending its funds to other Government agencies not concerned with long-range development, and a goodly portion of its income was diverted to other regular expenses.[27]

Despite inherent limitations and basic difficulties, the awareness of the people and the Government that the oil revenue could be used as a means of advancing the development of the country has had some positive and some negative effects on Iraq's growth. One might note a general tendency to depend exclusively on oil income, to the exclusion of all other resources of governmental and economic operations. For obvious reasons the Government adopted a policy of reducing taxes[28] in view of the gigantic income from oil.[29] Such a policy, combined

[26] In 1952-53, ID11 million of the Board's allotment remained unspent. *The Manchester Guardian*, Oct. 6, 1953.

[27] For a description of the various projects, see U.N., *Final Report of the Economic Survey Mission*, I, 71-74; International Bank, *Iraq Mission Report*, 185-457; Norman Burns, "Development Projects in Iraq," *The Middle East Journal*, IV, Summer, 1951, 362-370; Fuad Jameel, "Development Projects and Economic Progress in Iraq," *Al Aswaq al Tijariya*, Apr. 3, 1954; Mohammed Zaki Abdul Kareem, "Beehive of Construction," *Al Aswaq al Tijariya*, June 12, 19, 26, July 3, 1954; *Foreign Commerce Weekly*, Dec. 13, 1954, 3.

[28] In 1953 the Government lifted the consumption tax on fresh fruits and vegetables, increased the reductions in the real estate tax and announced substantial cuts in customs and excise taxes. Jameel, "Development Projects," *Al Aswaq al Tijariya*, Apr. 3, 1954.

[29] The 1952-53 total Government budget amounted to $134,000,000, of which about 42 per cent came from direct oil revenue (only 30 per cent of total income, the other 70 per cent being assigned to the Development Board). U.N., *Summary 1952-53*, 60.

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obtained in 1950. It was not fully drawn upon, and has been repaid. The other major foreign debt was a loan of $12.8 million from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, in 1950, to meet the foreign exchange requirements of the Wadi Tharthar irrigation scheme. In addition, the Government obtained several advances free of interest from the oil companies, totalling ID 4.5 million, which have now been repaid.

Five domestic loans, totalling ID 7 million, were used to finance the railways and irrigation schemes. Two of these, of ID 1 million each, at 3 per cent interest, issued in 1944 and 1947 with maturities of 3 and 5 years respectively, were redeemed. Other outstanding bond issues comprised a one ID 1 million loan with 3 1/2 per cent interest, issued in 1948, and two twenty year loans, issued in 1944 and 1948, for ID 1 million and ID 3 million respectively. The above mentioned total does not include outstanding Treasury bills and the loans and advances made by the National Bank, commercial banks or other institutions. However, the public debt of Iraq is comparatively small and does not constitute a real burden on the economy of the country. In fact, the Government now has almost no difficulty as far as revenues are concerned, in redeeming not only foreign debts but also domestic ones as well. It is believed that the floating of domestic loans is intended to absorb "idle money" and is an anti-inflationary measure, while the foreign loans were to provide foreign exchange required for various development schemes. The repayment of the United Kingdom loan and the announcement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development that the Government of Iraq had cancelled the unused balance of $6.5 million on its loan are evidence of Iraq's ability to meet its needs from its own resources.

Development programme

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The rapid increase in revenue anticipated from the expansion of petroleum production and the revision of the terms of payment by the oil companies led the Government to initiate an over-all plan to develop the resources of the country. In 1950, a Development Board was established and a comprehensive five-year (1951 to 1956) development plan, involving an estimated expenditure of ID 65.8 million, was drawn up.

In 1951, at the request of the Iraqi Government, a mission from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development visited Iraq and submitted a report, which included a five-year plan with an estimated expenditure of ID 168.5 million. 1/ The Iraqi Government accordingly, in the light of the Bank's recommendation, replaced its earlier plan by a six-year plan (1 April 1951 to 31 March 1957) calling for expenditure of ID 155.4 million (table 30).

1/ International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The Economic Development of Iraq (Baltimore, 1952).

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Table 30. Iraq: Proposed Expenditure and Revenue of the Development Board, 1951/52 to 1956/57

(Thousands of Iraqi dinars)

Item	1951/52	1952/53	1953/54	1954/55	1955/56	1956/57	Total
Revenue:							
Oil revenue	10,150	18,690	32,900	34,300	34,300	34,300	164,640
Proceeds of Tharthar project loan	320	1,850	970	640	185	-	3,965
Miscellaneous receipts	2	8	50	35	20	20	135
Total	10,472	20,548	33,928	34,975	34,505	34,320	168,740
Expenditure:							
Administrative and research expenses.	170	460	600	650	650	650	3,180
Irrigation projects:							
Tharthar	1,250	3,600	3,140	1,450	185	675	10,300
Habbaniya	450	300	500	500	200	250	2,200
Diyala reservoir	200	450	1,800	2,100	1,700	1,000	7,250
Dokan reservoir	200	600	1,400	1,700	1,550	1,250	6,700
Bekhme reservoir	200	1,000	2,500	2,500	2,500	2,500	8,700
Udhaim barrage and construction of canals	-	550	250	500	500	500	1,800
Other irrigation projects	724	1,500	2,000	2,450	2,700	2,950	12,324
Major drainage projects	200	400	750	750	1,000	1,000	4,100
Total, irrigation projects	3,024	7,100	10,840	11,950	10,335	10,125	53,374
Roads and bridges	2,066	3,800	4,700	5,300	5,450	5,450	26,766
Buildings	2,368	2,650	3,100	3,300	3,300	3,300	18,018
Reclamation of land, etc.	1,686	3,450	4,150	4,400	4,600	4,700	22,986
Industries	650	3,000	5,000	6,000	8,000	9,000	31,650
Total	9,364	20,460	28,390	32,600	32,535	33,225	195,574

Source: Compilation of Laws concerning the Development Board (revised). Schedule A (Baghdad, 1952), pages 8 and 9. Figures represent planned expenditure and revenue for fiscal years ending 31 March.

67: United Nations S-5 (1945-1954) 1955 MI Middle East
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Previously the Government had carried out several schemes in various fields but development projects had had to be kept small and had been aimed at the more immediate needs. Financing was carried out by means of yearly capital works appropriations, totalling about ID35 million from 1931 to 1950. It is not, however, clear whether these appropriations were fully spent.

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The execution of the Six-Year Plan was entrusted to the Development Board, established in the spring of 1950 under Law No. 23 of 1950 as amended by Law No. 6 of 1952. It was constituted under the presidency of the Prime Minister; the members were the Minister of Finance and six executive members, nominated by the Council of Ministers for a term of five years, including three experts, one each in finance and economics; in irrigations; and in an unspecified field to be prescribed by the Council of Ministers. The Board was entrusted with the duty of preparing "a general economic and financial plan for the development of the resources of Iraq and the raising of the standard of living of the people"; with undertaking "a general survey of the exploited and unexploited resources of Iraq"; with the execution of the plans "in accordance with their determined priority"; and with co-ordinating the various ministries' development schemes in relation to the general development of the country. The Board has its own budget, and its revenue consisted, at the outset, of the total revenue received from the oil companies, but in 1952 this was amended to 70 per cent plus such other sums as may be allotted to it by Parliament and the proceeds of any loans, domestic or foreign.

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In July 1953 the Ministry of Development was set up, headed by a new cabinet minister who became the ninth voting member, the Board's representative on the Council of Ministers and the link between Parliament and the Board. The new law did not change the Six-Year Plan or the financial structure of the Board, although it changed the latter's organizational framework and required the new minister to prepare a new development plan to be executed after the completion of the present one. Furthermore, with a view to administrative decentralization, a distinction has been made between "capital development projects" to be carried out entirely by the Board and "small development projects" which, though financed by the Board, are to be entrusted to the appropriate government departments for execution. The Board held its first meeting on 30 November 1950 and in May 1951 prepared its general programme, which was approved by Parliament in June 1951. The Six-Year Plan (1951 to 1957) calls for a total expenditure of ID 155.4 million and an estimated revenue of ID 168.7 million.

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Actual expenditures on development plans for the financial years 1951/52 to 1953/54 totalled ID 26 million. They fell short of planned expenditure, which amounted to ID 58.2 million, thus leaving an unspent balance of ID 31.9 million. The building programme and reclamation of lands and other projects ran nearest to schedule while irrigation and industry lagged behind (see table 31). In addition, the Board has granted a number of loans to municipalities and semi-governmental institutions. As the end of March 1954, approvals (in thousands of Iraqi dinars):

Omnibus service, Baghdad	1,000
Agricultural machinery and tools	500
Oil refinery service	6,000
Baghdad Water Board	660
Directorate General of Iraqi Railways	2 500
Industrial Bank	500
Eight municipalities	3,553
Total	14,113

67: United Nations S-S (1945-1954) 1955 Ml Middle East
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Table 31. Iraq: Allotments and Anticipated Expenditure of the Development Board, 1951/52 to 1953/54

(Thousands of Iraqi dinars)

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Item	1951/52		1952/53		1953/54		Surplus, 1951/52 to 1953/54
	Allotments	Anticipated expenditure	Allotments	Anticipated expenditure	Allotments	Anticipated expenditure	
Administrative and research expenses	170	110	460	260	600	300	560
Irrigation expenses	3,024	1,733	7,100	1,064	10,840	4,000	13,807
Major roads and bridges	2,066	836	3,800	2,933	4,700	2,500	4,398
Buildings	2,368	1,368	2,650	2,650	3,100	2,900	1,200
Reclamation of land etc.	1,736	953	3,450	2,076	4,150	2,150	3,157
Industries	-	-	3,000	5	5,000	500	6,495
Total	9,364	5,000	20,460	8,988	28,390	12,350	31,876

Source: Development Board, Annual Report, 1953/54 (Baghdad, 1954); figures are for fiscal years ending 31 March.

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433 The increase in oil production and other earnings of the Board resulted in a higher revenue during the years 1951/52 to 1953/54 than that originally estimated, in spite of a smaller withdrawal from the 312.8 million Wadi Thartar project loan granted by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. In the meantime, the Board's over-all expenditure during the same period amounted to about ID 40 million, including loans and advances; accounts deposited with the National Bank of Iraq for the disbursement of the Thartar project; and the sum of ID 10.5 million paid to the Ministry of Finance for the schemes undertaken by the various ministries on behalf of the Board (see table 32). Furthermore the Board has authorized government departments to finance various plans on its behalf, and has awarded several contracts for its major plans to various foreign and national companies. Some of these plans have already been completed and the rest are to be completed in the next few years. Thus the actual expenditure plus the obligated expenditure of the Board have been estimated to be about ID 45 to ID 55 million.

The most important reasons for deferring the expenditure of the allocated amounts provided for in the Board's budgets since its operation have been the delay in the approval of the programme by Parliament; the inability of the different departments, particularly in the first two years, to execute the projects entrusted to them by the Board; and the necessity for providing adequate time to study, survey and prepare the estimated cost and specifications for inviting tenders for the various projects. Most of the projects outlined in the original programme needed further studies and surveys, several of which have since been completed. Many have been submitted by various engineering consultants of international repute, and are under consideration by the Board. The Board hopes to accelerate the execution of such projects as were planned since it has almost reached the end of the planning stage.

Major projects

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433 One of the main purposes of the Six-Year Plan is to control floods in the Tigris and Euphrates by storing surplus water which can be used for irrigation. An over-all programme has been prepared, at an estimated cost of ID 335 million, providing for the construction of ten dams; 1/ it is expected to increase the cropped area by 75 per cent and raise net annual agricultural income from its present level of ID 62 million to ID 222 million; part of this programme is being implemented under the Six-Year Plan. The plan also provides for industrial expansion, the building of 3,500 kilometres of metalled roads and improvement of a further 3,000 kilometres.

1/ See Knappen, Tippets, Abbott and McCarthy, Report on the Development of the Tigris and Euphrates River Systems (Baghdad, 1954).

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Table 32. Iraq: Revenue and Expenditure of the Development Board, 1951/52 to June 1954

(Thousands of Iraqi dinars)

Item	1951/52	1952/53	1953/54	1954 April to June
Revenue:				
Oil receipts	6,702	22,876	34,824	9,471
Proceeds of loan for Tharthar project	764	1,118	227	49
Miscellaneous receipts ..	1	5	226	95
Total	7,467	23,999	35,277	9,615
Expenditure:				
Development expenditure .	3,131	12,838	7,282	2,116
Net balance of loans and advances	769	6,227	9,799	2,245
Net balance of deposit accounts	- 267	- 2,591	2,676	- 5
Total	3,633	16,474	19,757	4,356
Surplus	3,834	7,525[a]	15,520	5,259

Source: National Bank of Iraq, Quarterly Bulletin, No. 11, July-September 1954 (Baghdad). Figures are provisional returns for fiscal years ending 31 March.

a/ Including ID 5 million transferred to the ordinary budget according to ordinance No. 7 of 1952.

67: United Nations S-S (1945-1954) 1955 MI Middle East
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